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The people that we call the Red-haired or Red Barbarians are one and the same as the Hollanders and
they live on the Western Ocean.
They are greedy and cunning, have ample knowledge of valuable goods, and are skilled at seeking
their own advantage. For profit they do not even hesitate to jeopardise their own lives, and no place
is too distant for them to try and reach it. [...]
Who meets them at sea, will certainly be robbed.
Thai-Wan Hoe Tsi (after Groeneveldt )

Foreword
‘How to create a monster and how to get it back in its cage’ seems to be an appropriate motto
for this research project of mine. Not because the research and the work itself turned out to be
monstrous but because my own ambitions and the ensuing consequences went out of hand.
What started with the idea of reconstructing the shipping history of some VOC ships in the
th century gradually evolved into a systematic study on the whole VOC fleet and their ship-
ping activities in Asia until . I had initially hoped for my research to just shed light on an
underexposed aspect of the Dutch and Asian maritime history, but found wrestling with the
ever growing database of VOC ships in service and the voyages they made. Meant to support
me in the analyses of the development of the shipping network in Asia it turned out to be a
project and a creature in itself. To date it contains more than . records of voyages to about
 individual destinations. Of these, . voyages between  destinations in  Asian
areas are relevant to this study.
Of course, this monster was created voluntarily and primarily nourished by my curiosity to
find out more about the maritime context the VOC ships were operating in. This interest was
sparked already in the ’s during my research work for the Batavia-project, in first The
Netherlands for the ‘replica’ building in Lelystad, and later also in Australia for the Western
Australian Maritime Museum. Since then I have been privileged to be part of various other
projects centred around the activities of VOC in Asian waters of which the Avondster project
in Sri Lanka was the highlight.
I feel privileged not only because I was able to work on exiting projects but above all, because
it brought me in contact with wonderful colleagues many of which have become friends. Here,
I would really like to pay tribute to the team members of the various projects I worked on.
Together with the support of other friends and colleagues from the Western Australian Mari-
time Museum and the Amsterdam Historical Museum the writing of this publication became
an academic adventure rather than the synonym more often used: the lonesome quest.
With so many people supporting my work it is difficult to single out some of them with a
special acknowledgement. Still, there are a few that played a special role in the conception of
this research. First of all, the people that inspired me to start this intellectual journey by stimu-
lating me to look always for a new question behind an answer: Jeremy Green, Bas Kist and of
course my supervisor Leo Noordegraaf. Then, the people who stimulated me to carry on and
made it possible to fulfil this task: Isabelle Garachon, Camille Parthesius, Romain Parthesius.
The support I received in that respect from Pauline Kruseman, director of the Amsterdam His-
torical Museum, was essential and heart warming. Special thanks to Menno Leenstra who be-
came the driving force behind the establishment of the database by continuously collecting
‘trips and ships’ and whose comments and advice were of invaluable importance to me. Het
Centrum voor de studie van de Gouden Eeuw, on instigation of its director Henk van Nierop, sup-
ported me financially to complete the final stage of this research.
Then, there are those who just believed in this endeavour and therefore supported me im-
mensely. There were many but four need to be singled out: Karen Millar, Albert van Nunen
Karioen, Miranda Vos and Patricia Meehan. I also would like to thank Karina Acton, Christine
van der Pijl-Ketel and Fred Lambert for reading the text and correcting ‘my English’.
Although I enjoyed the whole process of this research tremendously, the real delight of the
work laid in the tail end. During the last year, when the writing and deciding on the final draft

of a publication can get a bit complicated, Olive Schmidenberg crossed my path to inspire and
assist me. Shoulder to shoulder we both walked the last miles of our two extraordinary jour-
neys together. Olive had to give up her journey here in July . Her pearls of wisdom and
strength will go a long way. It is to this special friend: Ying Wu, the Chinese plate-spinner that I
dedicate this work.Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
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
Introduction
Dutch ships in Asian waters
From the th century European ships sailed to Asian markets on a regular basis. Their main
goal was the purchase of the highly sought after spices from the East Indies and exotica from
China. Traditional trade and shipping relations between the west and east existed long before
European ships arrived in the Indian Ocean region. Before the Portuguese discovered the sea-
way around the Cape of Good Hope to Asia at the end of the th century, spices reached
Europe over land. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to play an active role in trading
directly with Asia by sea. From their headquarters at Goa on the west coast of India, they tried
to get a grip on the traditional trading and shipping network by capturing the entrepot of
Malacca, which had a strategic role in the Asian trading network between the Indian Ocean
region and the Far East. Spain made its way into this region from their colonies in the Ameri-
cas. The Spanish influence was in the region around the Philippines: China , Japan and the
Spice Islands. At the end of the th century, other European nations also found their way to
Asia.
Soon after the first expedition in , the Dutch were able to surpass the Portuguese and the
other European nations’ trade in Asia. In various Dutch cities, trade companies were estab-
lished to equip ships for their voyages to Asia. This new trade became popular because profit
expectations were high, as a result of which large fleets of ships were sent to Asia. Until ,
when the various companies were united under the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) or
United East Indian Company, fourteen fleets were sent comprising  ships compared to a total
of  ships that had been dispatched by the Portuguese in the period -. Soon more
then % of the European ships that passed the Cape of Good Hope on their way to Asia were
Dutch (Gaastra ).
This development had a major impact on the growth of the Netherlands, although the eco-
nomic contribution to the Golden Age in the th century should not be exaggerated, the logis-
tical implications of the Dutch expansion into Asia were immense and very much evident in the
VOC cities in the Netherlands. Efficient trade was not easy, since the products had to be col-
lected from various parts of Asia, and the means of payment presented a problem. The Euro-
pean traders initially intended to base their trading activities on the available products in
Europe, but they soon found out that there was only a small Asian market for these items.
Large quantities of precious metal were required for the trade in Asia. In order to limit the
complications and risks attendant upon the transport of money, the VOC soon started to devel-
op its intra-Asian trade. The Dutch had to establish their position in the long-standing existing
trade network in Asia. Especially during the early years, the position of the company was one
of skilfully alternating between negotiations and the force of arms. That this policy was success-
ful can be concluded from the fact that the VOC was able to build up a significant capital from
its profits in Asia in the first half of the th century (Meilink-Roelofsz , p. ). In the
second half of the th century the VOC reached the zenith of its intra-Asiatic trade (Gaastra
).
The search for the seaway to Asia was a logical step in the broad and successful tradition of
Dutch shipping in Europe. In the th century, Dutch skippers and their ships held an eminent

position in the European shipping network. Their efficient assimilation into the changing cir-
cumstances in the European shipping trade is seen as the most important quality of the Dutch
shipbuilders and skippers (Davids , pp. -; Unger , pp. -). In the course of the
th century, the traditional sailing areas in northwest Europe were extended to the Atlantic
coast, the Arctic seas, the Mediterranean and, later, also Africa and Brazil. These new destina-
tions meant new sailing conditions and new types of trade and cargo, which in turn led to new
requirements for ships and shipping organisation. New ship types were developed as a result
of a general scaling-up in the second half of the th century. The most famous example of this
development is the development of the flute, which was designed in the s as a new type of
ship for the developing European trade. It met the ideal combined requirements of both the
merchant and the skipper, being cheap to build, easy to sail and having a large cargo capacity.
Changes took place on many levels of the shipping and shipbuilding sectors. Most of these
modifications were not as spectacular as the new flute design; however, the instigation of these
changes was the reason for the success in shipping that the Dutch enjoyed in the th century
(Wegener Sleeswijk ).
Sailing and trading in Asia were new for nearly all the Dutch merchants, skippers and sail-
ors. Although some theoretical information had been gathered by spying on the Portuguese
who had been sailing to Asia from the end of the th century, the practicalities had to be
learned by trial and error.
Purpose of this study: ‘The missing link’
This period in Dutch maritime history has been recognised for its importance and has been the
subject of many publications over the years (Gaastra , pp. -). However, most of these
accounts have dealt with the political and/or economic aspects of the early stages of the Dutch
presence in Asia. The study ‘VOC als zeemacht’ by MacLeod () contains a lot of informa-
tion on the development of shipping in Asia until . Although it was the preliminary goal of
this author to describe the political/military implications of the Dutch expansion in Asia, ex-
haustive listings of departure and arrival dates to illustrate the movements of the VOC officials,
offer an insight into the development of VOC shipping in Asia. This maritime aspect of the
Dutch history in Asia is also known through the many published ship journals. De Linschoten-
vereninging in particular has been very active since  in publishing journals on the voyages
made by VOC ships and skippers. To date, the prevalent view of VOC shipping is based on the
monumental volume ‘Dutch-Asiatic Shipping’ (DAS) by Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer (-
). This work focuses mainly on one aspect of the shipping network, i.e. the route between
Europe and Asia, the so-called Retourvaart (‘return shipping’ or homeward bound shipping).
Shipping within Asia itself is therefore not the main focus of these studies.
Initial investigations into the Asian world behind European-Asian shipping began during
research for the full-size reconstruction of a th century VOC ship. From the mid s, re-
search was carried out for the Batavia, wrecked off the coast of Western Australia in . The
wreck has been the subject of archaeological research by the Western Australian Maritime Mu-
seum in Fremantle since the s (Green ). In , a reconstruction project started in the
Netherlands. Based on archaeological, historical and iconographic evidence interpreted by tra-
ditional shipbuilders, a full size reconstruction was built in the Netherlands (Green & Parthe-
sius ; Parthesius ). The research question addressed an understanding of the design
and construction of the ship. In order to address this, it was necessary to reconstruct the func-
tions of ships like the Batavia and the nautical conditions under which they had to operate. The
work undertaken for the Batavia opened a window on the complexity of the VOC’s intra-Asian
networks, which in turn motivated further exploration and thus led to the present study. The
construction of the ‘biography’ of ships, like the Batavia, through the investigation of the VOC’s
administrative records listing arrivals and departures as well as ships’ journals, correspondence
and many other available sources was expanded over time to other ships and a longer period.
With this initial work on the reconstruction of Asian voyages, the impetus was given for an
extension of the research into Dutch Asiatic shipping.
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
The lacuna in the information in the existing literature on intra-Asian shipping was even
more apparent when the study of the VOC shipwrecks in Galle Bay, Sri Lanka, commenced in
the ’s. The th century shipwrecks of the Avondster (), Hercules () and Dolfijn
(), (of which the first two were located by an international team of historians and archaeol-
ogists), were not part of the shipping between the Netherlands and Asia, but of the intra-Asian
shipping network (Parthesius ; ). For a proper interpretation of the archaeological site,
a better insight into the organisation of intra-Asian shipping was important. The outcome of
this research gradually grew into a database that now contains a large amount of information
on VOC ships and shipping in Asia for the period -. By analysing the development of
the VOC ships in service in Asia up to , the research reported here hopes to reveal the
interesting and complex world behind the better-known return voyages.
To apply these questions to individual VOC, ships, it was first necessary to understand the
total context in which shipping took place. It was, therefore, important to gather detailed infor-
mation about the ships and ship types that were in service and their areas of operation. Bruijn,
Gaastra and Schöffer (-) provided the starting point for ships that sailed for the VOC
between Europe and Asia. However, the expansion of shipping within Asia itself was of crucial
importance to the changes that took place during this period. Therefore, in order to reconstruct
the complete shipping activities of the VOC, the work of these authors had to be extended. The
result was a database of more than , ships’ movements for the period -, which
proved to be a rich source of information on the development of the trade and shipping net-
works of the Dutch in Asia. Information was gathered on  ships that took part in the Asian
trading network in this period. This database includes ships that started their VOC career in
Asia, having been built, captured or bought there. This component of the VOC fleet has not
previously been studied, although it is an important aspect of the VOC organisation. The extent
of this ‘hidden world’ of intra-Asian shipping is demonstrated by the size of the fleet involved
in Dutch-Asiatic shipping and the fleet that served within the Asian network, which is outside
the scope of the Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer study. That work lists  ships up to the year
; the work reported here has identified a further  ships and vessels. These are only those
ships which were of sufficient size to be included in the records of the time under a specific
name. Many other smaller ships and vessels in service of the VOC in this period remain in the
shadows of recorded history. Following this method, statistical information became available
on the development of Dutch shipping in Asia and the composition of their fleet operating in
those waters.
This part of the study was valid as a stand-alone research, but the information gathered
allowed further analyses towards a research question that was partly raised by concurrent his-
torical-archaeological research (Parthesius ). In the second half of the th century, the de-
velopment of the VOC in Asia reached its peak. It was during this period that intra-Asian trade
contributed to a large extent to the economic soundness of the company (Gaastra ). The
success of this hidden world, behind the better-known shipping between Europe and Asia,
gives rise to many questions. The main question simply is: how was the VOC able to achieve
this level of organisational success so far removed from the formal management of the Nether-
lands? Other questions follow: what were the goals of the organisation? What obstacles were
they confronted with in attempting to achieve these goals? How were these obstacles over-
come? What role did the VOC vessels play in the successful development of an extensive net-
work that, in size, exceeded by many times the European shipping network?
This study focuses on the logistical and technical aspects that made the development of trade
and shipping in Asia possible. It examines the development of Dutch shipping in Asia in the
first half of the th century. The aim is to shed light on the way the VOC developed and
managed its complex shipping network and the process by which the VOC gained its experi-
ence and adjusted its fleet to the many requirements linked with trade, military-political activ-
ities and the maintenance of a network of trading posts and strongholds in Asia.
To what extent was the VOC successful in adjusting their fleet to the demands of the overall
organisation and unfolding events in order to conduct their Asiatic operations? The suitability
of a ship for a certain function depended on a complexity of features. In order to track the
development of the fleet fully, it became essential to study the complete range of functions
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possible for a VOC ship. By identifying the specific combinations of requirements and linking
them to the logistical elements of the shipping, the problems the VOC management encoun-
tered in adapting ships for their purposes can be understood beter. Above all, this study hopes
to broaden the European viewpoint on the VOC shipping towards a more inclusive perspective
that will inspire further European-Asian historical-archaeological research into this important
phase of this shared history.
Structure of the book
This study is based on a compiled record, contained within a database of intra-Asian shipping
for the period -. It is important for the reader to understand how the information for
the list of VOC vessels and their voyages has been gathered and structured. Therefore, the
following chapter is dedicated to the database and its design. The research is presented in three
parts. Part  employs a descriptive approach to present a chronological narrative of the growth
and logistical aspects of the VOC organisation and of Dutch shipping in Asia from -.
Part  is a detailed quantitative analysis of information contained in the database, created for
the purposes of this study, and which is intended to provide evidence to support, supplement
or challenge the conclusions that emerge from the standard account. An appendix with the full
list of vessels in service by the VOC during the period under study is included at the end of this
book. The full database will be published separate in an electronic format.
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters

The database and methodology
Introduction
The database was necessary in order to provide the systematic mechanism through which to
fulfil the purposes of this study, and to bring into sharper focus the hitherto obscured story of
Dutch shipping in Asia.
As previously explained, the vehicles of the Dutch expansion and their organisation are the
central theme of this study. Little systematic research has been carried out on VOC shipping in
Asia during the first half of the th century. This study will be a contribution towards closing
this lacuna in our knowledge of the period -. That systematic work on intra-Asian
shipping has not been undertaken previously is partly understandable owing to the proble-
matic nature of many of the available sources. For example, the VOC maintained a separate set
of administrative records for Dutch-Asiatic shipping, the so-called Uitloopboeken,which was the
basis for the Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer (-) work; the VOC’s intra-Asiatic shipping
activities, however, have to be reconstructed from a wide range of administrative and other
sources (like correspondence and daily journals of the trading posts).
A few problems were encountered in constructing a consistent and systematic database for
the voyages in Asia. The VOC organisation was strongly centralised and most of the adminis-
trative documents studied relating to intra-Asian trade passed the desks of the bureaucrats in
Batavia. The elaborate administration was very useful in the reconstruction of this network;
however, one had to be aware that not every ship sailed through Batavia and not every destina-
tion was recorded in Batavia’s administrative records. To address this problem and to fill in
some of the gaps in information wherever possible, the administrative records of other VOC
trading posts were also taken into account.
Fig. .: Schematic structure of the databases: (a) VOC vessels, (b) voyages
The main database consists of two primary structures: the database of ships that lists the VOC
vessels that were both identifiable and in the service of the VOC, and the voyage database that
contains data on departure and arrival destinations. A unique identification number has been
assigned to every ship and every voyage in the database. In addition, the ships database con-
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tains a large amount of data on the size, building year and vessel type. Modules within the
database link the identification number of the voyage, and thus also a specific ship, to informa-
tion (when available) on crew numbers, cargo size and other technical information like arma-
ments and seaworthiness during a certain voyage of such a ship.
Ships in the database
Many new ships were added to the list of VOC ships already known through the research
carried out by Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer (-) in which  ships are recorded leaving
the Netherlands for Asia up to the year . The database contains a further  vessels – a
number that excludes the small vessels not filed in the records under their own specific name.
This extension was mainly possible because the research was carried out from an Asian per-
spective, which revealed ships that never left Europe for the VOC, but were built, bought or
captured in Asia.
The Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer (-) study was very thorough and complete; not a
single ship that left for Asia from the Netherlands was not listed by them. Some small differ-
ences did come to light through the detailed research for the database. These are cases where,
because of the confusing system of naming ships, a particular ship was listed as one vessel
making more than one return voyage, whereas further investigation showed that these were
actually two different ships with the same name. The opposite was also possible where ships
with different names turned out to be one ship that was later renamed.
The th century spelling of vessel names is often arbitrary; therefore, the modern Dutch
spelling is used where possible. The system used by Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer (-)
has been adopted. In the database all the other spelling forms have been preserved in a sepa-
rate field. Other names of the same ship – before the ship was bought or captured by the VOC –
are also included in that field.
Ship types and rates: Classifying the ships
The original indication of the ship-type has been listed in the database. A limited range of
modern terms for a division into general rates and analytical purposes are also given. For ex-
ample, the descriptions chialoup, chaloup, sloep etc., are all replaced by sloep and, in English,
sloop. Often vessels turned out to be listed in the contemporary sources under more then one
type.
From the many resolutions about dispatching vessels to Asia, we know that the VOC consid-
ered various types of vessels suitable for the purposes of their activities. However, understand-
ing the composition of the VOC fleet in Asia and measuring the level of differentiation is not
simply a matter of adopting the archival terminology for the various vessels. One needs to
interpret the available information and design a systematic approach. There is no clear classifi-
cation available because the ships’ construction charters were loosely formulated and the VOC
shipbuilders did not always follow the specifications. Furthermore, the VOC fleet also included
acquired vessels from diverse backgrounds. The features and models of the various terms for
vessels in the th century have been under discussion for a long time, in fact, from the th
century when Witsen () wrote ‘the races of the ships are often very much mixed’. Indeed,
the same VOC vessel often has differing type indications in primary sources. Contemporary
terminology should therefore also be used with caution.
Whilst this study cannot provide a definitive conclusion to this discussion, it can contribute
to a greater understanding by systematising the information for one specific and important
branch of th century shipping, Dutch ships in Asian waters. The detailed analyses of the
information that served as the basis for a classification of rates are explained in Chapter . In
brief, the following steps were taken for this classification: initially all the terms used in the
literature to identify or describe a vessel-type were accepted as a starting point. Refinement
was then based on the tonnage or lastmaat since this can serve as a further indicator of the type
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of vessel and also shows the possible diversity for vessels with the same type-indication. Fea-
tures or functions mentioned in the archives of the shipping history gave further clues for de-
termination of the vessel-types.
By combining data about the type, dimensions and function of the vessel it is possible to
classify the VOC fleet into a specific number of rates. As the demarcation between rates in
some instances is not clear cut, it may be possible in certain cases, to dispute the classification
of a certain vessel as one particular rate or another. However, each rate has its own profile with
its own advantages and shortcomings – properties with which the VOC organisation had to
cope.
Terminological issues
Ships’ dimensions and the ambiguity of the ‘last’
In order to understand the role the various vessel types played in the organisation of the VOC,
it is necessary to know how the fleet was composed and what features made the vessels fit for
certain aspects of the company’s activities. Features like cargo capacity, suitability for certain
routes and destinations, together with military capacity, need to be looked at. An extensive
archive of shipping is available but most of the required information cannot be abstracted di-
rectly from that source. One of the most fundamental features of a ship, i.e. its size, creates the
first problem.
Although the value of lasten was commonly used in the Netherlands in the th century to
indicate the cargo capacity of a ship, this figure certainly was not unambiguous. In that sense, it
resembles the problems we have today with the many definitions of tonnage. The first problem
is that the last itself, used to describe an amount of cargo, was not a clear dimension. It could be
a measure of volume (about  cubic feet or , m) or a measure of weight (about 
pounds or  kilograms). The volume measure was used for light cargoes, where the amount
of space the cargo took in the ship’s hold was important, whilst the weight measure was used
for heavy cargoes. Certainly during the VOC’s development phase in Asia, the Company’s
ships mostly transported relatively light products such as spices. However, these products
were sold by weight. To facilitate the calculation of the necessary space on board,  pounds
were considered a last for pepper and spices. The earliest VOC reference to this issue is in 
(NA .., VOC , fol. ; Stapel , pp.  and ). In later records, the quantities of all
Asian bulk goods were described by the VOC either in their Asian units or in lasten of 
pound. So it came about that the Asian last, and with it the ships’ dimensions described in
Asian lasten, differed from the European definitions. To make the issue even more complex,
the specific use of and temporary modifications to a vessel could also influence the cargo capa-
city. For instance a vessel carrying its cannon down in the hold and with sealed gun ports could
carry much more cargo in terms of weight as well as volume, than the same ship ready for
military use. Reports of problems with ships not being able to use their guns are frequent in
th century shipping sources, not only for war ships, but also for other types of VOC vessels.
Last values in the VOC accounts
If the lastmaat is so ambiguous, the questions that arise are how the VOC dealt with this issue in
their administration. If we assume that the VOC would also have wanted to know about their
cargo capacity, whether it is possible to abstract reliable data from the archival sources. The
lastmaat of a vessel was also used as an administrative value for the authorities. Vessels of a
certain lastmaat were considered to be able to transport that quantity of freight and were taxed
accordingly. This was obvious for vessels operating on the known routes in Europe with fixed
commodities: for instance a ‘grain-flute’ sailing in the Baltic was designed in such a way that
the weight and the volume of the cargo were balanced with sufficient space remaining to ac-
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commodate the crew and their supplies. Since the VOC ships first had to sail to Asia before
they could be employed on a specific route there, this issue was more complicated. The vessels
leaving the Netherlands with large crews and victuals for voyages of many months could use
part of their cargo holds for other commodities. From the perspective of the VOC, it would be
reasonable to record these vessels as having a relatively low number of lasten for their outward-
bound voyages. In Asia however, these ships operated with smaller crews, which would in-
crease the cargo capacity to a realistic rate.
Apart from tax purposes, the lastmaat was also used in the Netherlands by the VOC for inter-
nal administrative purposes to control the agreed distribution of shipping volumes over the
various Chambers. The repartition as decided at the founding of the VOC in , applied to
many of their activities. For the Heren XVII, the distribution of the Chambers’ shares in the
activities was a constant concern. At the same time, the Chambers were dedicated to maximis-
ing their share, for instance by building slightly larger ships. To control this distribution, so-
called egalisaties (equal division) were conducted to compare the last figures of the ships built
and/or dispatched by each of the Chambers. These lasten had to represent the economic advan-
tages of building and equipping ships and the amount of profit from the Asian cargo that
arrived in the chamber. As long as all the ships were built by the VOC and all returned with a
cargo to their port of departure, this system could work with realistic cargo volumes. Problems
arose as soon as ships were bought instead of being built by the VOC and even more so when
vessels remained in Asia. The economic advantage for a certain Chamber would then be mini-
mal. In a number of instances, it was decided that certain ships staying in Asia would not be
included in the egalisaties (NA .., VOC , - (point XI) & - (point VIII) and
NA .., VOC , - (point X)). These resolutions were not executed however and all
the departed vessels were listed in the egalisaties. In general, vessels to be stationed in Asia were
given lower values than their real capacity, especially the flutes. This vessel-type was of light
construction and sailed with small crews, but could take comparatively large cargoes. For these
reasons the economic advantages to a chamber in equipping a flute for an extended stay in Asia
were relatively low. Also, in principle, the flutes would not sail back to Europe. This meant that
the Chamber would not have the economic advantage of a return cargo, which was represented
by an unrealistically low number of lasten in the egalisaties. No flute is recorded in the egalisaties
as more than  last, whereas the real cargo capacity could be as large as  last.
For other ship types, too, the number of lasten in the egalisaties represented the opinions of the
Heren XVII about the economic value for the chamber to which the ship belonged. These ideas
changed regularly and so did the egalisatie values. Illustrative of this are the regular changes in
the lastmaat of the largest rate of vessels, the Retourschepen (homeward-bounders) that sailed
between Europe and Asia. The difference in the VOC’s assigned egalisatie value for the same
ship could amount to more than %. For some of the larger ships, the VOC appears only to
have taken an educated guess about the real cargo capacity after the ship had returned fully
laden from Asia (NA .., VOC , fol. ).
Although egalisatie values for the number of lasten are available for all VOC ships sailing
from the Netherlands, these last values must be considered to be highly unreliable descriptors
of cargo capacity. For more reliable data, one needs to look for a less politically tarnished source
such as the so-called Navale Macht-lists. At least once a year a list of all vessels available to the
Company in Asia, which was named in the correspondence as the Navale Macht (Naval Force),
was sent to the Netherlands. After , most of these lists also show the lastmaten of the ships.
Probably, these are most realistic assessments of cargo carrying capacity, as the authorities had
to use them to calculate the available cargo space.
Apart from these systematic sources, for the determination of the lastmaat for a ship, many
incidental references to ship dimensions in lasten were also used. When such data was found
for certain ships, they were included in the determination of a ‘most probable’ cargo capacity in
lasten. The values found for specific ships in the Navale Macht lists and the incidental data were
also used to calculate more reliable data for comparable vessels for which only numbers of
lasten from the egalisaties are known. It is this ‘most probable’ lastmaat that was used to classify
the vessels in the database and as an instrument to review the total capacity of the VOC fleet.
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For a general comparison with the modern measure of cargo capacity, the ‘tonnage’ the last
value can be multiplied by two.
The structure of the voyages
Shipping destinations, areas and regions
Every destination was initially included in the database under its spelling used in the sources.
To systemise the data without losing information on these names, an additional module was
developed and every separate destination was allocated a -digit code. Historically linked des-
tinations are grouped in  areas with a -digit code, consisting of the first two numbers of the
-digit destination code. These areas are chosen following the terminology in the VOC sources
as much as possible. On the most general level, the areas are grouped in  regions of which the
code only contains one number.
For instance, in Region , the Bay of Bengal, all destinations on the Coast of Coromandel
(Area ) are listed with a -digit code starting with . All twenty-two variations of the spel-
ling of the destination that is now called Pulicat are listed under the Destination . The
largest area is the Strait of Malacca (Area ), ranging from Phuket ( as Udjong Salang) in
the north to Cape Ramunia near modern Singapore ( as Barbequet). VOC ships patrolling
somewhere between these two places are regularly reported in the th century sources as
being in "de strate van Malacca" () without further specification.
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Map .: VOC trading area in Asia with the main shipping Regions
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Map .: Destinations in Java (Region )
This main region is centred around the headquarters VOC Batavia (Jakarta), but also contains other
destinations in and around the Java Sea
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Map .: Destinations on the Arabian Sea (Region )
This main region ranges from the Maldives in the southeast, the west coast of India to Persia and Arabia
in the west.


















Map .: Destinations in the Bay of Bengal (Region )
This main region comprises Sri Lanka (Ceylon) in the southwest, the Coast of Coromandel in the west,
Bengal in the north and the Andaman coast in the east.























Map .: Destinations in Sumatra (Region )
This main region includes the whole of the island except the region of the Strait of Malacca which is part
of the region Strait of Malacca. Within the region there are three principal destinations. In the North
Banda Aceh (Area ), the ports on the west coast (Area ) and the south eastern part of the island
(Area ) .






Strait of Malacca (61)
Map .: Strait of Malacca (Region )
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“Spice Islands” (Banda Sea)
Bali (81)












Map .: Destinations in the ‘Spice Islands Route’ (Region )
This main region encompasses Ambon and Ceram, Banda, and the Moluccas. In this analysis, the desti-
nations and stopovers on the route to the Spice Islands are also considered. This route stretches out from
East Java and Bali, the Lesser Sunda Islands to south-east Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Also destinations
south east of Banda around the Arafura Sea are included.
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Map .: Destinations in the ‘Far East Route’ (Region )
This region centres around Taiwan and Japan as the main destinations. China and the Philippines were
derivative destinations. In this sector, the regions that were located on the route to Japan and Taiwan
could also be independent destinations.
The vessel movements
Since the complete database of ship movements in Asia constructed for this study contains
more then . records about voyages to about  individual destinations, it was important
to group the destinations. For the analyses of the development of VOC shipping in Asia, only
the voyages between two different Asian areas in the network were taken into account/consid-
ered. This approach eliminated short local journeys like, for example, vessels sailing from the
roads of Batavia to the Island Onrust where their repair facilities were housed, or vessels from
the blockade fleet of Goa sailing to Wingurla on the Indian coast to take in supplies.
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As a result, a total of . voyages between  destinations in  Asian areas were ana-
lysed in regard to the development of Dutch shipping in Asian waters until . Grouping the
shipping-areas into main regions allowed both a broader view of fleet differentiations to
emerge and a general overview of the development. However, these parameters could also
obscure important local developments or lend inaccurate statistical weight to vessels that were
just passing through a region. It is obvious that the information on the type of vessels active in
the waters of west Java does not represent the most suitable fleet for this region, but rather the
total VOC fleet, since most vessels would at some stage pass through the Dutch headquarters in
Batavia. To a certain extent, this situation also occurs at other destinations that served as a
junction in the VOC’s shipping network. Often, this problem could be avoided by a well
thought-out composition of the regions. In some cases this was not that easy. Galle is a good
example of a destination that was difficult to place in a certain main region. Its strategic role in
the Indian Ocean routes and monsoon system meant that many ships called there on their
voyages to and from the Arabian Sea. Shipping to that main region therefore is shown in Galle’s
and thus in the Bay of Bengal’s statistics. As a result, the image of the development of shipping
into the Bay of Bengal is distorted by the substantial number of military vessels on their way to
the blockade at Goa that used Galle as an assembly point. On the other hand, if the decision
had been to include Galle in the Arabian Sea region, the statistics would have been skewed by
the groups of small yachts, which were very suitable for the shipping on the Coromandel
Coast, but that where assumed to be unfit to operate in the military hostile waters on the west
coast of India. Most of the shortcomings that are created by the choice of the region boundaries
can be overcome, if in addition to the main destinations, the areas are also considered sepa-
rately (see chapter , ‘Fleets per region’).
In summary, the methodological problems have been addressed by (a) careful categorising;
(b) supplementing the statistical data wherever possible with descriptive information based on
a careful scrutiny of shipping movements in each region, so that the picture that emerges from
the numbers can be qualified, if necessary; and (c) looking at the picture from several angles,
including logistical and organisational perspectives and contextual factors such as the political
background.
Sources contributing to the database
The information on the journeys in the database is derived from various historical sources.
Most of the early voyages (those of the Voorcompagnieën and the VOC till around ) are
described in detail in the publications of the Linschoten-Vereeniging: (Rouffaer IJzerman (,
), Keuning (, , , , , ), Foreest & Booy (, ), Unger (),
Wieder (, ), IJzerman (), Booy (, ), Opstal ().
Most individual trips between destinations could be recorded from these published primary
sources. Only in some cases – mainly the return voyages of the vessels- additional archival
research was required. Some voyages of Dutch vessels, not known through Dutch sources
could be found in the early voyages of the English to Asia published in the Hackluyt-series:
Foster (, a, b, Moreland ().
The journals of the later journeys of Dutch vessels to the Zuidzee, such as the voyages of
Schouten en LeMaire (-) Spilbergen (-), de Nassausche vloot (-) and
Tasman (, / en ) are also published: Engelbrecht & van Herwerden (),
Warnsinck (), Voorbeijtel Cannenburg (), Verseput () and Posthumus Meyes
().
Secondary sources were initially used for the systematic description of the development of
the VOC shipping in Asia after . Many voyages of destinations in Asia could be derived
from: McLeod (), (de Jonge (, , ), Tiele (), Tiele & Heeres, (), Heeres
().
The database was further extended and refined through additional published primarily
sources and further archival research. The complete correspondence of Coen as published by
Colenbrander (-) and Coolhaas (, ) provided information on almost the com-
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plete VOC shipping in Asia for the period  - and -. Batavia’s daily journals
are available from  (Chijs -, Colenbrander -, Heeres , Hullu -
). In these documents the dates of arrival and departure of vessels in Batavia are listed, but
often they also contain information on VOC voyages between other destinations in Asia. Since
this series is not continuous for the whole period some years would consequently be under-
exposed in the database. For these years the ‘letters and papers from Asia to the Heren XVII’
(NA .. (VOC)  – ) have been used to complement the database. The books with
copies of letters sent from Batavia turned out to be a useful source of information on VOC
shipping in Asia. Almost all copy-letters contain information on previous correspondence in-
cluding when and with what ship these letters were sent. Moreover, the partly transcribed and
published ‘General Missives of the Governor-General and Council’ (Coolhaas , , )
contains information on various aspects of the development of the VOC in Asia. This source
covers the period -, but often the exact dates and names of the used ships are not
included in this printed compilation. This source however provided an efficient entry point
and clues to locate the original source.
Also primary and secondary sources of other VOC locations in Asia were studied in order to
counterbalance the predominant ‘Batavia perspective’. An extraordinary source of information
on ‘ships and trips’ are the published daily journals of the castle Zeelandia in Taiwan (Blussé et.
al., , , , ). These records contain detailed information on the shipping of this
region, especially shipping between Taiwan and the Pescadores and more exact data on ship-
ping on the route Batavia-Taiwan-Japan en vv. and the roundtrip Taiwan-Tonkin-Japan-Tai-
wan. Information on the exact arrival and departure dates in Japan in Mulder () could be
complemented by primary sources in the National Archives (NA .., Factory Japan, ).
The extensive description of military activities on the Chinese coast by Groeneveldt ()
provided data for the database for the period till . Secondary sources provide information
on the contacts of the VOC in areas now known as Vietnam and Cambodia (Buch ; Muller
). Information on VOC shipping around the Philippines was found in Sloos () but this
study covers only a short period. The same applies for other secondary sources for other desti-
nations: Terpstra on the VOC establishment in Patani, Coromandel Coast, the Indian subconti-
nent and the Westerkwartieren (Terpstra , , , , ) and also Dunlop () on
Persia. These studies cover mainly the development stage of shipping to these destinations.
This period coincides with the period that the daily journals of Batavia did not exist or have
not survived. This important source provided information for this region for the later period.
The starting point for the reconstruction of VOC shipping around Ceylon was the study of De
Geer (). Archival research on the VOC shipwrecks in the bay of Galle as part of the Avond-
ster project offered more detailed information on shipping between Ceylon and the Indian
coasts. Some references to voyages to specific destinations were found in detailed studies based
on primary sources in the VOC archive, for example: Ayutthaya in Blankwaardt (), Yemen
in Brouwer (), Banda in Chijs (), Borneo in Dijk (), Australia in Heeres (),
Mauritius and Madagascar in Heeringa (), Timor in Roever (), Djambi in Wellan
().
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
Part 
Development of the VOC
shipping network in Asia

3
The Dutch expansion in Asia up to 
The framework for this study is the establishment of Dutch intra-Asian trade and shipping. To
understand the development of Dutch shipping in Asia to its peak in the second half of the th
century, it is necessary to outline the initial development of Dutch-Asiatic trade (Gaastra ).
The Dutch expansion, and the associated growth of the VOC’s Asian shipping networks to
, is segmented into two periods: the establishment of the organisation up to , and the
expansion and consolidation of the VOC network in Asia between  and . Within these
periods various stages can be recognised.
In the first stage of the establishment of the organisation – until around  – Dutch ship-
ping was based on a ‘fleet-organisation’. A fleet equipped and crewed for a voyage of up to two
or three years would sail via the Cape of Good Hope to the Asiatic market. This market encom-
passed the region from the East coast of Africa to the shores of China and Japan. In Asia, the
ships had to sail to several places to obtain the desired commodities before they could return to
Europe. In order to purchase these items, other Asian products were often needed for bartering
purposes, in addition to the silver and cargo brought from Europe.
It soon became clear that this system of ‘returning fleets’ was not efficient for both commer-
cial and technical maritime reasons. Establishing profitable trade relationships required a per-
manent presence at the point of trade so that trade goods could be collected and stored over a
long period of time, placing the merchants in a better position to negotiate prices and quality.
The ultimate goal of the VOC was to gain a monopoly over particular products, which was
only possible if a stronghold was established. Apart from commercial and political considera-
tions, logistical factors played an important role in the changes that took place in the second
stage of the development of the organisation after  to . The VOC was confronted more
frequently with maintenance problems caused by the extensive periods that ships operated in
Asia before the fleets could return to Europe. Relief for the crew on these long voyages was an
additional issue of concern. Often ships had to be laid up temporarily or even abandoned dur-
ing their stay in Asia because of a lack of crew and/or the inability to repair these ships in the
absence of the necessary facilities. Obtaining cargo and then planning how it would be divided
between the ships of the returning fleet became a tour de force for the admiral who was in charge
of the operations in Asia. It became clear to the VOC that there was a need for a rendezvous: a
central place where ships could be repaired; where spare materials and skilled craftsmen could
be available; where refreshments and supplies could be exchanged, since some ships had sur-
pluses that could be used by others; and where ships could bring cargo for collection. On top of
this, any efficient organisation was hindered by the discontinuity of management between suc-
cessive admirals.
In this second stage of the first period, the system gradually changed to a more permanent
presence of VOC ships and personnel in Asiatic waters. A permanent management structure
was established under a governor-general. In , a VOC rendezvous centre was established
at Batavia on the island of Java near the Sunda Strait. In the early s, there was an interest-
ing period of a few years during which the VOC hoped to concentrate on the transport of
goods to Europe and leave most of intra-Asian trade to the traditional and private European
traders who would take the merchandise to Batavia. Trading posts established in previous
periods were closed to save on operational costs. This policy did not seem to be successful and

around  the VOC had to return to their original set-up with a network of trading posts and
strongholds to support strong intra-Asian trade.
By , VOC ships had visited most of the trading areas in Asia. The general characteristic
of the second period (from  till ) was the intensification of the shipping network and
the fine-tuning of the organisation. Up to , there was a rapid expansion of trading settle-
ments, fortifications, the semi-permanent fleet and staff in Asia. When in  the position of
the VOC was consolidated in the eastern parts of Asia, the company then extended its efforts to
the western parts and, around , established a firm position there as well. During the sec-
ond half of the th century, the VOC reached its peak in Asia as a commercial and military
organisation.
Fig. .. Growth of intra-Asian shipping in frequency and volume per ten-year period (<=)
(based Table - (part , chapter ))
It can be seen from figure -, that up to , there was a steep growth in the number of
voyages, consistent with the initial development phase. From  until  there is slower
but steadier growth: the existing network is further developed and intensified. In the period
-, the intensity of the total intra-Asian shipping decreases slightly. If the volume of the
shipping is considered, the same development pattern can be seen, though with some small
deviations. The total volume of shipping grows until , but the percentage increase is less
than the arrivals. After , growth stagnated somewhat, but then there was a steep growth in
the volume again between  and , even though there was only a small increase in the
number of intra-Asian voyages during this period. The volume stabilises again between 
and . The difference between the number of voyages and cargo volume is related to the
introduction of various vessel types; this aspect is explained in relation to the composition of
the VOC fleet in Asia in chapter  and chapter .
The Voor-Compagnieën and the VOC
Dutch shipping to Asia started during the last years of the th century when a direct sea route
from the Netherlands to Asia was opened. After unsuccessful attempts to reach the Asian re-
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gion via the north-east passages, the Dutch overcame their reluctance to follow the same route
as the Portuguese around the Cape of Good Hope. The Portuguese were not just competitors
and were predominantly a military enemy since the Netherlands were entangled in a war of
independence with Spain. This revolt had made the Dutch the enemy of the Portuguese since
Portugal and Spain were united in one royal family. The main concern for Dutch traders and
skippers was to establish direct contact with the area that produced the coveted spices and to
circumvent the existing trade network in and around the Indonesian Archipelago controlled
mainly by Portugal and to a lesser degree by Spain. From the late th century, when the Por-
tuguese opened the direct sea route to Asia around Africa, most spices for the European market
were distributed from Lisbon. In the course of the th century Lisbon’s primacy in that respect
was usurped by Antwerp. In the same period, the Netherlands developed into the main carrier
for Europe and maintained an extensive shipping network. The Dutch were famous for their
flexible and cheap shipping arrangements (De Vries & Van der Woude ). This situation
changed again when Antwerp was occupied by Spanish troops resulting in the blockade of the
entrance to the river Schelde by the Dutch in . Although initially it seemed that Hamburg
would take over Antwerp’s position as the principal supplier of Asian products in north-wes-
tern Europe, it was Amsterdam that eventually became the most important trade centre.
In the s, the conditions to commence trade and shipping directly from the Netherlands
to Asia were most favourable. Despite the war, trade with Portugal continued. The Portuguese
however, were unable to maintain their level of imports from Asia, which caused the price of
pepper to rise exponentially in Europe. This commercially promising situation and other cir-
cumstances in Amsterdam created the incentive to set up the costly and risky enterprise for
direct trade with Asia. The Protestant merchants who had fled Antwerp, brought not only their
capital but above all, their trading contacts abroad and their knowledge of modern trading
methods and organisational forms. In the th century, Amsterdam became a centre of exper-
tise and information from which direct trade with Asia could successfully be developed (Lesger
, pp. -). The well-developed shipping and shipbuilding sector in the Netherlands
could provide suitable ships for such an endeavour. Nautical science had progressed in the
course of the th century and the most able geographers and navigation experts were avail-
able in the Netherlands. An important source of information for the shipping route and the
new trade was the information provided by Jan Huygen van Linschoten. His books Reysges-
chrift and Itinerario contain his collected knowledge and experience from his years of service
with the Portuguese. The cartographer and clergyman Petrus Plancius also played an impor-
tant role in the research and development of the sea routes to Asia.
Java was not yet the primary goal for Dutch shipping in the early s when the first steps
to find a sea road to Asia were taken. The first initiatives were aimed at finding a direct route to
China (the Far East – Areas -) through a northeast passage around Asia. These attempts
were stranded in the polar ice; the passage proving to be impossible for a th century ship.
The ambition to get a grip on the China trade still remained consistent, although at that time it
was overshadowed by the push to develop shipping to other destinations. During this period,
attempts were also made to reach these eastern regions of Asia through the Straits of Magellan
over the Pacific Ocean. Two expeditions were organised in ; one by the Magelhaense Com-
pany, led by Mahu and Cordes, and another, undertaken by Olivier van Noort, which was the
first Dutch voyage around the world. Although respectively Japan (Area ) and the Moluccas
(Area ) were reached by these two expeditions, these routes to Asia were not developed
further after the route around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope) turned out to
be the most feasible sea route to Asia despite the potential for confrontation with the Portu-
guese.
In , the first fleet of four ships sailed to Asia around the Cape of Good Hope. Nine
Amsterdam merchants, united as the Compagnie van Verre (Far Distant Lands Company), raised
, guilders from various investors to fit out four ships and provide the required trading
capital. Setting up an enterprise in a company was a common way at the time to share the
investment and associated risk. On the return of the ships, the whole enterprise was to be liqui-
dated and the anticipated profits would be divided proportionally between the shareholders.
The first expedition was however, not the great commercial success the investors had hoped
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for. The fleet took fifteen months to reach Bantam on Java and failed to reach the Spice Islands.
After three years, the fleet returned with just enough pepper to cover the costs. Lack of experi-
ence combined with the logistical complications of long distance trade and shipping caused
many problems during this first voyage. Of the initial crew of , only  survived and one of
the ships had to be abandoned half way because the fleet did not have enough crewmembers to
man all four ships (Roeper & Wildeman , pp. -).
Nevertheless, the fact that it was possible for Dutch ships to undertake a return voyage to
Asia was a sufficient stimulus for other groups to fit out new fleets. In other cities of the Nether-
lands, in Holland and Zeeland, companies were established and fleets were dispatched for
direct trade with Asia. Between  and  no less than fourteen fleets,  ships in all sailed
to the Asian market. All these companies, later called the Voor-Compagnieën (Pre-Companies),
because they were the forerunners of the VOC, had the same structure as the Compagnie van
Verre. Each voyage was treated as a separate enterprise. The participants or shareholders depos-
ited their investment with the directors of one of the companies. They could not influence the
management of the enterprise. Although in principle no permanent organisation could be built
up, there was still continuity in the activities of the company if the money from one voyage was
reinvested in the next.
The new trade turned out to be so profitable that it almost collapsed under its own success.
The Dutch trading companies were in competition with foreign traders, but at the same time
they were competing with and obstructing each other, causing significant increases in the price
of pepper and spices on the Asian market, whilst bringing down the price in Europe. The result
was a weak economic foundation for what was a risky and costly enterprise. For the Staten
Generaal (States General), the highest body of the then Netherlands Republic, this development
was most unwelcome. They were also concerned about the political-military consequences of
the war against the Iberian enemy in Asian waters. A well organised trading enterprise and a
strong Dutch position in Asia would have its effect on the Spanish-Portuguese power. The
States General had already made an attempt to persuade the merchants into collaboration as
early as . Negotiations turned out to be difficult and slow since there was a lot of distrust
from the smaller cities in the Netherlands towards the dominant position of Amsterdam. It
took until  before the Voor-Compagnieën merged into one company under the full name
Verenigde Nederlandse Geoctroyeerde Oostindische Compagnie (United Netherlands Chartered East
India Company) in this study referred to as the VOC.
The final agreement to establish the VOC represented a political compromise. The VOC was
a decentralised company that resembled the constitution of the Republic of the Seven United
Netherlands, where cities and districts had a high degree of independence. The organisation
was centred round the so-called Kamers (Chambers), representing the cities of the former Voor-
Compagnieën. There were six Chambers: Amsterdam, Zeeland (Middelburg), Hoorn, Enkhui-
zen, Delft and Rotterdam. Each Chamber had its own Board of Directors, with the VOC’s gen-
eral management consisting of a central board of seventeen directors, the so-called Heren Zeven-
tien (Gentlemen of Seventeen). Like the Republic of the Seven United Provinces (Netherlands),
the Chambers also had a great degree of independence. They had their own facilities like ware-
houses and offices and organised auctions of Asian products within the framework of prices
and quantities agreed upon by the central management. However, all the activities of the var-
ious Chambers were dictated by a distribution formula laid down in the VOC Charter. Am-
sterdam represented one-half, Zeeland one-quarter and the smaller Chambers one-sixteenth of
all the activities. Political compromise was also the reason for the remarkable number of seven-
teen central directors. Sixteen directors would have conformed to the distribution formula;
however the fear of Amsterdam assuming a dominant majority position by virtue of its size,
meant that Zeeland and the smaller Chambers had to have a seventeenth director to neutralise
this power. This formula was applied to activities ranging from the building and equipping of
ships to the division of Asian products shipped back to the Netherlands. In the administration
of the VOC, egalisiatie (equalisation) was an important term that created many administrative
and logistical challenges. It was often a complicated management assignment to load the
agreed quantity per formula of the various Asian cargoes onto the ships returning to the re-
spective Chambers. For that reason shipbuilding was very strictly regulated, particularly be-
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cause Chambers that built bigger ships than agreed would have been able to transport a larger
quantity of cargo and earn more profit.
The VOC was supplied with a considerable capital from large and small investors, the total
investment being . million guilders. The VOC is often compared to a modern limited liability
company; indeed, the shareholders were only liable for the amount of their investment. How-
ever, unlike modern companies, the shareholders had little influence over management. The
VOC directors had from time to time to deal with complaints and political opposition. With
some material concessions and political support, this opposition could usually be overcome.
The government had granted an official charter providing the new company with extensive
powers. The organisation and the structure were outlined in  clauses. The States General
transferred important rights to the VOC, basic to which was the sole right to fit ships for trade
east of the Cape of Good Hope or through the Straits of Magellan. Some sovereign rights were
also transferred. The VOC was authorised to make treaties with rulers and states in Asia, to
build fortifications, and to undertake military operations, but they could not operate comple-
tely independently from the Dutch government. VOC senior officials were obliged to swear
their loyalty to the States General and on every return of the ships, a report was to be submitted
about the state of affairs in Asia. The charter of  was granted for  years, thus in  the
VOC had to apply for an extension. On this occasion, some changes were made to the clauses;
as a result of complaints, the shareholders were granted more rights and some restrictions were
imposed on the directors of the VOC. The internal structure with the division of assignments
over the separate Chambers however, remained unchanged. Although every extension of the
charter gave rise to negotiations with the States General, the VOC became a strong and perma-
nent organisation, with a structure that was unprecedented at the time.
Searching for a suitable organisation in Asia up to 
The Dutch, more than their Portuguese, Spanish and English competitors, became deeply in-
volved in the organisation and control of their trade and shipping in the Asian region. This
development was based on the economic-political strategy followed by the Dutch. The VOC
aimed for the control over purchasing of specific products in Asia, hoping to acquire a mono-
poly on particular items such as spices. The general idea was that if they were able to prevent
competition, mainly from the European traders, they would be able to dictate purchase prices,
control the export and therefore also, to a certain extent, the selling prices in Europe. Another
important objective of the VOC was to minimize the import of money from Europe into Asia,
and to fund the operations in Asia and the purchase of the return cargo through intra-Asian
trade. To meet these ambitions, it was essential to participate in the existing trade network in
Asia. An essential pre-condition to this was the availability of local products for the Asian
trade. Most European products, apart from money and bullion, were of minimal value on the
Asian markets or could only be sold in small quantities.
The main goal of the Voor-Compagnieën was purely commercial; nevertheless, they were also
equipped for confrontations with other European nations. They expected a strong Iberian in-
fluence in Asia since the Spanish and the Portuguese controlled important strongholds on the
traditional trading routes. By aiming for the commercial centre, Bantam, on the island of Java,
the Dutch hoped to steer clear of the main Portuguese spheres of influence, like Goa and Ma-
lacca. Bantam seemed to be the ideal place to set up trade because of its long history as a centre
for pepper and spice trade and its international contacts, for example, with the Chinese traders.
The Dutch, however, were misinformed and found out on arrival that Portuguese merchants
were present in Bantam. But the Portuguese power in most places in Asia was not absolute,
and in Bantam it was very limited; in fact they were just one of the trading nations in Bantam
and in that sense were equal to the Dutch. Until the arrival of other European nations in Asia,
there was no need for the Portuguese to establish a firm position there. As Spain and Portugal
were the only nations already trading in Asia, they maintained strict control over their regional
market. With the arrival of competition in that market their only recourse was to the strong
political influence that they wielded in order to attempt to disadvantage the Dutch merchants.
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This kind of political conspiracy made it clear that a purely commercial trade arrangement
would be impossible and that violence and confrontation would be inevitable, not least because
the Dutch government was in favour of exporting the war against the Spanish and their allies to
Asia. Notwithstanding this, the directors of the Voor-Compagnieën could not be persuaded to
organise military action in Asia. On a more practical level however, the Dutch ships’ crews
were quite keen to attack the Spanish and the Portuguese for their often very lucrative loot.
The Dutch government sanctioned the capture of enemy ships and the division of a part of the
spoils amongst the crew. Soon the capture of ships became an important strategy of Dutch-
Asian trade: the capture of Portuguese ships proved to be a rich source of commodities such as
porcelain from China. Sometimes, the Admiral appointed by the directors of the VOC as the
commander of a fleet, could decide to use violence against the enemies of the local rulers with
whom he was in negotiation about a trade contract, especially if the Portuguese were these
enemies or allied with them. It is interesting to realise that inter-European relationships were
sometimes somewhat confusing from the Asian perspective. Often, the Dutch had to prove
their independence from their fellow Europeans, the Portuguese.
The active and also passive military support of local rulers turned out to be a useful tool both
in cementing Asian relationships and at the same time fighting the competition. In  Admir-
al Steven van der Haghen assisted a local ruler in Ambon in his fight against the Portuguese in
exchange for an exclusive trade contract in cloves. In reaction, the Portuguese sent a war fleet
from Goa. They encountered with Dutch ships in the waters of Bantam. The Dutch won this
first full-scale sea battle between European powers in Asia, but temporarily lost their strong-
hold on Ambon.
Shipping from the Netherlands to Asia had grown so rapidly that competition between the
various Dutch companies also created problems in Asia. The competition between the many
Dutch ships arriving in the same period drove prices up, while the prices in the Netherlands
were under pressure when the supply of goods for auction sometimes turned out to be over-
whelming. This, together with the desire of the Dutch government to organise military action in
Asia, formed the background to the pressure the Government put on the various companies to
unite under the banner of the VOC. In March  the Dutch State granted the VOC the rights
to all trade and shipping in Asia.
The policy towards the Portuguese and Spanish opponents changed with the establishment
of the VOC. The Admirals of the first VOC fleets were sent off with instructions to provoke the
enemy. The general aim of the VOC directors was to have outward-bound fleets attack the
important Portuguese strongholds on their way to Asia. Once in Asia, they were expected to
trade and return to the Republic. The first four fleets of the VOC (-) had first to lay
siege to Mozambique, Goa and Malacca before they could then attack the Portuguese fortifica-
tions at Ambon, and the Moluccas. It was clear that this plan was overly ambitious. Even if an
attack was successful, it was difficult to sustain the new position of power. Every time they
captured a Portuguese stronghold, as was the case in  at Ambon and in  at the Moluc-
cas, the VOC had serious difficulties defending these places after the ships left for Europe.
The VOC had to change their policy or their organisation in order to be successful in their
attempts to monopolise the important spice trade. Not all the VOC investors supported this
aggressive policy of the first years. Some of them objected to the excessive force of violence for
religious reasons; others were just concerned about the commercial effects of this policy (Wes-
tera ). The essential difference from the earlier practices of the Voor-Compagnieën was that
finances were not settled at the end of every expedition; the directors could now reinvest any
profit in a new equipage. In reality, this meant that the participants did not see any returns
from their investments for many years. The opposition to use the VOC as an extension of the
State policy against the Iberian enemy was growing. When in  the Republic signed a sus-
pension of arms with Spain that excluded Asia, the government was forced to support the VOC
in the continuation of hostilities on the other side of the world. They provided ships and arma-
ments, but more importantly, they protected the VOC against their own investors who had
become dissatisfied with the low return on their investments and were even calling for the
VOC to be disbanded. The government’s support gave the directors the space to make changes
in the organisation of the VOC.
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Building a permanent structure in Asia up to 
The political structure
Around  the VOC organisation was transformed from a ‘floating structure’ to a more per-
manent establishment. Until then, the execution of the VOC’s activities in Asia were in the
hands of the Admirals of the successive fleets. This system could easily lead to inefficient man-
agement of an already complex organisation. It was almost impossible for the arriving Admiral
to get a good overview of the whereabouts of the fleets and merchants. In this way it was very
difficult to build up a position on the Asian market and to maintain a power base. Passing trade
was not profitable and it was very hard to develop relationships with the local rulers.
The solution to these problems came with the establishment of a permanent presence and
structure in Asia. As early as  on the Spice Islands and  in Bantam, staff members
were left behind to organise trade in the absence of the fleet. In , Wybrand van Warwyck,
the Admiral of the first VOC fleet, was allocated a stone building and a yard in a central posi-
tion in Bantam. In fact, he established the first VOC headquarters in Asia with a mission head
and a council. His instructions were to organise trade and shipping, to oversee administrative
processes but also to hinder the Portuguese and to make preparations for Dutch families to be
housed (NA .., VOC , fol. , ). From , the VOC appointed a Governor-General
as the highest authority in Asia. The Governor-General was the head of a Raad van Indië (Coun-
cil of the Indies) that formed the delegated government to oversee the interests of the VOC.
In addition to pepper, the core business of the VOC was the trade in spices from the islands
of the eastern archipelago. The main assignment of the first Governor-Generals, Pieter Both
(-), Gerard Reynst (-) and Laurens Reael (-), was to obtain a mono-
poly on spices. They were allowed to sign treaties but could also use force if that was thought
to be appropriate. Through the earlier treaties made by various Admirals before , the VOC
had the exclusive rights to buy cloves, nutmeg and mace. Since both the formal partners and
legal background of the contracts were disputable, it was very difficult to exercise these formal
rights. The VOC had to get heavily involved in local politics on the Spice Islands and the use of
force became part of their trade policy in this area, a situation that did not always sit comforta-
bly with all the VOC directors. Violence against the Portuguese and Spaniards in Asia was not
an issue since the truce, that prevented a military confrontation in Europe, excluded Asia. The
Spaniards were heavily attacked on the Moluccas and some military expeditions were sent to
the Philippines in . Fighting another European competitor, the English East India Com-
pany, was more complicated. Although, in the opinion of the VOC, they also violated their
rights, since they refused to recognise the VOC’s claims in this area, the directors in the Repub-
lic were not keen to use the force of arms against them because they did not want to lose the
support of England in the European political arena. Instead of fighting them an attempt was
made to turn the English competitors into partners.
Governor-General Reael was not unsympathetic to such a solution. One of his council mem-
bers, Jan Pieterzoon Coen, as Director General responsible for the trade policy of the VOC in
Asia, had other ideas: his ambition to rule out all foreign shipping around the Spice Islands
allowed little room for such co-operation. On the contrary, his policy was to head for a violent
confrontation. The English East India Company had supplied local rulers with weapons and in
 the capture of English ships led to direct conflict.
The relationship with the Asian nations was no less complicated and full of dilemmas. If the
VOC followed their strategy of banning all foreign shipping, they would also cut the region off
from the traditional Asian shipping and trade. The Dutch would hardly be able to replace this
lifeline of the inhabitants of the Spice Islands to essential supplies and import products. The
local rulers would also not be pleased to lose their income through taxes on this trade. Once
again the Governor-General Reael and the VOC directors in the Netherlands had conflicting
opinions: Reael felt that by enforcing this ban on the region, the VOC would damage itself. He
predicted serious economic consequences for the whole region if indeed the VOC failed to take
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over the role of the foreign traders (Coolhaas , pp. -). The VOC, convinced that he was
the right person to implement the VOC strategy in Asia; they appointed him Governor-General
in , a step that would prove to be a turning point for the organisation in Asia to a hard-
line approach. Coen’s opinion had been clear for some time: ‘Trade without war, and war with-
out trade cannot be maintained’. He had therefore already been requesting the means and the
money from the Netherlands for some time to pursue his philosophy. Coen’s view was that if
the Governor-General did not have the means to fight, then he would not have the capital to
trade. If there was enough budget available in Asia, it would be possible ‘[…]with the fruit of
the same [trade capital] to maintain all the forts, trade posts, ships […] soldiers and garrisons
that the gentleman have in Indië’ (Colenbrander , p ).
Coen was a dynamic manager but had a talent for making himself very unpopular. At the
end of  hostilities broke out between the English East India Company and the VOC after
four English ships were captured in  and  near the Spice Islands. The English sent a
fleet in retaliation to Bantam and Jayakarta (then still a small trading post). In the confrontation
that followed, Coen defeated the English and took advantage of the situation to take Jayakarta
and transform Batavia into the rendezvous for which the VOC had long been searching.
Although the relationship with the rulers of Bantam had not been very warm up to that time,
from then onwards, when the VOC became sovereign in the region, Coen ran into direct con-
flict with the neighbours of the Dutch settlement. Consequently, the VOC periodically blocked
the port of Bantam until . On land, Coen had also to defend the position of his newly
established VOC headquarters against the state of Mataram, who controlled the main areas of
Java and Madura. The raids on Batavia in - especially threatened the position of the
headquarters of the VOC in Asia. It took until  before the VOC could develop friendly
relations with the sultanate of Mataram.
Coen could not benefit from his victory over the English fleet in . The VOC directors had
decided that instead of fighting the influence of the English, the English East India Company
and the VOC had to join forces in the development of the trade in Asia at the expense of the
Iberians. Costs and profits were to be shared on a proportional basis. This set-up was not very
sound, since the VOC was much stronger than the English East India Company. It was very
difficult for the English to meet their obligation to provide ships for military actions in the early
s to the Philippines and to the Arabian Sea. The VOC was also not very keen to stick to the
treaty, and the promised spices were only provided in dribbles. In  this cooperative ar-
rangement came to an end.
The practical organisation: ‘round-trading-tours through Asia’ and the start of the
shipping network before 
In the period before the establishment of the central emporium, Batavia, in , Bantam
served as the logistical centre for the VOC. The main role of the VOC organisation in Bantam
was to direct the trade and shipping in Asia and to organise the return cargo for the Euro-
pean market. It was not always easy to combine all the aspects of trade and shipping and to
fulfil all the ambitions of the organisation. The VOC directors in the Netherlands were very
demanding: they were aiming for self-contained Asian trade and shipping and on top of this it
had to be profitable enough to cover the costs of the return cargo for the European market .
Initially, the VOC’s trading activities were aimed at obtaining pepper and spices for the Euro-
pean market, but gradually they came to understand that in order to make the Asian trade
profitable, they had to become involved in the Asian trade system itself. This forced them to
trade in products that were not originally meant for the European market. In the first twenty
years many ships had to sail around the region to trade and collect cargo in various places
before the return cargo was finally assembled and the ship could sail back to Europe. During
the first years of the VOC, the directors had recognised the importance of the intra-Asiatic
trade. In this period in Asia, the VOC had learnt the importance of textiles as ‘currency’ in
intra-Asian trade. The set-up of this intra-Asian trade also required adaptations to the logistical
organisation. In the s, when the VOC was engaged in setting up a permanent organisation
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in Asia but did not have a firm basis of operation to work from, the problems they encountered
to combine trade and military actions are apparent. It is interesting to note that in this period
the Governor-General often operated from the Spice Islands, using this area as the centre for
political and military decision making; while the Director responsible for shipping and trade
had his base in Bantam on the island of Java, a more central location that was accessible the
year round.
A so-called retourvloot (returning fleet or homeward bound fleet) sailed back to the Nether-
lands annually. At first, ships sailed back alone or in small fleets, but later the VOC organised
the return voyages in larger fleets only. Around , various ships had to abort their return
trip to Europe or were even lost, because of their poor condition after their long service in
tropical waters. Initially, the VOC directors were in favour of sending ships to Europe as soon
as they were loaded, thus avoiding further weakening of the ships that had already been in the
tropical waters for a long time. Soon they realised that better regulations could create greater
advantages. Sailing in a fleet provided better support in the event that ships lost part of their
rigging, were leaking or ran into other problems during their trip over the Indian and Atlantic
Oceans. Around  those problems were mostly solved because the ships were better
adapted to their more specialist function and they also had a faster turn-around time in Bata-
via. They were not often employed to sail on an intra-Asiatic route before they sailed home, as
was common before . However, ships were still sent in convoy for mutual assistance but
above all to make sure that all skippers stuck to the agreed route and sailing scheme that would
bring the ships back in Europe before the Autumn.
The VOC’s administration in Batavia endeavoured to dispatch a fleet around New Year for
arrival in the Netherlands in the European summer. This was not an easy task since they had to
deal with many variables, such as gathering the return cargo, planning the supply from the
various trading posts and allowing enough capacity to ship the goods to Batavia. Shipping
was organised in such a way that the various routes were synchronised; however, delays could
easily occur as shipping routes were often subject to the monsoon. It frequently happened that
the return fleet was delayed, waiting for other vessels to arrive from their various departure
points. In the end, final decisions were based on economic considerations above regulations: to
keep a fleet waiting created extra costs and risks, so sending the ships off on time was the usual
choice. However, if cargo for Europe arrived too late from an Asian destination, storage in
Batavia until the next return fleet meant more expenditure. The net result was that, although it
was forbidden, ships were dispatched to Europe in the few months after the fleet had departed
almost every year.
The decentralised organisation of the VOC and specific demands from the Netherlands made
the job of the directors in Batavia even more complex. They had to make sure that the requested
volume of cargo was transported, but also that the volume was divided between the ships of
the specific Chambers (Kamers) of the VOC in the Netherlands. They had to endeavour to en-
sure that the cargo on a ship sailing back to Amsterdam, Zeeland or one of the other cities
represented the correct ratio for the internal distribution of cargo. It was also important that
the ships arrived in the Netherlands in the late summer, before the start of the stormy season,
at a favourable time for the auctions but still with opportunities for ongoing transport connec-
tions within Europe.
An attempt to reorganise the Asian trade and shipping: -
Developments up to  laid the groundwork for the growth of an extensive network in Asia.
In regions like the Spice Islands, the VOC was able to establish a firm position that allowed
them to dictate trade and shipping. Governor-General Coen’s determined objective was to ex-
tend his influence militarily into Spanish and Portuguese controlled areas, but it became clear
that success would come at a price with ramifications for trade and shipping. It seems that the
VOC had over-estimated its capabilities and was forced to make fundamental decisions about
the organisation of trade and shipping in Asia.
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As part of the (mutually reluctant) cooperation with the English, a ‘fleet of defence’ was sent
to the Philippines in . Although the booty captured from the Chinese junks was substan-
tial, the combined action against the Spaniards was not very successful and the alliance soon
broke up. Other VOC ships were then employed directly on the coast of China to break open
the Chinese market. So, once again, fewer ships were available or suitable for regular trade.
This situation became worse when attacks on Portuguese strongholds intensified again after
the end of the truce that had lasted for  years. At the same time, expansion of the many
trading posts was also responsible for a rise in operational costs. It was obvious by then that
not all the VOC’s ambitions could be fulfilled and that decisions had to be made to reduce costs.
On Coen’s advice, the VOC tried to concentrate on the shipping of cargo to Europe, leaving the
intra-Asian trade to local traders and the private European operators. Even the monopoly on
trade in the Spice Islands was no longer sacred. In a letter from , Coen suggested to the
VOC directors that Ambon could be used as an emporium where locals and traders from the
Orient could bring items from the Chinese trade to be shipped to the Netherlands, thus reliev-
ing the VOC of many expenses. For other destinations, too, he hoped to arrange affairs in such
a way that ‘many Indians would sail for us and thus [that we], without investments and adven-
tures, enjoy a fair amount of their profit’ (Colenbrander , p. ).
Coen was reluctant to recommend that European private traders (vrijburgers or vrijlieden)
operate in Asia because, in his opinion, this group consisted merely of ‘scum’. Still the VOC
could not ignore this growing group of vrijburgers, mostly former VOC employees who stayed
in Asia after they had served their contracts. In order to organise the private trade for the
future, Coen recommended establishing colonies of good officers and reputable families who
would, together with slaves, be able to organise affairs in Asia (Colenbrander , p. ). His
successor, Pieter De Carpentier, extended this policy to include the role of private traders and
wrote to the VOC directors in the Netherlands: ‘Liberate all trade also for the vrijlieden, except
for the Spice Island, Paleacatte (Coromandel Coast) and the Chinese and Persian silk and indi-
go. Through a price policy and by force at sea, the trade should be directed to Batavia, which
means that then many trade posts could be lifted’ (Coolhaas , p. ). The initiative to set
up this policy to stimulate a colony of vrijburgers with associated opportunities for free trade
was taken by Coen before he left Asia for Europe in . It was clearly not yet an official
policy, but pending a formal decision, the developments were tolerated. On his return to the
Netherlands, he was able to present his plans to the directors of the VOC for the restructure of
the organisation in Asia onto a ‘new footing’. Initially, Coen could count on sympathy for these
plans and some of his suggestions were followed up. On the instructions of the directors in the
Netherlands, large ships were only to be used for the return shipping between Europe and
Asia, whilst yachts were to be used in Asia. Using these specific vessels, proportionally
equipped by the VOC Chambers in the Netherlands, would also help the management in Asia
to follow the proportional division of return-cargo between the various Chambers (Colenbran-
der , p. ). Coen also suggested opening a direct link with Surat and the Coromandel
Coast from the European Chambers (Colenbrander , p. ). The directors followed this
advice by sending several ships directly to Surat in this period. As a consequence of this
policy, most trading posts could be closed. Coen advised that only Surat, Coromandel, Japan
and Solor should be continued – as long as the private traders did not take over the trade in
sandalwood.
In , the trading posts in Patani, Sangora (north of Patani), Siam, Cambodia and Atchin
were closed. During this period, various initiatives by European private traders to develop
shipping on these routes can be seen. For example, in , vrijlieden sent various ships ‘with
special commission and permission’ to places like Jambi, Siam and Patani to set up trade, and bring
the most sought after food supplies to Batavia (Heeres , pp. , ). Even the trade to
Coromandel was released by the VOC on condition that the private traders paid appropriate
customs duty (Colenbrander , p. ).
Gradually however, opposition to these plans arose. Coen ended up in a highly political
power game over his ‘new footing’ policy. The political arena included, apart from the Heren
XVII, Reael as former Governor-General opposing the plans of his successor, a group of active
dolerende (dissenting) shareholders, complaining officials in Asia and the Dutch government.
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
Under discussion was the question of whether private traders should be given access to infra-
structure developed for the Asian trade that had been funded by investments made by the
VOC shareholders and the Dutch state. Efforts by the government to get involved generally
resulted in unwillingness by the VOC directors to bring the decision-making process to a con-
clusion. When Coen left the Netherlands in  to serve his second term as Governor-General
he was no longer seen as a promising talent who could reorganise the VOC organisation in
Asia. Instead he was rendered powerless in his decision-making capacity when his proposal
for the ‘new footing’ was finally turned down at the end of . From then on the vrijlieden
were banned from the most lucrative trade in Asia and the VOC would build further on intra-
Asian trade that proved to be very profitable indeed.
The expansion of the VOC network up to 
After  the VOC network in Asia was in place but it would still take many years and a lot of
effort to establish the organisation that led to the strong position of the VOC in Asia. There was
no systematic approach to this development. Progress was dependant on the local situation as
well as the available means. An understanding of this progression is important for further ana-
lysis of VOC shipping to .
The situation in the eastern region
The focus of the intra-Asiatic trade around  remained the Spice Islands – Ambon, Banda
and the Moluccas – in the eastern part of the Indonesian Archipelago. The eastern Banda Island
group was the only place where nutmeg was grown and harvested in the th century. The
original population of the island had been completely annihilated by the VOC and replaced by
a newly imported populace who were only allowed to sell nutmeg and its by-product, mace, to
the VOC. Ambon was the island from which the VOC tried to control the clove trade, which
was much more difficult to regulate than nutmeg..
Most of the European return-cargo, besides pepper, came from this area. Sailing from Batavia
to the Spice Islands was only possible between late October and early March. Return trips were
only possible between April and early October. On this route Timor and Solor, close to Java,
were separate destinations instead of stopovers.
Since this route to the Spice Islands was so important for trade and so monsoon-dependent,
the VOC experimented with sailing off-season using smaller ships, or on an alternative route,
south of Java or west and north of Sulawesi. These attempts never lead to regular, commer-
cially feasible shipping off-season.
Before , it was difficult for the VOC to enforce their desired monopoly over mace and
nutmeg on the rulers and inhabitants of the Banda Islands. The VOC directors in the Nether-
lands were in favour of an aggressive policy but they hesitated to order a large-scale operation
against the local rulers in this region. The effectiveness of a policy that did not have the coop-
eration of the local rulers was questioned (Coolhaas , p. ). In earlier days, the main strat-
egy was to put a blockade on trade and shipping, which was, in itself, already harmful to the
Banda islanders. However, after Coen was appointed Governor-General, things took a dra-
matic turn for the local population. In  a military expedition consisting of  soldiers
overran the main centres on Banda. By replacing the existing inhabitants with a VOC selected
population, the absolute monopoly on mace and nutmeg was achieved. The traditional island
community ceased to exist.
For the monopoly on cloves, Coen followed another policy. Cloves were grown over a large
area of many islands near Ambon (Ceram) as well as in the North-Moluccas. Coen negotiated a
treaty with the ruler of Ternate, who had nominal authority over large parts of this area; this
treaty was forced upon all his subjects and at the same time all clove shipments not exported by
the VOC were declared illegal. In the s, Coen organised the hongi expeditions to destroy
clove trees and other crops on the Moluccas. He had hoped to make the ‘illegal’ production of
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cloves impossible. In practice, it turned out to be very difficult to control the region and the so-
called illegal trade. On Ambon, the VOC forced the locals to assist in the hongi-expeditions and
to sell the cloves on VOC conditions. The strategy failed and the result was a long-lasting state
of war with the Ambonese. Eventually, in  the VOC was able to achieve its goal of a mono-
poly over cloves but again only after first destroying the original population.
Bali (81)














Map .: The region of the Spice Islands indicating the routes and monsoon winds.
The north-eastern region: China, Taiwan and Japan
The ‘Far East’ included destinations north-east of Singapore around the South China Sea like
Patani, Siam, Vietnam, the South Chinese coast and Taiwan with the Korean peninsula and
Japan as the most distant. The Chinese market was another focus of the VOC right from the
start of Asian shipping. Expectations for this market were high. The hope was that the silk
trade with Japan would be sufficient to finance the whole VOC trade in Asia (Colenbrander
, p. ; Colenbrander , p. ). A number of nations conducted trade in Chinese prod-
ucts. The Portuguese transported merchandise from Macao to the European market via Malac-
ca and Goa. The Spaniards had their cargo transported by Chinese Junks to the Philippines
from where it was shipped by galleons to Mexico. From the Mexican east coast it was taken
over land to the west coast and over the Atlantic Ocean to Spain. the Chinese themselves
traded directly with Indonesia and Malaysia. Portuguese, Spanish and Japanese traders were
active along the coasts of Malacca via Siam and Vietnam to Japan.
The VOC wanted to trade directly with the Chinese but access to the Chinese market was
very restricted (prohibited by the Ming court) and the Portuguese were also very successful in
obstructing the Dutch attempts. On the first visit by the Dutch in  the Portuguese, fearing
for their position, had the Dutchmen hung on the pretext that they were pirates (NA ..,
Voorcompagniëen, ). This pretence seemed to have been something of a self-fulfilling pro-
phecy, since the Dutch realised that the best method to acquire Chinese merchandise was in fact
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to capture the vessels, sailing for the Spanish and Portuguese, carrying these goods. Large prof-
its were made from cargo captured from Chinese junks on their way to the Philippines. These
captured products allowed the VOC an active role on the Japanese market, but excluded them























Map .: The north-eastern region, indicating the shipping routes
The VOC followed an aggressive policy trying to break into the Chinese market. Confident due
to the VOC successes at Banda, Coen dispatched a heavily armed fleet to the Far East. How-
ever, a raid in  at Macao failed completely. Eventually, the VOC could do no more than try
to set up a blockade at Macao and launch some scattered attacks on other locations on the
Chinese coast. In , a large Chinese fleet surrounded the established VOC stronghold on
the Pescadores. The superior strength of the Chinese forced the VOC to move their centre of
activities in this region to Taiwan (Formosa) from where the VOC continued their attempts to
take part in the Chinese trade. In  a last unsuccessful attempt was made to defeat the
Chinese navy. Taiwan served for a substantial period as an indirect link to the Chinese market
although officially the Chinese forbade this. However, supply was unreliable and subject to the
vagaries of the political situation in China. Changes in the Chinese regime eventually forced the
VOC from Taiwan in .
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From  the Dutch gradually gained great economic strength through their position in
Japan. Apart from a short period between  and , when the Dutch were in conflict with
the Japanese authorities on account of Taiwan, the VOC was privileged above the other Euro-
pean nations. After the Tokugawa dynasty isolated itself from the outside world in , they
were the only Europeans allowed to trade with Japan. The Japanese authorities prohibited their
people to travel to other countries. They were afraid that Japanese society would be contami-
nated by foreign (i.e. Christian) ideas. Since Chinese traders were also obstructed in both Japan
and China, the Dutch were virtually the only foreign traders with access to Japan, under ex-
treme restricted conditions (were confined to a artificial island off Nagasaki, Deshima). Japa-
nese silver, copper and gold were important products on the Asian market and the Dutch had
an advantage over their competitors in that they did not need to transport all these precious
metals from Europe for trading purposes. Japanese precious metals, traded for silk and lux-
ury items, were used to purchase textiles from India; these formed the most important barter-
ing products for pepper and spices. This system formed a very lucrative profit cycle even
though the Dutch did not control prices on the Japanese market.
The situation in the western region
The western region is comprised of the important trade area of the Bay of Bengal with the Coast
of Coromandel on the east coast of India and Ceylon in the south. The second important part of


















Map .: The western region: Bay of Bengal, indicating the shipping routes.
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Textiles from India were of substantial importance when bartering for many products in Asia.
The earliest lasting contacts were on the Coromandel Coast where the influence of the Portu-
guese was not as strong as on the west coast. Trading posts around India were established from
the early th century including a long strip along the Coromandel Coast where the VOC es-
tablished various trading posts and strongholds to secure trade. The important textile factory
on the northern coast in Masulipatnam was established in . The VOC Governor for the
Coromandel had his residence in Palecatte (Pulicat) on the south coast, which also served as
the VOC headquarters for the region until . The Dutch had to fight many European com-
petitors to protect this essential trade. An almost constant state of war with the Portuguese
prevailed. This and the internal conflicts between the local rulers, forced the VOC to organise
their trade from strongholds like the fort Geldria in Paleacatte, built in  with the consent of
the local ruler. The town and the fort of Nagapatnam were captured from the Portuguese in
. The ramparts and most of the houses were destroyed in  by what might have been a
tsunami. The VOC built an impressive fort on the ruins and this became the new headquarters
for the VOC presence on the Coast after . The military action of  organised by Van
Goens as military commander in the region finally removed the Portuguese from Ceylon,
and reinforced the VOC’s position on the Coast of Coromandel.
Another important centre for textiles in this region was Bengal, located on the delta of the
river Ganges. The Dutch had already explored Bengal for trading purposes in , but it took
until the late s before the VOC established trade relations there on a large scale. The Mon-
gols, the rulers of Bengal, granted the European companies trade concessions. Once in position,
it was important for the Europeans to maintain diplomacy in the form of embassies to the Great
Mongol. Since , the VOC had established itself deep inland in Chinsura near Hooghly. It
was very difficult for larger ships to reach this place. Apart from textiles, other important com-
modities were silk, opium and sugar. Saltpetre was a key raw material for the production of
gunpowder and was also used as paying ballast. The VOC managed to get a foothold in Arra-
can (the modern Myanmar) after . The VOC exports from this area were mostly slaves and
rice.
Although several attempts were made in the earlier period, it was only in the s, that the
VOC considered establishing a land-based military operation in Ceylon. Until then, the VOC
could not do much more than patrol and capture Portuguese ships in the region around Galle.
In , a contract was signed between the King of Kandy, Radja Singa, and the VOC for mili-
tary assistance in removing the Portuguese from Ceylon. As a reward, the VOC were to get
trade privileges. Trade items controlled by the King, like elephants and cinnamon, were to
cover the expenses of the military operation. The Dutch finally succeeded in capturing Galle
from the Portuguese in . During the s and ‘s the VOC was able to take control of
the coastal area from the Portuguese. Radja Singa had hoped to remove or take over the Portu-
guese fortifications, but the Dutch retained them as a pledge against the payment of expenses.
That proved of course to be a two-edged sword, since the debt was set at so high a price that
the King was by no means able to meet it. Very disappointed, Radja Singa had to conclude that
the assistance by the Dutch in regaining authority over the coastal areas of Ceylon had changed
nothing for Ceylon other than the nationality of the occupier: they had simply replaced chilli
for ginger!
Ceylon played an important role in regional trade and shipping. For some years in the sec-
ond half of the th century, when a direct shipping link was operative with Euorpe, Ceylon
was also able to play an intercontinental role under the dynamic leadership of Rijcklof van
Goens Sr. This direct link reflected the central role of Ceylon in the trade of Coromandel, Surat,
Arabia and Persia.
In their search for textiles, the VOC also expanded their activities to the other side of India.
The Portuguese had their powerbase in this sector and establishing trade connections was
therefore more of a risky business for the VOC. In Surat in the north (around the modern Gu-
jarat), they could only do so with the permission of the local ruler, the Great Mongol. This
centre for textiles had already been visited in , but it took until  before the VOC was
able to set up a trading post there. Once again, diplomacy was essential to retaining the trade
concessions and reinforcing the VOC’s position against other competitors. During the s,
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the merchant Francisco Pelsaert, stationed in Surat and Agra at that time, and a man who ap-
parently understood the importance of correct protocol, wrote to the VOC recommending lux-
ury items to send from Europe. He observed the surprise by the rulers that the VOC had gold
and silver manufactured into articles that were in common use in India:
‘It would be well therefore, for the first trial, to manufacture such goods as the following
to the value of  to  reals-of-eight, and to the same amount in gold: feet for
kettles, or bedsteads, hollow, and as light as possible, but artistically wrought. Aftabas,
or ewers used by Moslems for washing their hands. Betel boxes Fan handles, handles for
fly-switches. Dishes and cups with covers. If necessary, the style or fashion of these items
should be explained’ (Green ).
After returning to the Netherlands, Pelsaerts advice was followed and with the fleet of , a
fine collection of this type of articles was sent. Due to the wrecking of the Batavia on the west

















Map .: The western region: Arabian Sea, indicating the shipping routes.
The traditional centre for trading connections with Europe, the Asian Silk Road, was in the far
west of the VOC’s trading area in Asia. Persia was still important for its silk, but also for bullion
obtained by selling pepper and spices. The money was used by the VOC to trade in Asia. Trade
in Persia presented a dilemma because the spices used for barter by the VOC and other traders
were likely to create competition with the VOC’s own spice exports to Europe; they had found
their way to the European market over the traditional land route long before the sea route was
opened. The VOC set up a post in Gamron (Bandar Abbas) in . The English in particular
were very active there and were often a threat to the VOC.
In the extreme west, the VOC established a small trading post at Mocha on the south-western
tip of the Arabian Peninsula. In the early days, the VOC traded spices for precious metals from
Europe, although reluctantly. During an early visit to Mocha in , the VOC official Pieter
van den Broecke advocated that the supply of money the VOC used for trade purposes be
sourced from this region instead of being shipped around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope.
He also described a local specialty: ‘Kahauwa, a kind of black bean / resembling Boontje-Holwor-
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tel / of which they make black water / that they drink (Commelin c, p. ). It was only at the
end of the th century that coffee became an important commodity from this region.
From the s onwards, the VOC assembled an impressive military force of big heavily
armed ships in the Arabian Sea aimed against the Portuguese. After , the VOC added their
annual blockades of Goa to this highly militarised situation. There was a constant risk of con-
frontations with heavily armed Portuguese (and later also English) vessels. Visiting vessels
therefore needed to be heavily armed or escorted by another defensible vessel. Although the
VOC was not able to expel the Portuguese from this region, they were able to a large extent to
frustrate Portuguese trade and shipping.
After the military successes of Van Goens on the east coast, the VOC focussed on the west
coast of India The Malabar Coast was believed to be a threat to the VOC in Ceylon if the Portu-
guese used it as the base for operations to recapture Ceylon. Pepper was the prized commodity
there. Eventually, after several military actions the Malabar Coast was brought under VOC
control in . The main trade post was in Cochin, but along the coast various fortifications
were constructed. A position on the Malabar Coast pepper market meant that the VOC was less
dependent on Indonesian and Malaysian pepper producers.
Strait of Malacca
Map .: This map shows the strategic location of the Strait of Malacca in the intra-Asian network
Due to its highly strategic position, the area of Malacca warrants separate attention. Right from
the start of Dutch shipping in Asia, the Strait of Malacca was an important military destination
being the main connection between the Far East and the Indonesian Archipelago on one side,
and the Indian Ocean on the other. The Sunda Strait, the second important connection, was
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already under VOC control from the ’s. Controlling both seaways was an important aim
for the VOC. Initially, the VOC was able to build alliances with the Sultan of Johore who was
driven out of Malacca by the Portuguese. In those early days military confrontation involved
the use of large ships whereas in later years, this changed to patrol activities to disrupt traffic
and capture smaller vessels for the booty they carried. After , when Malacca was taken
over from the Portuguese, the VOC tried to re-establish an international trade and shipping
centre there. This policy was difficult to combine with the VOC’s ambition to gain a monopoly
over the pewter trade from the local rulers. However the producers of pewter managed to
evade contracts that would result in a shift of control to the VOC.
The general development of the Asian shipping
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Map .: General development of VOC shipping (frequency of arrivals per region) to 
From the data in Table . graphically shown in Map ., the development of the total shipping
network can be seen. In the period under consideration, % of all the arrivals (and % of the
total cargo space involved) of VOC intra-Asian voyages took place in the region around the
Java Sea with Bantam (only in the early years) and Batavia, as the most important ports. This
region was pre-eminent in inter-Asian shipping. The tables also show the central role of this
region in the intra-Asian network. A constant growth can be seen in the arriving shipping vo-
lumes in this area over the whole of this period, indicating a complementary increase in the
stock of Asian goods available in Batavia for transhipment to Europe.
Throughout this period the Spice Islands were an important destination as one of the core
businesses of the VOC as well. Ambon (area ), Banda (area ) and the Moluccas (area )
together represented almost % of all arrivals and the total shipping volume. The region
shows some fluctuation in the numbers of visiting ships and their cargo space because of the
effects of large military actions in some periods, but is otherwise consistently high during the
period  to .
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
For other regions, like the important pepper ports on Sumatra (areas ,  and ), the in-
crease in shipping is clearly visible during the VOC’s development phase. Shipping to other
destinations like the Arabian Sea and the Far East emerged later in the process, but was already
in some decline in the last -year period under consideration. The growing importance of the
Bay of Bengal (VOC's "vette weide" – the plentiful pastures) is clearly shown, by the numbers of
visits and volume amounting to nearly % of total VOC shipping in Asia during the last -
year period.
Besides developments instigated by trade, other aspects such as a military emphasis on a
region are also reflected in Tables . and .. Changes in the arrivals and volumes of shipping
to the Strait of Malacca (area ) are indicators of changes in the nature of the shipping. When
the VOC intensified its attempts to ban Portuguese shipping through this important link be-
tween the Far East and the Indian Ocean around , they sent smaller, well-armed yachts to
this region. Table . shows the frequency of arrivals in this region increasing rapidly, but there
is a decline in the average tonnage of the ships to around  last in the s and the s, and
even in the absolute shipping volume arriving in the area (as can be seen in Table .) After
, when the situation had stabilised, the average tonnage again increased to values around
 last in the period between -.
Although the general issues can be clearly seen, a more detailed analysis will reveal much
more of the way the VOC shipping in Asia developed during the first half of the th century.
The quantitative part of this detailed analyses will be given in part two.
Table .: Development of VOC intra-Asian shipping to  in arrivals at main regions over -year
intervals.
Table .: Development of VOC intra-Asian shipping to  in volume (in last) at main regions over
-year intervals.
The Dutch expansion in Asia up to  
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Connecting the Asian regions: The trading
and shipping network in operation after

Introduction
After the period of ‘round trading tours’, a network of regular shipping gradually developed in
the various regions in Asia. In , Batavia in Java became the centre for shipping. It was the
traffic control centre for most shipping in Asia and the main connection between the European
management and the Asian branch of the VOC. Shipping was dependent on the seasons of the
monsoon. The following sections describe the development of the Asian shipping network as
the various shipping configurations were adjusted to the requirements of the weather and other
conditions. It was sometimes very difficult for the VOC to regulate the connections between the
many shipping routes spread out over a large area. In some cases, a ship delayed for only a
short time could have major consequences for the organisation if a connection on a route sub-
ject to a specific monsoon season, could not be made; for instance when important products
like textiles from India could not reach Batavia in time to be shipped to the Spice Islands where
they were significant items for barter. Another difficulty was created if ships were delayed for
months while waiting for a change of season and could not be employed on other routes. These
problems do not appear to have been fully appreciated by the power holders in the Nether-
lands. Already in , Governor-General Hendrick Brouwer had to explain to the VOC Direc-
tors in the Netherlands the importance of the timely departure of ships in order to be able to
make the connection with the most prominent shipping routes in Asia:
The money and cargo [from the Netherlands] that is meant for China and Japan should
arrive here [Batavia] in the month of May. The commodities for Coromandel, Persia and
the Surat are to be sent at the beginning of July and therefore, also because these trading
posts are drawing most of the money and other means, [we] request Your Honour to
send us these with the ships departing in the autumn that is before the winter from Your
Honour, because otherwise these delayed arrivals means a fruitless stay with us for a year
(Colenbrander , p. ).
Ships departed and arrived to and from Europe at regular intervals. Fleets of VOC ships left the
Netherlands for Asia around New Year (the so-called Christmas fleet), and at the beginning of
the spring (the so-called Easter fleet). Departures from Batavia to Europe were around New
Year (December-January). Running the shipping through Batavia was first and foremost a
management control issue since, for ships to call at Batavia was not always the most practical
strategy. Ships could follow various main routes for voyages within Asia to or from Batavia,
depending on the season and sometimes on the type of ship. Over the years, the VOC suc-
ceeded by trial and error in designing a shipping network that ensured an efficient year-round
deployment of ships to various destinations.

The main routes in Asia
The eastern route: the Spice Islands
The Eastern Route stretched directly east from Batavia to the Spice Islands. The three important
destinations on this route were the island groups of Banda, Ambon and what at that time was
called Molucca. In this period, only Ternate, Tidore and a few neighbouring islands were re-
ferred to by this name by this as opposed to later definitions of Molucca, or the Moluccan
Islands. From the centrally located Ambon, it was usually possible, though in some periods
rather difficult, to reach both other destinations. The route from Batavia to Ambon, however,
was the most monsoon-affected of all the VOC shipping lanes.
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Map .: The Eastern route to the Spice Islands. The route was connected with the route to the Far East
along the Philippines (the purple pine).
It was only possible to sail from Batavia to Ambon from October to March. This applies not
only to the larger Dutch cargo vessels, but also to smaller ships, whether of European or Asian
construction. Ships leaving Batavia in March or even at the end of February often failed to
make the voyage and had to return to their port of departure. From April to October, ships
returned to Batavia with their cargo of nutmeg, mace and cloves. All types of vessels were
used by the VOC on this route. Normally, the voyage was not dangerous for the larger ships
with regards to weather conditions or attacks from enemies of the Company. The only naviga-
tional risks were the very steep shores of the islands and the reefs with nowhere suitable to
anchor in adverse winds, or currents to prevent stranding. Because the skippers expected little
danger on this easy route between Java and the east of the Archipelago, accidents often hap-
pened due to inattention. The ship Hollandia (ID:) whose fate is described in detail in a
report in the VOC archives is a case in point. This large retourschip sailed to the Spice Islands in
 with an accompanying smaller vessel and was wrecked on a reef near Lombok. The loss
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
occurred during excellent weather on a clear night and it seemed to have happened, ‘as if no
person was keeping watch’ (NA .., VOC , fol. ).
Fig. .: Shipping in the Spice Islands Region: Average arrivals and departures from Ambon and Ceram
per month for -
The VOC often used worn out retourschepen for the journey to the Spice Islands; ships that were
determined unfit for the return voyage to the Netherlands. Apart from these ships, a number of
middle-sized, small and even very small vessels (sometimes just open boats) sailed from Bata-
via every monsoon (see chapter ). To protect the VOC’s clove trade from what the Company
considered to be smuggling, a number of small vessels in good condition and heavily armed for
their dimensions, which could be rowed if necessary, were used to fight local ships. They were
also used to transport some of the soldiers and their possessions to the Spice Islands. Most of
the troops, however, were transported to the Spice Islands on the large ships. Because the VOC
tried to prevent foreign merchants from trading with the Spice Islands, the Company had to
provision itself, so the larger VOC ships also had to carry substantial amounts of rice and other
food products.
Only part of the cargoes carried on this Eastern route can be considered genuine intra-Asian
trade. Most of the spices brought to Batavia were exported directly to Europe. A portion, how-
ever, was used by the VOC to trade with the rest of Asia. On their outgoing voyages from
Batavia, the ships transported foodstuffs and utensils for VOC employees, soldiers, slaves, also
for the other people on the islands. Most of these commodities were imported by the VOC from
other parts of Asia, but also a large quantity of European meat and wine barrels were shipped
to the Spice Islands in every west monsoon period. The textiles transported eastwards from
Batavia were mostly intended to be traded for cloves, directly or indirectly. An interesting as-
pect is that the VOC itself generated intra-Asian trade, for example by using Asian pottery for
storage instead of European built wares. Instead of wooden barrels, the VOC stored water and
powder on the Spice Islands in martabans (stoneware storage jars) imported from ports in the Bay
of Bengal, and which were in use there by the local people.
On this eastern route, only a few intermediate ports were of importance to the VOC. Some
ships visited ports in Java, Bali or Macassar on their voyage from Batavia to the Spice Islands to
buy food (mostly cattle from Bali and rice from Macassar). Trade products from these places
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were of very little importance and ships very seldom made a direct return trip between these
places and Batavia. Due to the smuggling trade, the relationship with Macassar was often tense
and as a result this region became an occasional destination for military operations.
The only independent destinations on the eastern route for VOC ships, were the islands of
Timor and Solor. At nearly every monsoon, one or two yachts sailed to these islands to buy
sandalwood, an important trade product for the Asian mainland, and returned directly to Ba-
tavia. Local political and geographical circumstances meant that the VOC ships had to collect
the sandalwood themselves near the areas were it grew. Vessels needed to be medium-sized
and easily manoeuvrable for this trade, as the places from where the sandalwood was shipped
were often on dangerous lee-side shores. The VOC tried to establish strongholds for them-
selves, first on fort Henricus on Solor and later fort Concordia on Timor, but they gave up on
this policy because the local traders could not be persuaded to bring the sandalwood to the
trading posts.
VOC ships regularly visited ports on central and western Java for provisions and building
materials for Batavia. This required a number of ships of different sizes; sometimes with the
ability to load long wooden logs, but these ships were usually utility vessels rather than trade
vessels from the network.
There was a link with the north-eastern route to the Far East by way of the VOC ships de-
ployed for a military action. From the Moluccas, they attempted to intercept the Spanish ships
around the Philippines carrying supplies and soldiers to the Spanish allies in Tidore. The VOC
also tried to intercept the Spanish silver galleons arriving in the Philippines from Mexico. They
were, however, unsuccessful in this mission. Throughout the whole period of Dutch-Spanish
warfare not one Spanish silver ship was captured in this region. In some periods a number of
heavily armed ships left the Moluccas for this destination around January/February. After their
activities in the region between the Moluccas and the Philippines, these ships would sail further
north. Here they tried to intercept Chinese junks travelling to Manila. The VOC was much
more successful in these actions and large quantities of Chinese products entered the VOC
trade system in this way. Small amounts of cloves were also brought to the Chinese market in
these ships. Weather conditions made this voyage a lot more dangerous then the eastern spice
route. Larger ships in good condition were required, not only to withstand weather conditions,
but also to resist assaults from Spanish ships which were much more powerful then those of the
Asian enemies the VOC encountered around the Spice Islands. Before , these ships sailed
on to Japan on a regular basis where they could sell the captured trade items and wait for the
change of the monsoon. In the second half of the period covered here, that base moved to
Taiwan because entry to Japan had become restricted.
The north-western route, Branch A
The VOC’s north-western voyages during this time were influenced by the military conflict
with the Portuguese in the Arabian Sea. Naval expeditions to the area commenced in the s
with some being undertaken in conjunction with the English. Later, more attention was given
to the blockade of Goa. From , the VOC sent a large, strongly manned and armed fleet to
the Indian west coast nearly every year. The Portuguese port of Goa on the west coast of India
– the centre of their Asian administration – was highly monsoon-dependent. Between April
and September, this coast had a very dangerous lee shore where hardly any shipping was pos-
sible, making the blockade of the port of Goa only worthwhile in the period from September to
April. In order to be effective, Dutch ships had to be near Goa at the earliest possible occasion.
Because it was difficult to sail northwards through the Strait of Malacca just before September,
these ships would sail through Sunda Strait and search for the most favourable winds in a long
curve over the Indian Ocean. After a first fleet had arrived in Goa travelling through Sunda
Strait, other ships would arrive later in the season at Goa by way of the Strait of Malacca. From
late September the passage to the Indian Ocean was much faster following this route than it
had been through the Sunda Strait.
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This blockade was the only place in Asia where, after , the VOC could expect to have to
fight a full-blown battle with another European fleet and therefore they had to deploy a strong
blockade fleet. Combining this with trade activities in this region could reduce the cost of the
blockade. The extensive expenses were justified by the VOC by the damage caused to the Por-
tuguese supply of Asian products to Europe, which, it was believed, would ultimately benefit
the VOC through higher prices on the European market (Coolhaas , p. ).
These circumstances meant that after the arrival of the fleet in Goa, a number of VOC ships
could be used for trade, depending on the strength of the Portuguese fleet and the judgement of
the Admiral of the blockade fleet. In addition to the stores and armoury needed for the block-
ade, some trade products were usually carried by the fleet as well. Normally, shortly after the
fleet arrived in Goa, these goods would be sent on one or two ships to Surat, the most impor-
tant port in north-western India, where the VOC had a factory. Trading ships sailing on to
Surat or Persia had to be strongly armed to be able to resist the Portuguese still operating from
many strongholds in the area. Indeed, the VOC lost one richly laden ship – Franeker (ID:)
described as a warship, but too lightly armed to sail alone in this area – in a Portuguese attack
(Colenbrander , p. ). From December to May, shipping along the Asian coast between
Surat and Persia could be carried out in both directions. VOC ships travelled this route with
products from other parts of Asia, and also as traders between these ports, even regularly
transporting freight for local traders or authorities. From Persia, some VOC ships would sail
on to Mocha in Arabia, where coffee (quawa) was already a trading item, though not yet a very
important one. More important for the VOC were Persian silk and Surat cloth. At the end of the
blockade, some ships were sent to the Indian coast in the neighbourhood of Goa to buy rice and
pepper. Good profits could be made by first sailing to Surat to buy amphioen (opium) and then
trading this for pepper on the Malabar Coast of South India.









Region Bay of Bengal 
Region Sumatra
Region Route Spice Islands
Region Java Sea
Region Route Far East 
































Map .: The north-western routes, Branch A & B
Ships returning from Persia directly to the Sunda Strait often had great difficulty in finding
favourable winds which meant that voyages to Batavia could take as long as five months. A
more efficient route was to first cross the Arabian Sea to its eastern shore. Ships sailing along
the Indian and Ceylon west coasts could approach Galle nearly all year round, since this port
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was on the only east-west oriented coast in the region and thus independent of the monsoon. In
the early s, Galle was unable to play a logistical role in the shipping network, as the fort
city was completely isolated from the surrounding area. Even basic supplies such as rice had to
be brought in by passing VOC ships. In this period, however, Galle was used as a transit port
for some goods; for instance, Persian horses, which were not able to make the long voyage to
Batavia in a single trip, would have a rest and recreation stop there while their ship sailed on.
By the end of the s, Galle had gradually built up its logistical role in the shipping system.
Batavia could be reached from Galle or South India along the west coast of Sumatra, through
the Sunda Strait in generally little more than a month. During some months of the year, vessels
in poor condition chose the longer but more sheltered route through the Strait of Malacca.
There was one other Asian area frequented by VOC ships that had to be reached through Sun-
da Strait, the pepper ports on the west coast of Sumatra. Commerce had a totally different
character here from that described above. Trade was simple, only involving two products, cloth
for pepper, but was dependent on the good will of the Sultan of Atjeh who dominated the
whole region. Portuguese or other Asian adversaries were hardly present, so the ships did not
need heavy armaments. Ships of intermediate size and good cargo-carrying capacity were
needed to gather the pepper from the different ports along the coast and take it back to Batavia.
Some VOC ships, often flutes, were almost continuously engaged in this trade.
The north-western route, Branch B
Sailing in a northerly direction through the Strait of Malacca was not entirely limited by the
monsoon. It was always possible to pass through the Strait but during the adverse monsoon
period (going north this was from around February to September), the voyage could take a
long time and Branch A was preferred. Ships with a destination in the Bay of Bengal had to
observe certain aspects of the wind and current patterns after leaving the Strait of Malacca in
order not to end up on the wrong side of Ceylon and miss the entrance to the Bay of Bengal. It
was possible to arrive at, or leave from the ports in the Bay of Bengal almost during the whole
year, but direct sailing from one port to another was only safe at certain times and in certain
directions. Normally Pipelij, the northern-most VOC base in the Gulf, had to be reached before
December to take advantage of the favourable wind conditions.
The situation with regard to trade was somewhat different here compared to the other side of
the Indian subcontinent. On the west side, there were two important trade ports for the VOC,
Surat for northern India and Gamron for Persia, where goods were brought overland from afar.
On the eastern coast there were a large number of ports each with their own trading products.
Each location would have locally specific patterns printed on. Besides the larger ships trans-
porting substantial quantities of cloth and saltpetre to Batavia, smaller ships were also needed
to collect these goods. The sequence of obtaining and transporting gold, silver, other metals
and ores and some spices with which to buy these commodities was very important. For the
most eastern ports in the Bay of Bengal, called Arracan and Pegu by the VOC (modern Myan-
mar), it was difficult to apply the system because the period when ships could go there in
combination with other destinations was very limited. Consequently slaves and rice, which the
VOC bought there, were often taken directly to Batavia.
VOC ships visited all the other ports during voyages up and down the coast, from the mouth
of the Ganges in the north to Ceylon in the south, even though they had to be careful near
places under Portuguese influence. Trade depended on a large number of local coastal rulers
with these frequently being governors representing greater kings living further inland. Most of
the ports had local traders and shipping operating concurrently with the VOC. The danger of
interference from large, armed Portuguese ships was much less on this coast than on the wes-
tern side of the subcontinent.
A number of VOC ships sailed from Bengal to transport sugar and tropical products to Per-
sia. Because of the VOC’s positive trade balance there (after a problematic start), the ships re-
turning after  to the Coromandel Coast and Bengal often carried gold and silver coins.
Although these ships did not always sail into the bay of Galle, they nearly always tried to
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establish communications there, underlining the strategic position of Galle in the trade and
shipping network.
Shortly before , the VOC established a connection between the north-eastern and the
north-western routes. Around December, some ships returning from Japan and Taiwan would
not sail to Batavia but would travel directly through the Strait of Malacca to the north instead.
Some of these ships were expected to report to the Goanese fleet around January to be escorted
through Portuguese spheres of influence and to redistribute cargo for Surat or Persia. Others
had orders to sail directly to the Coromandel Coast. Japanese silver and copper, Chinese gold
and porcelain and sugar were their most important cargoes. From the Coromandel Coast, these
ships would join the other VOC ships trading in the region and then return with them to Bata-
via. There was no direct VOC trade in the opposite direction through the Strait of Malacca to
China, as the Portuguese had carried out with their annual shipping from Goa via Malacca to
Macao.
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Map .: The connection between the routes to the Far East and the North-West after 
The developing complexity of the trade and shipping network between these regions illustrates
the flexibility of the VOC in utilising their ships to the fullest extent and keeping them sailing,
in contrast to the Portuguese who often left ships idle in Macao, waiting for a change of season.
It is interesting to note that the VOC seemed to be the only partner who could transport and
safely store large amounts of gold and silver along all the ports mentioned above. Local rulers
in all these places knew that it was not wise to allow any major theft to take place, even if it was
in the guise of robbery by bandits, because the VOC was able to take retaliatory action in the
whole area. The VOC was therefore effectively able to capitalise on the exchange differences
between gold and silver values and between different kinds of coins, by transporting large
amounts of these currencies. The transport of the right kind of bullion to the right place was a
permanent concern for the VOC traders (see Case Study -).
Like Branch A, Branch B also included a pepper route to Sumatra. VOC ships visited the
south-eastern coast of this island to exchange cloth for pepper. Trade here was in some ways
different from that on the west coast of the island. Most of the centres for the pepper trade were
situated inland and connected to the sea by rivers. The VOC often kept some smaller ships on
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the rivers to transport the pepper down river to larger ships anchored outside the shoals that
abounded on this part of the Sumatran coast. In this way, even the large retourschips could sail
to Jambi to collect pepper in the interval between their arrival and the departure of the fleet
back to Europe.
Between  and , many smaller vessels were sent to the Strait of Malacca to assist in
securing all the waterways of the region for the VOC. The places and dates for ships to be
present in this region were dictated by the possibility of intercepting Portuguese vessels, so the
VOC fleets moved up and down the Strait of Malacca to the rhythm of the monsoon.
In , the VOC took over the city of Malacca after a long siege with the Portuguese. The
city then became a stopover for almost all VOC ships sailing through the Strait. Although Ma-
lacca did not reach the same status as an important emporium that it had under the Portu-
guese, it was still an important location for the storage and redistribution of stock. As far as
intra-Asian trade was concerned, Malacca became a VOC centre for the pewter trade in this
region and an independent destination from Batavia for pewter and pepper.
Case Study -; Two examples of VOC currency exchange
The VOC was able to implement an active exchange policy of currency as is demonstrated in the
following instances where the differing value of gold and silver in the region is maximised.
‘Van Thaiwan door de straete Malacca aff te senden in Japans silver ende Chinees goudt thienhondert-
duysent guldens, mits dat in 't versenden des gouts by scharsiteyt Coromandel prefereren ende des te
meer silver nae Suratte schicken, alsoo 't gout meer in Masulipatnam als Suratte rendeert’
Send from Taiwan, through the Strait of Malacca the Japanese silver and the Chinese gold worth ten-
hundred-thousand guilders. The gold to Coromandel, if due to the scarcity, it is preferred there and
thus extra silver to Surat, because gold yields more in Masulipatnam then Surat (Coolhaas , p. ).
‘De wissels aen de Moren in Bengale en op de cust, om op Seylon betaelt te worden, is een goede sake,
maer het verschil van de reductie der pagoden en het verlies, dat mitsdien op Seylon geleden wort, is
te groot. Weshalven de gouverneur besloten heeft van de comptanten, uyt Persia of Suratte voor en ten
behoeve van Bengale op Seylon comende, soo veel ropias te lichten, als de wisselbrieven medebren-
gen, de Moren ropias in plaets van ryxdaelders gevende.
The bill of exchange to the Moors in Bengal and on the Coast [of Coromandel] to be paid on Ceylon is
a good practise, but the difference of the reduction of the pagode and the loss, that therefore is made on
Ceylon, is too large. Therefore the Governor has decided to take from the ready money, that will arrive
from Persia or Surat to Ceylon to be used for Bengal, so many ropias as required for the bills of ex-
change, so we can give the Moors ropias instead of ryxdaelders (Van der Chijs , p. ).
The north-eastern route
Starting around April VOC ships would leave Batavia in a north-eastern direction, some sim-
ply sailing to Siam and back. The old capital, Aythaya, of what is now called the Kingdom of
Thailand, was located much higher up the river than its modern equivalent, Bangkok, which in
that period was only a toll station near the mouth of the river. Smaller VOC ships would cross
the sandbar in front of the river mouth and sail up the river; larger ones would anchor in front
of it. There was direct trade, large in volume though small in value (mostly in rice and wood),
between Batavia and Siam. Some VOC ships would continue along this route to Taiwan with
deerskins and products from the tropical forest (mainly Sappan wood) being their most impor-
tant cargo. In Taiwan they would find other ships that had sailed directly from Batavia; ships
would leave Batavia for Taiwan as late as September.
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The special conditions prevailing in Taiwan meant that a great variety of VOC ships were
dispatched to this region. The largest VOC ship type was sent to load large bulk cargoes from
China and Japan. These ships arrived in the region in July/August, but had to leave before the
end of October, for commercial rather than nautical reasons. Otherwise it was very difficult to
get the cargo from China and Japan to Batavia in time for the return fleet that left around New
Year. The Taiwanese port could however only be accessed by ships with a depth of less than 
feet. In addition, the road in the Dutch settlement at Taiwan was dangerous because of foul
weather during the part of the year when the ships were there. To overcome these difficulties,
larger vessels were loaded with the cargo collected from the Chinese traders during the year in
Taiwan and then transported during September-November to the roadstead near the Pisca-
dores Islands. This transport system required a large number of cargo ships of different sizes.
Some yachts assigned for military functions in this region could also carry cargo, but their
armaments and construction hampered their usefulness. Captured Chinese ships were also
pressed into service by the VOC, as were other Asian-built ships that were bought or hired in
the region. In VOC correspondence they are all called jonken, which does not necessarily mean
that they were all of the type now known as junks. It is remarkable that of a fleet of five VOC
ships sailing together to the same destination near Taiwan, the three so-called jonken had pre-
dominantly Chinese crews, whilst there were no Chinese crew on the other two (Blussé, Milde
& Ts`Ao Yung-Ho ). Jonken/Junks sometimes carried cargo between Taiwan and Batavia or
Siam, but were mostly utilised around Taiwan itself by the VOC.
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Map .: Route to the Far East
The north-eastern route did not end at Taiwan but went on to Japan. Ships would sail on from
Taiwan to Japan and return a few months later. Direct VOC trade between Batavia and Japan
was rare until  when they lost Taiwan. However, the products in demand in Japan came
for the greater part from the Asian mainland. In addition, trade with Japan was regulated very
strictly by the Japanese authorities who not only controlled which goods could be imported
and exported, but also in which period the sales could take place. On account of the variation
between the Japanese and Europeans calendar years, this would be some time in October. The
VOC skippers could not make their own decisions to take advantage of favourable conditions
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but were completely dependent for their departure on the permission of the Japanese author-
ities. The ships then only had a very short period to reach Batavia in time to load their goods
onto the ships of the return fleet. Ships for Japanese trade did not need to be heavily armed, but
they had a good chance of encountering hurricanes while sailing in the East China Sea or in the
strait between the Pescadores and Taiwan. In addition to concerns about their highly valuable
cargoes, this also meant that ships travelling on this route had to be sturdy and robust. Never-
theless, quite a number of VOC ships were lost due to the weather conditions in this region.
Because the VOC did not succeed in establishing factories in China, the Company tried to
buy Chinese products in Cambodia and Vietnam. In the th century this area consisted of
kingdoms that were more or less vassals to the Chinese emperor and in a permanent state of
war with each other. The VOC still tried to get a foothold in a number of places despite these
dangerous conditions. Ships could not be too large, because in most cases they had to sail far
up river, but on the other hand they had to be heavily armed. Some rivers were so narrow that
flutes were preferred over yachts because the woodcarving on the transoms of the latter could
be severely damaged by collisions with trees on the shore (NA .., VOC , fol. ). The
VOC lost at least three ships in the period covered by this study due to hostilities in the region.
Mostly ships would sail directly from Batavia to the Asian mainland around May to be in
Taiwan in time to transport a part of their cargo to Japan. Tonckin (the northern part of modern
Vietnam) proved to be the most profitable and stable connection. For some time the VOC oper-
ated with a number of ships in the silk trade on the Tonckin-Japan-Taiwan-Tonckin route.
The VOC called the waters around Taiwan a harde en swaer vaerwater (hard and heavy
waters), which meant that ships had to be strongly built and be in good shape in order to sail
this route with its difficult sea conditions. The route between Batavia and Siam was considered
to be easy and for this old ships could be used.
Inter-regional transport: The compilation of the ‘return cargo’ in the
s
The main cargo for Europe consisted of pepper and spices, but numerous other products were
also requested. In a general memorandum written in the s, the VOC directors in the Neth-
erlands instructed the Governor-General, his council and all the merchants in the trading posts
all over Asia to send specific products for which they also specified the quantity as well as the
quality. Heading the list was large quantities of pepper. Based on the experience up to that
time, they expected that this pepper could come from the production areas on Sumatra: Jambi,
Campar, Andrigiry, Tyco, Priaman, Celiber, Achim, Ligor, and Bordelon. The directors consid-
ered the Malabar Coast to be a potentially rich supplier, if the problem of the Portuguese in that
region could be solved. The responsible authorities needed to ensure that only the largest and
cleanest peppercorns were sent to the Netherlands. The VOC also requested that cloves, mace
and nutmeg be sent annually in enough quantity for a two-year supply in case ´through an
accident or other inconvenient circumstances, that God prevent´ there was a shortage and trade
in Europe would come to a halt (NA .., Geleynssen de Jongh , fol. ).
The retourschepen followed a strict time schedule. As stated before, the VOC’s preference was
to leave Batavia before the end of December; the ship could then arrive in the Netherlands in
the late summer or early autumn. During two to four months time, the cargo was unloaded, the
ship cleaned, repaired and equipped. Depending upon the weather conditions in Europe, the
ship could then leave the North Sea in January to sail to Batavia in seven to eight months. The
Cape of Good Hope was not yet a permanent staging post and compulsory stopover for the
ships on their way to the East Indies before . Still, the Cape was often used as a meeting
place and somewhere to leave messages. Supplies and water were taken on board at various
places. On the way back to Europe, St Helena was the most frequented place for meeting and
supplies.
The Hollandia (ID:) is a good example of one of the first retourschepen that sailed almost
exclusively between Europe and Asia. The ship left the Netherlands for the first time on Boxing
Day, th December . Built in  for the Chamber Amsterdam, the Hollandia made the
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trip between Europe and Asia seven times before it was wrecked on a reef near Lombok on 
December  (p. -). At - last, it belonged to the largest ship type in the service of
the VOC in that period. In  the Hollandia was sent to Banda to transport soldiers and in
 and  it collected pepper at Jambi. But in all the other cases the ship arrived in Batavia
and returned directly to Europe, mostly with a very short turn-around time.
The Hollandia is an interesting example of the problems the VOC encountered synchronising
the Asian trade system to these voyages to and from the Netherlands. Because the loading of
pepper at Jambi took longer then expected, the Hollandia left Batavia at the end of January 
on her second return voyage. This was rather late, bearing in mind the instructions of the VOC
directors. Indeed, the ship did get into great trouble in the midst of the Indian Ocean and had
to sail to Madagascar for repairs. Both her companions, Gouda (ID:) and Middelburg (ID:)
perished. The voyage is vividly described in the travels of Willem Ysbrands Bontekoe, a book
famous in the Netherlands in the th century and still read today. The Hollandia lost its masts
during the storm in the Indian Ocean. The ship was repaired on the Mauritius and was fitted
with new masts, locally cut (Hogerwerff ; Roeper ). These problems gave the directors
in the Netherlands new reasons to set the urgent departure of the homeward bound ships from
Batavia in December so as to avoid the hurricane season in the Indian Ocean.
Because of the repairs needed, the Hollandia could not leave the Netherlands again before
May. The third voyage of the ship in  is also very well documented in a journal printed in
the th century (Commelin f). Shortly after the Hollandia left, the skipper discovered that
he had to bear the consequences of poor maintenance work during the short turn-around time
in the Netherlands. Whether the Mauritian masts were replaced in the Netherlands is unclear,
but the repairs were not satisfactory and the ship was leaking heavily when it reached the
Atlantic Ocean. During a stop over at Sierra Leone on the west coast of Africa in order to attend
to this problem, the carpenter found the bow of the ship in very poor condition. Stops like these
could cause long delays, especially on the west coast of Africa, were the wind and current con-
ditions in the Gulf of Guinea could hold the ships up for many weeks. Later when more experi-
ence was gained, ships were forbidden to stop in this region and had to follow a very specific
course over the Atlantic Ocean, sail close to the east coast of South America and then follow a
long curve to the Cape of Good Hope. At Sierra Leone, the Hollandia also had an encounter
with the illustrious Dutch pirate Claes Compaen. During a short exchange of gunfire, four peo-
ple, including the vicar and his wife, were killed. However, the homeward-bounder must have
been too big and powerful for the pirates. The confrontation ended peacefully with some cour-
tesy calls and even the exchange of presents. After this setback, the continuation of the trip to
Batavia was still problematic, and in October the ship lost parts of the bow section. Neverthe-
less, the Hollandia arrived on  December  in Batavia, after a relatively fast trip, with 
souls on board including  woman and children. During the trip  people died and Com-
mander Schram died shortly after his arrival (Heeres , --).
In view of the repeated strict proscriptions about departure times, the Hollandia was too late
for the returning fleet of that year, and had to wait until the end of  to return. Given the
problems encountered on the journey from Europe, the ship must first have been sent to On-
rust, an island off the coast of Batavia with repair facilities. In the course of , the return
cargo was collected from all parts of Asia. In October, the return fleet was ready for departure
to Europe. The management in Batavia under Governor-General Coen, then starting his second
term of office, was faced with the following dilemma. The preference was to send the fleet off at
the earliest opportunity, taking the ships back to the Netherlands in the late spring or at the
start of the European summer, in accordance with the VOC directors’ insistence on arriving
before the autumn. The sailing scheme dictated by the monsoon however forced the manage-
ment in Batavia to wait as long as possible in order to include cargo from a number of other
destinations. If this cargo missed the return fleet, it would have to be stored in Batavia for a
year with all the additional costs and risks. Often, the practice was for one or two ships to wait
for the delayed deliveries from the Asian VOC fleet and sail after the main fleet in the first
months of the New Year. The VOC directors restricted this practice after the loss of the ships
Gouda (ID:) and Middelburg (ID:) in the previous year.
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Loading a ship with a cargo of various products was not an easy task. The differences be-
tween light and heavy goods in relation to the requirements of the balance of the ship had to be
taken into account. The necessity to store products in such a way as to ensure that their quality
was preserved, and that they did not contaminate each other during the trip to Europe, such as
highly aromatic goods polluting other cargo was equally important.
On  October , the return fleet was ready to sail. At the last minute, the management
considered loading the ship Vianen (ID:) and sending it off with the fleet. Although they
believed that with the pepper that had just arrived in the yacht Witte Beer (ID:) from the
west coast of Sumatra, the pepper still in stock, and the cargo they expected ‘at any hour’ from
Bantam, the ship could be loaded, they took the decision not to further delay the departure of
the fleet (Colenbrander , p. ). It still took some days before the fleet was sent off with a
letter for the directors in the Netherlands indicating that the management in Batavia could no
longer wait for the delayed arrivals in order to prevent the risk of fire or other disasters and to
avoid unnecessary loss of salaries, and supplies on board:
‘deselve alsnu op’t spoedichste in compagnie sullen toegesonden werden, sonder die lan-
ger in noodeloos perijckel van brandt, schips-leedt, verloop van maentgelden, consump-
tie van viveres etc. op te senden, […]’
[These should be sent at the earliest occasion in ‘company’ without leaving them in un-
necessary risk of fire, ship disaster, wastage of salary, consumption of supplies etc.] (Co-
lenbrander , p.).
The fleet consisting of the Frederick Hendrick (ID:), Hollandia (ID:), ‘t Wapen van Delft
(ID:), ‘sLandts Hollandia (ID:) and Galias (ID:), left Batavia on  November 
and arrived in the Netherlands in June . Contrary to regulations, Governor-General Coen
did in fact dispatch the Vianen in January  with a cargo of Chinese silk received from Tai-
wan in December.
Batavia was not always the only departure point and ships sometimes sailed to Europe from
other destinations in Asia. For example, in December  the ship Dordrecht (ID:) sailed to
the Netherlands from Surat. The function of Batavia as the VOC’s central rendezvous is re-
flected in the cargo of the Hollandia. Among the correspondence from Asia at that time a so-
called factura has survived. This document shows the cargo’s specification, cost price and sup-
plier and gives a unique insight into the functioning of the Asian trade and shipping network.
The Hollandia’s cargo of  is chosen as a good example because the origin of the diverse
components of the return cargo was fully described and it is representative of the cargo usually
sent to Europe in that period. The typical composition of cargo by volume was: % pepper,
spices and silk each represent %, and the last % comprised of a variety of miscellaneous
products.
The cargo of the November  voyage of the Hollandia was sourced from a number of
locations and arrived in Batavia from January to October of  (Table -).The complexity of
the developing shipping and trade network is evident in the Hollandia’s collection of cargo.
Pepper arrived during the first half of  from: Succadena on Borneo (Kalimantan); Patani
(Malay Peninsula); the west coast of Sumatra; south east Sumatra (Jambi) and Siam. The Pep-
per from Siam arrived in Batavia in the Cameel (ID:) on  February . This large merchant
ship of  last then left Batavia on the th of February for Ambon and Banda. For larger
ships, the end of February was about the latest time of year to sail eastward from Batavia to
the Spice Islands. The Cameel left Banda on  April with a cargo of nutmeg and mace then took
on board cloves in Amboina from where it departed in May to arrive back in Batavia on  June
. Most of the spices brought by this ship were loaded onto the Hollandia. Some more mace
arrived just in time to be shipped by the Hollandia, on the Munnickendam (ID:). This flute left
Banda in August (just after the main harvest season), and arrived rather late in Batavia.
Pepper that had arrived in Batavia in November and December from Sumatra was also
shipped on the Vianen in January . As the cargo of baled silk and pepper had a low specific
weight, the Vianen needed a substantial load of Japanese copper to ballast the ship. The vessel
even returned to Batavia from the Sunda Strait to Batavia for an additional  last of copper but
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the loading of the additional cargo proved problematic for the slender vessel; there were com-
plications getting this ballast down into the hold of the ship without the time consuming task of
unloading and re-loading the cargo completely.
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Map .: The origin of the Hollandia cargo in Asia
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Persian silk was shipped to Batavia in a fleet of war ships that had been in conflict with the
Portuguese in the northern part of the Arabian Sea. The ships of this fleet arrived in Batavia in
June . Part of their silk cargo was carried by the Hollandia.
The saltpetre shipped as ‘useful ballast’ in the Hollandia most probably arrived in Batavia in
September with the Medenblick (ID:) from the Coromandel Coast. The timely arrival of this
ballast commodity was important; the VOC transport system relied on the availability of en-
ough ballast goods when ships were loaded with lighter cargo.
Some Chinese products like porcelain and ginger were also part of the cargo of the Hollandia.
These items are reported as ‘captured’; it is known that VOC ships defeated at least four Portu-
guese ships in  in the Strait of Malacca (Colenbrander , p. ; Heeres , p. ). Like
some of the pepper, the precious stones and musk in the Hollandia’s cargo most probably ar-
rived from Borneo on the Haan (ID:) in January . Chinese silk had been taken to Batavia
from Taiwan on  January , too late to be shipped in the return fleet of . More silk
was expected from Taiwan, but only arrived in December , again too late to be included in
the cargo of the Hollandia. This consignment of Chinese silk was eventually shipped in the
Vianen which left Batavia two months after the Hollandia.
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The development of the VOC fleet
The main aim of this study is to investigate the role of the VOC fleet and the organisation of
shipping in the development of the VOC in Asia during the th century. As described in
Chapter , the inconsistent terminology used to describe the various vessel types can create
confusion about the characteristics of specific vessels. To understand the role of these vessels, a
number of categories were developed covering features that contributed to the organisation of
the VOC in Asia. In this chapter the rationale for these categories is explained.
Eleven categories were identified, comprising of ten rates and a further undefined group. ‘Rate
’ contains vessels that were mentioned in the literature but had a minimal role in shipping. For
instance, a ship that may only have made one trip, or, alternatively, one about which, apart
from its name, no other information is available. The Rates  to  cover various categories of
vessels ranging from the small afbreekboots to large retourschepen.
Table .: The composition of the VOC fleet in Asia to  in number.
The homeward-bounder or retourschip [Rate ]
The largest and best known ship type in use by the VOC was what the organisation called the
retourschip. The name originates from the cargoes brought home from Asia, which were called
retouren in th century Dutch. Although Dutch ships returned regularly with Asian cargo after
 and the word retouren was used from the beginning of the th century, the name re-
tourschip only emerged after . Prior to this, all vessels returning from Asia were simply
referred to as (East-) India ships. From , ships used by the VOC to transport goods from
Asia to the Netherlands were called retourschepen, but the name also applied to the ship type
specially built for this function. The first meaning of the term retourschip indicates the use of a
certain vessel as a homeward-bounder and th century Dutch sources sometimes contain
phrases such as ‘tot een Retourschip aen te leggen het Jacht Avontsterre’ [to be used as a home-
ward-bounder the yacht Avondsterre] (NA .., VOC , fol. ) or ‘gebruiken de fluit …
tot een retourschip’, [use the flute … as a homeward-bounder]. In this study, the use of the
names ‘homeward-bounder’ and ‘retourschip’ refers to the second meaning, that is, as the term
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for a specialised type of ship. The retourschip was a large vessel specially built to bring substan-
tial quantities of Asian products home to the Netherlands. The homeward-bounder was also
used within Asia, before a return voyage to the Netherlands or at the end of its career, when it
was not considered seaworthy enough to carry the precious cargoes home. The fact that when
sailing within Asia these ships were also referred to as retourschip, demonstrates that the VOC
used this term to define a specific type of ship.
Fig .: Retourschip Salamander, Reinier Nooms. The Salamander (ID ), a homeward-bounder of
around  last in the service of the VOC during  and . The ship made six return journeys
and is shown here probably during large maintenance in the Netherlands.
Until , nearly all ships sent out by the Voorcompagniëen or the VOC were meant to return to
the Netherlands. There was no specific category to classify homeward-bounders; larger vessels
were termed schepen (ships), smaller ones jachten (yachts) and the VOC administration main-
tained a distinction between ships and yachts over the whole period. However, as an added
complication the term ‘ship’ was also used as an inclusive term for vessels in general. The th
century administrators were already aware of this problem when they wrote: ‘dat het nieuwe
schip segge jacht genaemt sal werden Bommel’ (that the new ship called yacht will be named
Bommel (ID:)) or ‘dese ses naeghenoemde Schepen Amsterdam, Dordrecht, Haerlem, Leyden,
Delf ende Goude (ID:), welck laetste Schip een Jacht was’ (the following six ships […] of which
the last ship is a yacht). At their meeting of October , the assembly of the Heren XVII
agreed on a charter with the dimensions for vessel types: large ships with a length of  feet
and smaller ships or yachts with a length of  feet.
When the first Governor-General, Both, was sent to Asia in  to set up a permanent struc-
ture for the VOC in Asia, it was the intention of the VOC directors to work with the principle of
the homeward-bounders (Rietbergen , p. ). Although they were not yet called re-
tourschepen, the intention was that new large ships would not be used in Asia, but would sail
to a main port and load cargo collected in advance by other vessels, allowing a return to the
Netherlands as soon as possible. The VOC had good reason to develop such a system because it
had experienced the near loss of a number of ships, with their precious freight, after they had
first sailed around Asia picking up cargo before they returned to Europe. These round trips
throughout Asia could take more then a year and wore the ships out before they commenced
their lengthy return voyage. The policy of reserving specialised vessels for the return trip to the
Netherlands was clearly the first attempt at a differentiated shipping organisation. However,
the number of VOC ships in Asia and the infrastructure in Asia did not allow this policy to be
properly implemented. As a result, the new large ships were still used for lengthy trips to
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collect cargo from many places in Asia and a fleet of large well-armed ships was built up and
used in Asia to counterbalance Portuguese and English forces. In , Both perished at sea on
a return trip to the Netherlands when his ship and two others were lost, all of which had
sailed for over three years in Asian waters (Colenbrander , p.). The effective deploy-
ment of specialised homeward-bounders commenced after the establishment of the VOC head-
quarters in Batavia in . The significance of these headquarters is discussed in Chapter .
From the commencement of this differentiated shipping between Europe and Asia in the
’s, a new and different ship type was designed, tailored to the inter-continental journey. As
these vessels were not commonly available on the market, they needed to be constructed in the
VOC’s own shipyards. This gave the organisation the opportunity to develop customised
homeward-bounders, optimised for their purpose like the grain and timber flutes in Europe.
The development of this ship type was often the subject of discussion within the VOC organi-
sation, as is reflected in the resolutions of the Heren XVII. The VOC eventually developed a
ship building policy which was the result of of experiences with a variety of models and the
insights of both the ship builders and users.
In /, -the Dordrecht (ID:)- was built in Amsterdam according to the dimensions of
the  Charter for the ‘large ships’. At the inspection of the ship by the experts of the com-
bined Chambers, the Dordrecht was found to have been built slightly broader than the specified
dimensions. Although the purpose of the inspection was to make sure that the agreed charter
was followed, the committee came to the conclusion that a new charter of ship with the dimen-
sion of the beam of the Dordrecht, but longer, would better serve the VOC (this changes were
laid down in the  Charter). This type of important technical decision was taken by men
with extensive experience in shipbuilding. Among them were Jan Rijksen, the VOC master
carpenter who, in , had already built two very successful Indiamen with exceptional di-
mensions for that period, and Pieter Jansz Liorne, the Mayor of Hoorn, who was the initiator
of the innovations in Dutch shipbuilding which resulted in the construction of flutes (NA
.., VOC , fol. ).
The Amsterdam shipbuilder Jan Rijksen played an important role in the development of the
homeward-bounders. In , the ships he had built were praised for their excellent perfor-
mance by those who used them in Asia (NA .., VOC , fol. ). During the first dec-
ades of Dutch shipping in Asia, these ships did not just sail between Europe and Asia. Most
large vessels built before  only made a few return voyages and were not used or built
exclusively for this purpose. Within two years of the  Charter a total of seven vessels were
built according to these new ideas, at least one by each Chamber. With regular maintenance,
these ships were capable of lasting at least ten years and of making three or four return voyages
in that time. Some, like the earlier mentioned Hollandia (ID:), were in fact used for  years.
This homeward-bounder made seven return voyages, a number that became the standard for
the following generations of homeward-bounders. According to the egalisaties, the cargo capa-
city of these ships was  last. In reality, the Hollandia was able to transport  last (NA
.., VOC , fol. ). The vessels of this category of ships were consistently called re-
tourschepen from about  on. From this date it can be established with little doubt if newly
built vessels were of this type or not. Of the ships built before the  Charter was established,
only the Dordrecht and two other vessels named and used as homeward-bounders could be
classified as Rate ; the remainder are classified as ships (Rate ).
Differentiating vessels in this transitional period is not simple. For instance, the classification
of the ship Westvriesland (ID:), built in  as an early homeward-bounder, is not clear cut.
This vessel, built by the Chamber Hoorn, exceeded the agreed Charter of . The directors of
this smaller Chamber created immense problems for themselves in their greed for profit. The
ship was probably not much larger than the ships built after the  Charter, but theWestvries-
land’s draught of  feet or more when fully laden caused great logistical problems. The only
Dutch inlet where this ship could enter safely was the Schelde in Zeeland, where it returned
three times not only causing navigational problems, but also problems with the egalisatie sys-
tem since the costs and benefits to the Chamber Zeeland had to be compensated. The Chamber
Hoorn’s gross disregard of the  Charter initiated a system of mutual inspections and fines.
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Although many discussions followed within the VOC about the optimal dimensions for the
homeward-bounder, a length of around  feet became standard. The maximum draught de-
pended on the limitations dictated by the inlets of the various Dutch ports and was around 
feet; ships that exceeded that draught could only return to Zeeland or in an emergency to the
Eems in Groningen, which did not have a VOC Chamber. The various successive VOC Charters
also prescribed variations for in the depth of the hold (NA .., VOC , --; NA
.., VOC , --). Vessels with a deeper hold had an extra deck (the so-called
koebrug) which was structurally necessary to reinforce the vessel. The deeper hold and the extra
deck increased the loading capacity of the vessel and also the accommodation area for soldiers.
The Chamber of Zeeland occasionally had permission to build ships with a larger draught
because it was the only one with a deep-water entrance to their port. These vessels could also
have an extra length of  feet. (Stapel , p. , ). Other experiments to enlarge the cargo
capacity included building broader or longer but shallower ships, were not successful due to a
reduction in seaworthiness (NA .., VOC , fol. ). However, since it was not uncom-
mon for differences to occur between the prescribed charters and the completed ship, it is diffi-
cult to judge what the real dimensions of these ships were. An actual cargo carrying capacity of
 Indian lasts (approximately  pounds) of pepper [see Hollandia (ID:)] was a normal
figure.
Use of the homeward-bounders in Asia
With the growing volume of the retouren (the cargo brought from Asia to the Netherlands),
more homeward-bounders were needed. The VOC addressed this issue by initiating a regular
building program on its own wharfs in the Netherlands. However, problems with logistics and
communication or sudden changes in trade patterns in Asia, often because of hostilities, caused
intermittent shortages or oversupplies of homeward-bounders in Batavia (Coolhaas , p.
). There was also often a mismatch between the dates of arrival at Batavia and the pre-
scribed period for the departure of the return journey of these ships. In these cases, the Gover-
nor and his Council in Batavia could choose to use the homeward-bounders for voyages in
Asia. Sometimes this was in preparation for the return trip by assigning these ships to take on
board a part of the return cargo directly from the production areas. For example, a homeward-
bounder could be sent to the south-east coast of Sumatra, where the most important bulk cargo
pepper could be loaded (Heeres , p. ). After the conquest of Malacca in  this port
also served as a destination for these ships to load pepper (Van der Chijs , p. ). Home-
ward bounders were sent to Taiwan as well, where sugar, used by the VOC as a profitable
ballast-good, was available in large quantities (NA .., VOC , fol. ).
Homeward-bounders were also used in Asia as heavily armed traders sent to Persia and
India. From  on, the VOC tried to organise an annual expedition to the Arabian Sea, the
purpose of which was partly military, to conquer or destroy the large Portuguese ships sailing
in this area, and partly commercial. Fleets of heavily armed large ships were required, and the
retourschepen played an important role here. Once in the area, these vessels were also used to
transport trade goods. The first of these annual expeditions was organised from the Nether-
lands, and ships would sail directly to the Cape, then along Madagascar to the Arabian Sea.
With additional trade in the area, the logistical problem of matching these expeditions with the
shipping from Batavia increased and it was decided to sail to this region only from Batavia,
with one or two loaded homeward-bounders sometimes returning directly from Persia or Sur-
atte (in north western India) to the Netherlands.
When a homeward-bounder was no longer considered seaworthy for the return journey or
safe enough to carry the rich cargoes, its career was not over. These ships could still be used,
often for many years, sailing with cheap bulk cargo on relatively gentle waters. The first desti-
nation in this new role could be in the Bay of Bengal, but usually the easy route between Bata-
via and Siam was used. Ships could be repaired in Siam, or even modified, for example by
removing the heavy superstructures used to accommodate many VOC employees on their
way from the Netherlands to Asia (Colenbrander , p. ). Rice and wood were cheap bulk
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cargoes from Siam; in some instances the old ships literally floated on their cargo of wood. Old
homeward-bounders were often used to transport soldiers and food from Batavia to the Spice
Islands. The ships could then be used in that area as floating fortresses (Coolhaas , p. )
or could return with spices. It must be kept in mind that spices were precious commodities in
the European market, but were bulk cargo with a low cost price in Asia. After  to  years,
barring accidents, a homeward-bounder usually ended its career as a steenhaalder (stone car-
rier), a floating warehouse or a ‘carpenters-ship’ (NA .., VOC , fol. ). In this last-
named function, the vessel was used to assist with the careening of other ships. When it became
too difficult to keep them afloat, the wood was used as firewood, or the hulls sold to local
Chinese to be burned down to salvage the structural iron that was still useful (Van der Chijs
, p. ). An interesting observation in this respect is that almost every homeward-bounder
which had made a successful voyage back to Europe was selected again to make another voy-
age to Asia. This is in contrast with the practice in Asia, where homeward–bounders were often
decommissioned for the return voyage if their condition was considered deteriorated, most of
them staying in service of the VOC in Asia for many years. This could lead to the conclusion
that the VOC was less concerned with sending large quantities of money and crew on the out-
ward sailing ships of dubious quality than risking the return of valuable cargo. Initially, it may
appear that the reuse potential of a homeward-bounder would be greater in the Netherlands
than Asia. However, due to their size they were too large for almost every shipping activity in
Europe, and the economic value of these ships on the European market must have been low
compared to the exploitation possibilities in the Asian network. These factors might have con-
tributed to the VOC decision to send inferior ships to Asia.
Men-of-war [Rate ]
Though the homeward-bounder was heavily armed, it was originally designed as a ship to
transport a large number of people and large amounts of cargo, not a warship. In Asia, the
VOC also used ships originally built for military purposes. Up to , these vessels were not
built by the VOC, but provided for by the State as support for the role the VOC played in
conflicts. Substantial financial exchanges took place between the VOC and the Dutch State.
The VOC had to pay the State large sums of money in taxes and a share of the profit generated
by the VOC’s many conquests of Portuguese ships. On the other hand, the State agreed to sub-
sidise part of the VOC’s activities as their share in the war against the Iberian enemies. Support
from the State was provided in the form of ships and equipment seconded from the Admiral-
ties, but could also be a grant or a loan. The Netherlands navy in this period was decentralised
like the VOC and there were various Admiralties in the Netherlands all with their own facilities
for shipbuilding. They were regularly ordered to hand over ships to the VOC.
This category, men-of-war, includes all ships provided by the Admiralties if there is evidence
to suggest that they were built in an Admiralty shipyard for military purposes and not commis-
sioned by the VOC. After , the Admiralties did not provide the VOC with any more ships
and the company bought or built a few warships itself. This category also comprises those
vessels mentioned in the VOC records as an oorlogschip (man-of-war) of which the origin is not
known.
Jachten are often mentioned in historical sources as being built or used as oorlogsjacht (war-
yacht). The rate of a yacht was not sub-classified as the terminology used in the source texts is
inconsistent and jachten could often operate as both military and trade vessels with equal suc-
cess. For the explicitly named men-of-war this was not the case. They are distinctly different
from cargo ships both in the way they were built and in the way they were used. It is apparent
that ships of a certain size were built either as cargo ships or as men-of-war. Distinctive differ-
ences include the layout of the decks and the weight of the construction needed for reinforcing
the hull and decks. Of course men-of-war could still transport cargo but the difference in the
cargo capacity for vessels of comparable size is striking. The Hollandias which both operated
during the same period and under the same name are good examples. Both Hollandias were
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listed as ships of  last. One Hollandia (ID:) was built specifically as a retourschip and first
sailed to Asia in . Another ‘military’ Hollandia (ID:) sailed to Asia via South America in
the Nassausche fleet in . When both ships sailed back in the return fleet of , the VOC’s
retourschip Hollandia could transport double the cargo of the man-of-war Hollandia. The first,
appropriately called the ‘big’ Hollandia, carried  million pounds of spices (including pepper),
 sockels of mace,  bundles of silk and . pounds of saltpetre as ballast. It is worth
noting that the spices alone accounted for nearly  last in th century terms. The other Hol-
landia could only carry . pounds of pepper and spices,  sockels of mace,  bundles of
silk and . pounds of saltpetre as ballast. Both ships can be considered to have been fully
laden (NA .., VOC , fol. ). Drastic modifications were required to make the men-
of-war suitable for cargo transport, such as sealing gun ports, which of course made them less
suitable for military functions.
Fig .: View of the bay of Cordes in the Straits of Magelhaen, expedition of Joris van Spilbergen ,
Badische Landesbibliothek Karlsruhe INV nr b.
This is the war fleet of Joris van Spilbergen in the Pacific Ocean in . This fleet depicts an example of
the use of the Admiralty ships in the service (partially) of the VOC. The three largest ships are the Grote
Maan (ID) and the Grote Zon (ID) of the Admiralty of Amsterdam, and the Morgenster (ID)
of the Admiralty of Rotterdam, all classified as Men-of-War, rate . The two clearly less heavily armed
ships are the De Grote or Zeeuwsche Aelosu of rate- (ID) of the Admiralty of Zeeland , and the de
Jager of rate (ID ), which was bought by the VOC. All these vessels remained in the service of the
VOC after their arrival at Ternate in  and did not return to the Netherlands.
The dimensions of the large men-of-war are comparable to those of the homeward-bounders.
According to the accepted wisdom of the first half of the th century, ships of this size were
too large to operate in the English Channel (Elias , pp. , , ). The Admiralties could
only use them on long expeditions against the Iberians in the Atlantic. If such expeditions did
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not take place, the ships could be handed over to the VOC. On the other hand: the VOC-built
homeward-bounders used in the first Anglo-Dutch War (/) were the largest ships used
by the Dutch. These ships could carry enough heavy weaponry for their military purposes, but
they had great difficulty in getting in and out of the Dutch inlets in company with the rest of
the fleet (Elias , p. ; Gardiner -a, p. ; Gardiner -b, p. ). On a few
occasions, Admiralty ships came into VOC service in Asia as part of a fleet sent out by the State
with specific military goals. After a number of years, they had to return to the Netherlands for
maintenance and, unlike the homeward-bounders, were then seldom used again for the VOC.
The Admiralty men-of-war remaining in Asia were often not seaworthy after a few years be-
cause of damage sustained in the course of their military involvement. Sometimes their service
was only temporary and they remained State property and the VOC only managed their opera-
tion in Asia. Two State fleets sailing to South America came under VOC management in Asia
after crossing the Great Ocean. The most important areas of military action were the waters
around the Philippines, the Bay of Bengal and for a short period between  and  in the
neighbourhood of the Sunda Strait.
The men-of-war built or bought by the VOC between  and  had a much longer
period of service with the VOC. Most of the eight ships called man-of-war in the VOC records
made at least two return voyages. Where the homeward-bounders were used for return
voyages and sometimes for action in the Arabian Sea, the men-of-war were normally used for
military action, but also made one or two return-voyages (including for maintenance pur-
poses). In Asia, their main theatre of operation was the Arabian Sea where the VOC’s military
objectives gradually changed from patrolling for Portuguese ships at sea to the blockade of
Goa. The Henriette Louise (ID:), the last ship built by the VOC specifically as a man-of war,
in , had a very long career and made regular return trips in the period when the VOC was
not at war with the Portuguese.
After , during the period of peace with European nations, the VOC apparently did not
require large warships. When new hostilities broke out with the English and the Portuguese in
, the yachts developed to such dimensions that they became the largest vessels with speci-
fic military functions sent out by the VOC.
Ships [Rate ]
A third category of VOC vessels with the type name ‘ship’ includes those vessels in service in
the initial stages of Dutch navigation to Asia, when no differentiation in ship- type was made.
These vessels were clearly not specifically homeward-bounders, nor were they men-of-war.
Each large vessel was simply termed ‘ship’ and used for multiple purposes: return-voyages, as
men-of-war and cargo carriers within Asia. The difference between ships and yachts during
this period is not very clear, mainly because of the lack of reliable primary sources with type
names. A vessel of  last and more was nearly always designated as a ship, but up to 
this term also included some smaller vessels.
All vessels for which reliable data are available for a lastmaat of  last or more, but without
a reliable type indication, are listed in Rate . About % of the  vessels listed in this rate are
the undifferentiated ships of the early period. They sailed to nearly all the VOC destinations in
Asia of that period. Other than yachts, there were very few policy guidelines in the early years
about sending specific ships to specific destinations. Admiral van Neck, for instance, first or-
dered the two smallest ships of his fleet to sail to China, because in his judgment the larger ones
were not suitable for that area, but later, he himself sailed to that destination on the Amsterdam
(ID:), one of the largest ships of this period (Foreest & Booy , pp. , ).
After , most ships used by the VOC had specifications as homeward-bounders or men-
of-war, but a few were simply called ‘ships’ and these are also included in Rate . They were
larger cargo carriers, ships often already in service for many years in Europe and bought by
the VOC for use when the Company needed to send large numbers of people and quantities of
supplies to Asia but did not expect to use the ships there afterwards because they thought that
crewmen, or the money to buy Asian goods, would not be available there (see next chapter).
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Most of these ships did however make some voyages in Asia; some even made a return voyage
carrying cargo back to the Netherlands.
Included in this rate are large vessels captured by the VOC from other Europeans. Some
large Iberian caraques were sailed to the Netherlands with a part of their rich cargo and a num-
ber of captured English ships also saw service with the VOC for a short time as men-of-war or
cargo ships in the Indies. However those other vessels captured from the English and called
‘yachts’ in VOC service, (like the Avondster (ID:)) are placed in the appropriate rates. Special
cases in Rate  are the French ship Saint Michel (ID:), confiscated by the VOC in Asia, and
the Spanish Galleon (named Spaans Galjoen (ID:)), which was conquered in Europe by the
Dutch, sold to the VOC and then sent to Asia. A few of the jonk-named vessels are placed in this
rate if there is evidence that they had a large cargo carrying capacity. They were bought and
used by the VOC in the beginning of their trade with Siam and Japan, sometimes also calling at
Java (Colenbrander & Coolhaas , p. ; Terpstra , p.).
Fig .: View of Tidore,  with the ships Amsterdam and Gouda on the anchorage. Badische Landes-
bibliothek, Karlsruhe INV nr b.
The Amsterdam (ID), a vessel of rate , and the Gouda (ID) , a vessel of rate  during the attack on
Tidore in . The Portuguese settlement is defended by two Portuguese ships together with the Dutch
yacht Trouw (ID), which was captured by the Portuguese earlier. The ships are clearly heavily armed
as all vessels were, which were out-going during the early period.
Yachts [Rate , ,  and ]
As early as the second Dutch voyage to Asia in -, vessels were used which were re-
ferred to as ‘yachts’. From that time on, yachts were part of nearly all the Dutch fleets sailing to
or in Asia. In number and in cargo-carrying capacity they made up the largest part of the
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VOC’s Asian fleet. Their dimensions varied widely. The smallest were only  to  last whilst
the largest appearing in th century VOC sources measured  to  last. th century draw-
ings of yachts show that their triple masted rigging and semi-enclosed superstructure are iden-
tical. All yachts were equipped with cannons, not only with one cannon in the bow, as on some
sloops and Asian vessels, but also with a cannon firing sideways through gun ports.
It appears that over time the differences between ships and yachts became more pronounced.
In the beginning of the th century, vessels with a cargo carrying capacity of  to  last
were often referred to as ships, whereas vessels of these dimensions were later more often
called yachts. It is not clear whether this was a change in name only or also in design, although
there are some indications that ships had a larger beam than yachts of the same length. Be-
cause the term ship was also used as a collective noun for vessels of all kinds, those vessels
called ships as well as yachts have also been included in the rates for yachts.
Fig -. Naval Battle for Goa . Östereichische Nationalbibiothek.
The men-of-war Utrecht (ID) is prominent in this illustration, but others, the men-of-war Vlissingen
(ID), the Ter Veer (ID) and the s’Gravenhage (ID), all of rate , are at the centre of the battle,
as are the Homeward-bounders (Wapen van ) Rotterdam (ID) and the Harderwijk (ID). The
smaller (war) yachts Texel (ID) and Bredam (ID) are seen to be outside of the battle with Portu-
guese ships, as well as the three afbreekboots (prefabricated vessels) -on the right- Klein Amsterdam (ID
), Klein Enkhuizen (ID ), and the Dolphyn (ID). Notice that these three afbreekboots (prefab-
ricated vessels) are small, but well armed copies of the larger yachts and do not seem to differ from the
yacht de Valck (ID), of rate .
Because of the large range of sizes of yachts and the fact that yachts of different sizes were used
for different purposes, it was necessary to divide the category for yachts into the following
rates:
– Big yachts of  last and more – Rate 
– Medium-sized yachts of  to  last – Rate 
– Small yachts, under  last – Rate 
Generally the difference in function was as follows: The large yachts of rate  had such a good
defensive and offensive military capability and were so seaworthy, that they did not have to
fear any single enemy or the sea conditions in normal heavy weather anywhere. Their action
radius was thus not confined by these factors. It is important to note that these yachts were of
the same size as the Dutch Admiralty ships in Europe (NA .., Liasses State General ,
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inspection report ships Sardam ). The dimensions and the expensive design of these ves-
sels (as compared to other cargo carriers) limited their tasks and areas of operation mostly to
military assignments. The amount of cargo they could load was often only of secondary impor-
tance. Many shores, ports and rivers were too shallow for these big yachts. Finding and orga-
nising repair and maintenance facilities for vessels of these dimensions was a problem for the
VOC.
Middle-sized yachts of rate  were also heavily armed, but because of their dimensions these
vessels were more vulnerable as targets for large European enemy ships. Since these yachts had
relatively small numbers of crew, they also ran the risk of being boarded by the enemy
although the closed quarters on board could provide some protection and possibly defence.
Sailing with other ships, they could make an important contribution to the military force and
the agility of such a fleet. On their own they could ship a useful amount of cargo to nearly
every port important to the VOC network. These vessels were all-rounders, suited to most
Asian destinations, and were primarily used for trade.
The cargo-carrying capacity of the small yachts of Rate  was so limited that they were not
useful for transporting bulk cargo over longer distances since the crew and their requirements
took most of the available space. Their small dimensions also made it a hazard to entrust them
with very valuable cargo in nearly all Asian locations (Colenbrander , p. ). When they
did make longer voyages, it was mostly for investigation or communication purposes. They
were most useful for logistical and military functions. Yachts with a very shallow draught and
which were more or less defensible were required for cargo transport over short distances or
controlling local shipping. As an offensive force, these small yachts could only be used against
unarmed or poorly armed Asian vessels; their shallowness and good sailing capacities, how-
ever, made them more effective for these tasks than the larger yachts. Their seaworthiness was
such that they were able to reach any of the areas of importance to the VOC. If they were built
in the Netherlands, they were able to sail on their own keel to Asia, but longer operations on
open oceans could cause problems.
The yacht in the function of homeward-bounder
In the period before  when there was not yet a regular service of homeward-bounders
between Europe and Asia and vice versa, yachts were also used for return voyages and were
called advies-jachten (literally “yacht of advice” from the th century Dutch, which translates to
“delivering instructions”). The advies-jachten did not belong to a specific type of vessel. Depend-
ing on the urgency of the communication, any available yacht could be dispatched from the
Netherlands, often with instructions to return immediately from Asia. This kind of yacht is
mentioned from  until about  after which communication was regulated in such a
way that homeward-bounders and some men-of-war returned to the Netherlands. Only on a
few occasions when there was a shortage of homeward-bounders due to unforeseen circum-
stances, were yachts recalled to the Netherlands. After , yachts were again sent back to the
Netherlands on a regular base. By then their dimensions had increased to such an extent that it
became useful to employ the largest yachts and flutes for this task. Moreover, these expensive
vessels had to be kept in good shape for many years, which was difficult to do adequately in
Asia and, therefore, a return trip to the specialist shipbuilding facilities in the Netherlands was
advisable.
Large yachts – [Rate ]
Yachts of this rate of  last or more, were used by the VOC in Asia from about . Their
assignments to Asia often coincided with periods when conflicts with other European nations,
England in particular, were expected in Asia. Eight yachts in this rate  came into services in
 - – during the spice monopoly conflict,  in - – a period of tension after the
Amboina executions in , and  in the years - – during the first Anglo-Dutch war
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and the resumption of the war with Portugal; with a total of  spread over concentrated peri-
ods. The other  arrived in Asia at a frequency of less than one big yacht every two years. As
the life span of such yachts was usually much longer than the conflict, they were often used for
purposes other than those for which they were originally intended. In some instances the con-
flict even ended before the yachts reached Asia.
From the early th century, the larger yachts combined military function with cargo trans-
portation in Asia. After , some large yachts took cargo directly from the Coromandel Coast
to the Netherlands. The Portuguese force in this area was such that until about  large well-
armed VOC vessels were needed to transport rich cargoes safely. With the development of
Batavia as a rendezvous, fewer yachts sailed directly from the Coromandel Coast to the Nether-
lands. During this period, until , these large yachts also played an important role in the
waters around the Philippines in preventing trade between the Spanish and the Chinese. Some
were also deployed against the English fleet in the confrontation around Jayakarta (later Bata-
via). After the conquest of Jayakarta and the establishment of Batavia as the new headquarters,
the VOC regularly blockaded Bantam to direct trade to Batavia. To prevent the English vessels
from sailing to Bantam, the Dutch fleet needed to include at least one vessel of the same force as
the enemy ships, so these blockades were often managed from a Rate  yacht, although there
were no open hostilities with the English.
In the period between  and , the VOC only purchased a few yachts of  last or
more. The yachts built by the Company in this period were all of Rate  dimensions or smaller,
with the largest charters in  and  of  by  feet and  by  feet respectively. With
military conflict with the Portuguese and the English looming from , the VOC felt the need
for larger yachts. In , the Company built yachts with a length of  feet and a beam of 
feet at its own wharfs. When the war started in , these dimensions were increased to  by
 feet for new yachts (NA .., VOC , --). According to the Heren XVII, yachts
of this size had to be brought into the egalisaties system at only  last, but in the Navale Mach-
ten they are shown as around  last, which must have been their actual cargo capacity. In the
same year, the VOC also bought some large yachts of about the same dimensions from the
wharfs in Zaandam, an important Dutch shipbuilding centre of that time. The same yachts
were first inspected by the Admiralties, which considered them useful for service after some
small adaptations. The high purchase price and the timing – the end of the war – meant that
they were not bought by the State (Elias , p. ). However, a few months after the inspec-
tion by the Admiralties, the VOC was able to buy them at a lower price. These yachts are also
mentioned in the Navale Machten at values of about  last. Between  and  the VOC
sent a total of  well-armed large yachts to Asia – three times more than in the previous 
years. Moreover, the VOC built two large yachts in Siam. During the short war with the Eng-
lish, the VOC also conquered a number of vessels, one of which, the Avondster (ID:), belongs
to this rate. However, before most of these big yachts arrived in Asia, the war with England had
ended and with it, the urgent need for these vessels of attack in Asia.
In  the VOC found itself with an extensive fleet of well-armed yachts that somehow had
to fit in with more peaceful activities. The relatively small cargo capacity of these yachts was
not an advantage and the specialised military function was in some cases a problem for trading
activities when their appearance made local partners uneasy about the VOC’s exact intentions.
In the s, the VOC only had need for the offensive military power of these yachts in the
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Most of the large yachts served in the annual blockade of
Goa on a number of occasions. This kept them locked around Goa from September to May
during the southwest monsoon. The yachts were then deployed within the area for other pur-
poses. There were limited trade options between Goa and Batavia, the most common was the
transport of pepper from the Malabar and cinnamon from Ceylon. Visiting Coromandel on the
return trip to Batavia would not allow enough time to refit and then resume activities at the
beginning of the next blockade. Commercially, the use of these big yachts for blockades was
justified because preventing Portuguese exports from Goa was believed to result in higher prof-
its for the VOC in Europe. During the annual blockade these vessels were fitted with up to 
cannon and  men to enable them to resist possible attempts by the large Portuguese vessels
to break through. The Portuguese did not succeed in breaking out of Goa; the Dutch vessels
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were indeed able to prevent this on the few occasions when they tried to do so but, although
the VOC was able to seriously disrupt the Portuguese transport system, they could not destroy
it completely. During the period of good weather in the off season, when the VOC blockade
was not in place, Portuguese ships had the opportunity to sail to and from Goa.
Sometimes, if the Portuguese force was considered to be weak enough, VOC vessels would
leave the blockade. On these occasions, the large yachts were used in the trade circuit of the
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Sailing with the monsoon winds, they traded along the
coasts of western Asia from the Persian Gulf, around Ceylon to the Ganges Delta and vice
versa. These heavily armed yachts were so safe that even local traders trusted their goods to
the VOC for transport in this area; large amounts of money or precious metals were safely
transported by the VOC. Only two Dutch-built big yachts were lost in this area in the period
between  and .
The large VOC yachts sailed another longer -purely commercial- circuit during this period.
This route started from Batavia to Japan and from there through the Strait of Malacca to the
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal where the yachts were then used in the Western Asian
circuit discussed above. On this combined circuit, the yachts could be away from Batavia for
over a year often transporting very valuable goods, changing their cargo  or  times before
returning. Their appearance in Japan, however, was counter-productive as Japanese authorities
were suspicious of the heavily armed yachts; they were accustomed to trade being conducted
with cargo carriers like the flutes (NA .., factory Japan , --).
Medium-sized Yachts (- last) [Rate ]
In the early years of the Dutch trade with Asia, yachts of – last regularly sailed to and
from Asia with the fleets. These yachts were specifically purchased for this purpose on the
Dutch ship market, and were then fitted out for the long intercontinental voyages. The rigging
was reinforced and an extra layer of sacrificial planking was added to protect the submerged
sections from the destructive effects of the wood-eating shipworm terredo navalis that lives in
tropical waters and could eat through a hull in a very short time. The medium-sized yachts
were a popular vessel-type. About twenty of these yachts were bought by the Voorcompagnieën
and they served their purpose well as nearly all of them returned to the Netherlands. The role
of this vessel-type in the Dutch-Asiatic shipping network was maintained and even extended
after the establishment of the VOC in . In  they decided to leave three yachts in Asia
to set up the basic infrastructure for trade and to make the acquaintance of the local rulers (NA
.. VOC , fol. ). In  the four yachts Arend, Griffioen Pauw and Valk, were specially
built by the VOC for actions in Asia with instructions to remain there. However, the VOC’s
military ambitions prevented the systematic development of an Asian network with these four
ships – although they sailed to various destinations for trading purposes, their main task was to
take part in military actions like the blockade of Malacca and the expedition to the Philippines.
In , simultaneous to the development of the homeward-bounder system, the directors in
the Netherlands discussed setting up a schedule for annual adviesjachten. In order to meet the
VOC’s need to ‘receive tidings and advice from Indien’ they proposed to buy three or four light
sailing vessels of around  last. Since these yachts were dedicated to delivering information
for the organisation and would not sail further than Java, they could manage with pinewood
sheathing and light armaments. On their way to Asia, they were allowed to call at the island of
Mauritius to collect ebony for the ships loading at Java where, in Bantam, the ebony was used
for ballast in other ships.
Assigning vessels to specific tasks was the first sign of an attempt to move toward a differ-
entiated shipping organisation. Soon after the VOC was founded, the directors also decided
that some yachts of slightly less than  last should be kept in Asia. The charters of the first
yachts built by the VOC itself (dating from  and ) mention yachts of about  by 
feet with a hold of  feet deep. Their construction was specifically adapted to tropical waters
and the possibility of carrying heavy armaments (NA .., VOC , fol. ). The lastmaat of
the vessels that were intended to remain in Asia, such as the flute after , were shown in the
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VOC’s records to be lower than it actually was. It is remarkable that the dimensions of the
vessels were mostly larger than the prescribed charter while the corresponding lastmaat, as per
the egalisaties, was less. This deflated lastmaat value can be observed in the records of the ma-
jority of the vessels that were meant to remain in Asia after  (NA .., VOC , fol. ).
In addition to building these ship-types, the VOC also started to buy medium-sized yachts.
The first yachts which were sent out by the organisation were not designated for a specific
route or purpose but simply for ‘sailing within Asia’. However, the VOC would soon pay atten-
tion to the specific requirements for vessels in certain areas and modify the yachts accordingly.
Eventually, medium sized yachts were the primary vessels in the VOC’s Asian fleet. After
, these yachts would seldom sail back to the Netherlands since the task of the adviesjacht,
that is. direct communication between the Netherlands and the VOC headquarters on Java, was
absorbed by the regular retourvaart. The lifespan of most of these yachts was shorter than 
years although some of the purpose built yachts could be in use in Asia for as long as  years.
Some vessels captured in Asia from the Iberians and the English are placed in this rate be-
cause of the similarity of their functional aspects to medium-sized VOC yachts. Although the
majority of the many captured Portuguese vessels were smaller, some – mostly those captured
in the period  to – were between  and  last. These are called Portuguese or Span-
ish navets in VOC sources that describe the taking of the vessels. While in use by the VOC they
were simply called yachts most of the time. The VOC captured the navets from the Portuguese
in the Strait of Malacca and on the coasts of India and used them in most regions except Japan
and the Arabian Sea, but only for a few years. The VOC captured English yachts were only in
service for a short period, with the exception of the yacht Supply, captured in  and re-
named Cabo Jasques after the location at the entrance of the Persian Gulf where it was captured.
In  the Supply/Cabo Jasques (ID:) was still used by the VOC in the Strait of Malacca.
From  onwards the VOC also built yachts of these dimensions in Asia, for instance, on
the Coromandel Coast and in Japara on Java. Most of these yachts were used on the coasts of
India and Ceylon but they also sailed to the Spice Islands and the South China Sea.
A multi-purpose vessel for Asian shipping
The medium-sized yacht developed as a very successful vessel type within the VOC’s fleet in
Asia. If extensive military power was not needed in a certain region or when the organisation of
trade did not allow large cargo carriers to operate, this type of yacht could be used efficiently
on almost every route for almost every purpose. The prefix oorlogs (war) was often attached to
the term ‘yacht’ for the vessels of this rate, but no yacht was exclusively called an oorlogsjacht
(war-yacht). The designations for these yachts reflected their use, which was mainly a combina-
tion of military and commercial applications. A selection of the  medium-sized yachts in
service by the VOC in Asia up to  will be discussed in detail in this section to demonstrate
the diversity of their use.
Soon after the VOC’s decision to establish a permanent organisation in Asia, discussions
started about the most suitable types of vessels for specific purposes in Asia. One of the first
ships to show a degree of specialisation on a specific trading route in Asia is the Der Goes
(ID:) which sailed to Asia in . This newly built vessel of  feet might be considered
to be one of the prototypes for the ships for the VOC’s Asian fleet. After arriving at Bantam, the
Der Goes made a trip to the Spice Islands in , after which it was reserved for the regular
trade between Bantam and the Coromandel Coast (NA .., VOC , -). By ,
when the ship was worn out, she had made five trips to the Coast. The trips were scheduled
with departure from Java at the end of the year and return to Java at the beginning of the
following year. On her fifth trip in  the Der Goes stayed in the Bay of Bengal and spent her
last years in regional shipping; at this time the ship was probably unsafe for the longer journey
to Java and back. The Der Goes was then replaced by the much larger Gouden Leeuw (ID:) on
this scheduled service (MacLeod a, p. ). It is interesting to note that the Der Goes was
one of the smallest vessels termed generically "ship" in VOC sources.
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Specialised vessels were sent from the Netherlands based on the VOC’s experiences of sailing
in specific regions of Asia. In  the assessment of the experts of the Chamber of Amsterdam
was that the yacht Groene Leeuw (ID:), with a length of  feet, a beam of  feet and a
draught when loaded of  ½ feet, would be useful on the Coromandel Coast (NA ..,
VOC , fol. ). This yacht of about  or  last did indeed sail directly from the Nether-
lands to that coast, but was also used in a number of other areas during its career in Asia of
more than  years. The Groene Leeuw was apparently suitable for gathering sandalwood from
Timor and made three voyages in three successive monsoons for this task. The slightly larger
Sterre (ID:) purchased in  particularly for use in the Spice Islands, was apparently a less
fortunate choice. In , it was already reported to be in a bad condition and it perished after
only one voyage to this destination.
In  the Heren XVII made the decision to build yachts that would, in addition to their
commercial tasks, be fit for military action in the shallow waters off the coast of Coromandel. It
is clear that there was some debate about the best design for these yachts. The VOC employees
at the coast reported that, to sail close to the vlacke cust (shallow coast) of Coromandel and to be
able to take these vessels into the river inlets of this coast for repairs, the draught (when empty)
should not exceed  or  feet (Colenbrander , p. ). On the other hand, the Chamber of
Amsterdam wanted these yachts to have a superstructure to provide shelter for the crew on the
long voyage to Asia and during the skirmishes in which these vessels would engage. The
yachts also had to be armed with heavy cannon. The decision makers clearly tried to combine
too many features in one design. The shallow draught combined with the heavy superstruc-
tures resulted in some unsuitable yachts like de Haan (ID:), which was known to have poor
stability and sailing capabilities. As early as its maiden voyage the de Haan was reported to be
too unstable and in need of additional ballast (NA ..., Aanwinsten () , fol. ).
Although there were many complaints about its design (Sloos , pp. , ), this yacht
was able to sail to Asia and served the VOC there for some years, including the offensive ac-
tions on the Chinese coast in , before it capsized near Java in  (Colenbrander , p.
). By trial and error the VOC arrived at the most suitable yacht design. Another, only
slightly larger yacht built in the same period – the Weesp (ID:) – had a successful military
career for many years, predominantly in the Arabian Sea, and was still in service in . It
functioned at the end of its career as an armed pepper carrier from the trading areas upstream
in southern Borneo [Kalimantan] where the rulers were in regular conflict with the VOC.
The multi-functional nature of these yachts is demonstrated by the yacht Sluys (ID:). Built
in  by the Chamber Zeeland with prescribed dimensions of  feet long, a beam of  feet
and a draught of  feet, the Sluys’s cargo carrying capacity was about  last. She was, in her
first years, used mostly in the Arabian Sea where good armaments were certainly required for
the transport of cargoes such as gold, myrrh and coffee, worth up to . guilders. Later, the
Sluys also sailed to the Spice Islands and Sumatra's west coast for cloves and pepper and to the
Coromandel Coast for cloth. After  armaments were hardly necessary for a yacht trans-
porting these bulk cargoes in these regions. The Sluys was still in service in . Similar yachts
in operation in that period had the same diverse cargoes and destinations.
Multi-functionality meant the ability to change from one task to another as well as the capa-
city to combine military and commercial objectives. The Concordia (ID:) was regularly desig-
nated as an oorlogsyacht (war-yacht) and was involved in the capture of the Blessing (ID:)
and the Supply (ID:). The Concordia was also to transport cheap bulk cargoes such as ebony,
used as ballast for the homeward-bound fleet from Mauritius to Batavia and coarse pewter
from Malacca to Galle. While bringing a very rich cargo from Suratte to the Persian Gulf in the
beginning of , news of the start of the first Dutch-Anglo war arrived overland. The yacht
was hastily unloaded and sent out to patrol that region in a purely military action, which even-
tually led to conflict with, and the subsequent capture of, the English East-India vessel Blessing.
After escorting the captured English vessels into Gamron, the Concordia loaded its share of the
 bales of silk bought by the VOC in Persia and transported them to Batavia.
The VOC had to make decisions about which vessels would best serve their purposes in
varied circumstances in Asia. Military tension was often the catalyst for some swift changes.
During the outbreak of the first Dutch-Anglo war the VOC decided to put the emphasis on
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more defensible yachts at the cost of the successful cargo carrying but less defensible flutes.
Often these choices meant a burden on the VOC later on in times of peace as these military
vessels became less economical than those they replaced. The yacht Domburg (ID:) was built
during the Dutch-Anglo war but arrived in Asia after that war had ended. Though the need for
well-defended cargo transport was no longer urgent in most regions of Asia, the Domburg
could still serve some purpose through the shipping of a cargo of silver from Japan to Suratte.
Its military capacity was fully exploited between May  and May , when the Domburg
took part in the blockades of Bantam and Goa. Between blockades over the period of a full year
it did not have any other commercial task other than transporting  last of rice from India to
Galle.
Small yachts (under  last) [Rate ]
The approximately  vessels in this rate are mostly or exclusively referred to as ‘yachts’ in
primary sources, but also included are vessels with other name-types such as fregat and pinas.
Yachts of these dimensions sailed as armed surveyors with the first fleets from the Netherlands
to Asia.
Early shipping was organised in fleets and initially these small yachts were to stay in the
vicinity of the larger ships, but they quickly made voyages on their own. The first recorded
European visit to Australia was made in  by the yacht Duyfken (ID:), measuring only 
last. It was probably  metres long and  metres wide with accommodation for a crew of
around twenty and three gun ports on each side.
In , the Enkhuizen Chamber was allowed to build two ships designated for intra-Asian
shipping (NA .., VOC , fol. ). The yachts Brack (ID:) and Hazewind (ID:) were
built. Both ships sailed to Asia in . The Brack only served for a short period, and was
wrecked in  on a trip to Japan and the Spice Islands. The Hazewind, however, had a longer
and more interesting career in intra-Asian shipping. In accordance with shipping practice at
that time the yacht made a round trip throughout Asia. It sailed to the Coromandel Coast, to
Japan and, from there, directly to the Spice Islands arriving back in Bantam in  where it
was deemed to be no longer capable of safe transport over longer distances.
With the development of a network in Asia, these small yachts were used for new purposes
in addition to the existing functions of survey, discovery and communication. Shortly after 
there was a demand to send small but defensible vessels from the Netherlands to be used in
Asia for trade in certain areas. Most probably local vessel-types were not considered defensible
enough. Building these small yachts in Asia was not a success, judging by the short period of
service of the vessels built there before . There were also serious concerns about their sea-
worthiness; the Groene Papegaai (ID ) built in Arakan in  and another Brack (ID:)
built in Jayakarta in  both capsized on their maiden voyages (Colenbrander , p. ; NA
.., VOC , fol. ).
The small yachts built or bought by the VOC in the Netherlands in the s, were  to 
feet in length with a beam of  to  feet. Generally they were armed with  to  cannons and
were crewed by  to  men, depending on the duration of the voyage. From  onwards,
small yachts, sent from the Netherlands, transported pepper for the VOC on the shallow Jambi
River and blocked the local private trade in cloves (called smuggling by the VOC) in the Spice
Islands (Colenbrander , pp. , ; Colenbrander , p. ). The Jambi River in the
southeast of Sumatra was an area where VOC vessels were subject to attacks from small Portu-
guese fusts (vessels probably comparable to a Dutch sloop). The Halve Maan (ID:) was also
listed as a vlieboot (a small square-sterned vessel in use since the th century). It had become
famous for its part in Hudson's voyage of discovery to find a passage to Asia in , after
which it was sent to Asia where it served the VOC for six more years (Colenbrander , p.
). The yacht, recorded to be of about  last, could transport at least  picol or .
pounds of pepper along the Jambi River.
In the period from  to , when the VOC intended to withdraw from most of the intra-
Asian trade, only two small yachts were sent to Asia from the Netherlands. At the same time
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about  vessels, built in Asia, came into service. Most of these had been captured from the
Portuguese, but the VOC now also had the contacts and the capacity to have yachts built in
Asia. The VOC had contacts with wharfs in the region near Surat on the Indian coast famous
for its shipbuilding tradition (Terpstra , p. ). At Ambon, the VOC were able to set up
some small-scale shipbuilding once they had developed some understanding of the local mate-
rials (Kroniek , p. ).
From  on, the VOC embarked on a programme to build small yachts in the Netherlands.
Their area of service had expanded. To frustrate Portuguese trade or Asians transporting goods
for the Portuguese along the coast of China and Coromandel and in the Strait of Malacca, the
VOC utilised small but well-armed vessels. In addition, when the establishment of Batavia as a
rendezvous brought conflicts between the VOC and the local Javanese rulers, the Dutch used
small yachts against local vessels and forces positioned at the harbours of the island. Between
 and , three to seven of these small yachts of  to  last were dispatched per year
with the fleets from the Netherlands for these tasks in Asia. With these dimensions, they were
somewhat larger than the yachts sent out before . They could be armed with up to 
cannons and could be manned with  sailors and soldiers when used for military purposes.
Some were soon lost during these confrontations, but others were in service for  years in
Asia.
Finding the balance between suitability for tasks in Asia and seaworthiness for the voyage to
that continent was a process of trial and error. The design of the yacht Rijswijk (ID:) built by
the Delft Chamber in  was disastrous. The sailing capacities of this yacht were so bad that
it had to be towed by the other ships of the fleet (NA .., VOC , fol. v). The fleet was
hampered to the point that Rijswijk was sent back to the Netherlands from the coast of Brazil
despite the issue of the defensibility of this vessel sailing on its own. On its way back in , it
was captured by Dunkirk pirates operating from the Flemish coast. When in  another small
yacht was captured on its way to Asia, the VOC changed their modus operandi. From then on,
for a number of years, small yachts were transported to Asia in the large ships in prefabricated
form and assembled there; these so-called afbreekboots are classified as Rate  and are discussed
on page .
After , the VOC made a further change in policy regarding the smaller vessels. The truce
with the Portuguese in Asia meant that fewer armed vessels were needed in this region and the
reduction of the threat from the privateers in European waters made it possible to send less
defensible vessels to Asia. Vessels of very small dimensions sailed with the fleets to Asia on
some occasions. These were the smallest sized yachts of between - last that could be used
over longer distances. The area these small vessels sailed in the period between  and 
is quite remarkable. The Leeuwerik (ID:), a yacht of  last, was used in Asia for  years and
sailed to both Japan and to Persia. The even smaller Zeemeeuw (ID:) of  last brought seven
slaves from Madagascar to Mauritius, and also made a voyage of discovery to Australia (Heer-
inga , p. ). The extensive use of these smaller vessels in this period can also be ex-
plained by the fact that it was the first time in its existence that the VOC had no need to fear
confrontations with other European military forces in the Asian waters of the VOC trade net-
work. The only area where the VOC used its military force against Europeans in this period
was in the waters around the Philippines to prevent trade between the Spanish and the Chi-
nese.
Frigates and other small vessels [Rate ]
Of the  vessels in Rate  only  originated from the Netherlands and most of them were
built in Asia. Vessels of less than  last in Asia were often listed as ‘frigates’. The VOC used
these type-descriptions very regularly for small captured Portuguese vessels or for small ves-
sels that the Company had themselves built in Asia for their own use. However, the frigate was
almost always also listed as a yacht . For this reason it is hardly possible to distinguish between
yachts and frigates of less the  last and both are therefore included in the classification: Rate 
. The frigate in the VOC fleet clearly originated in Asia; only once was a vessel listed as a
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frigate equipped from the Netherlands: Waeckende Boeij (ID:). Governor Van Diemen men-
tioned that frigates were very useful in fighting small Portuguese vessels. The frigates therefore
must have been well-armed and had good sailing capabilities (Coolhaas , p. ). This is
supported by the renaming of frigates sent to Ceylon as “yachts equipped for war” (Anthonisz
, p. ).
From VOC descriptions we have the basic specifications of the Portuguese frigates. They
were vessels of  feet long with a beam of about  feet, crewed for war by  men with 
cannon: three in the front and two in the stern (Colenbrander , p. ). Around , the
VOC built three frigates of  feet long and  feet wide in the area of Suratte. They were used
for a number of years as yachts in the Spice Islands to counteract ‘smuggling’. Most captured
Portuguese frigates had a short career with the VOC. As an exception, the frigate Pera (ID:),
captured in the Strait of Malacca in , together with the frigate Arnhem (ID:) ,built in
Asia, undertook a voyage of discovery in the Gulf of Carpentaria during the second VOC
expedition to that area in , after which it operated in the Spice Islands until . The
majority of frigates captured from the Portuguese in the Strait of Malacca were also used by
the VOC in this important route between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea. Using the
principle ‘it takes a thief to catch a thief’, captured frigates were deployed to attack other Portu-
guese vessels. Because of their sailing capabilities they were seen as better adapted to this task
than the Dutch built yachts.
Another ship-type included in this rate is the pinas. At the end of the th century, the pinas
was a small war-ship much used by the Dutch Admiralties. Some of these pinasses sailed out to
Asia with the first fleets. In the th century, the type-name no longer appears in VOC docu-
ments for vessels in Asian waters although in the Netherlands the type-name pinas was in use
for a heavily armed trade-ship whose dimensions increased over time. Some confusion can
arise with the type-indication pinance, also used in English sources in the th century for small
surveyors called ‘yachts’ in most Dutch sources.
The small yachts could be rowed in emergencies but were not specially designed for this
manner of propulsion. Oars are even mentioned for VOC vessels up to  last (Colenbrander
, p. ). The only mention found in the VOC sources to rowing over long distances, is the
use of the small tenders to rescue crews after a shipwreck. Around  there was a short
period when the VOC attempted to use galleys in Asia. Initially this type of vessel was mostly
used in the Mediterranean Sea. Galleys were propelled by large numbers of forced oarsmen.
The Iberians were also successful in employing these vessels in the region of the Moluccas.
Galleys were ideal to avoid the VOC blockades in times of little wind and to take supplies and
soldiers to their strongholds. These vessels were also successful in taking some smaller Dutch
vessels, like the one in  with Admiral van Caerden on board.
Around , the Dutch gained some experience in constructing and using this effective ves-
sel-type in their battle against Spanish galleys operating from Dunkirk on the Flemish coast.
Some galleys were brought from the Netherlands to be assembled in Asia (Colenbrander ,
p. ; Colenbrander , p. ; Colenbrander , pp. , , ). Another galley was
captured from the Portuguese in the Moluccas (Rietbergen , pp. , ) and one was
built on the island of Onrust near Batavia (Colenbrander , pp. , ). These vessels,
however, were not successful partly due to their poor construction but also because of a lack of
manpower to row them. A separate rate for rowing vessels was not included in the classifica-
tion system, and these vessels fit the criteria for, and are included in Rate .
Prefabricated vessels (Afbreekboots) [Rate ]
A special category was developed for the so-called afbreekboots. These were small vessels,
mostly yachts, prefabricated in the Netherlands and loaded onto larger ships. Afbreekboots are
also referred to in the reference sources as sloep, sloepjacht or roeifregat, but these vessels were
clearly different from the tenders that were standard equipment for larger ships and which
could be hoisted onto larger vessels. The afbreekboots were assembled at ports on route to Asia
or in destinations in Asia like Batavia or the Spice Islands and, after construction, sailed inde-
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pendently. They were reported in the logs of early Dutch fleets sent out by the Voorcompagni-
eën (Keuning , p. LXII). Afbreekboots provided the VOC with the ability to use small yachts
as surveyors, without the problem of having them undertake the whole voyage on their own
keel. In addition, they could be assembled in places where no shipbuilding facilities were avail-
able to the Dutch. These vessels were first built and then dismantled in a ‘construction kit’
form. Initially, the newly built vessel was cut into parts, but reassembling turned out to be
difficult. A Pinasse was transported in sections on the voyage of Mahu en de Cordes in 
but it took the crew days and a good deal of worry to fit the parts together. The result was not
satisfactory as the vessel was not watertight (Wieder , pp. , ). In the years that fol-
lowed there were many arguments about the best design for this type of vessel. Eventually the
VOC chose to take the various construction elements apart, rather than cutting the completed
vessels into sections, and had them shipped as real ‘do-it-yourself’ kits.
It is surprising that later on, when better shipbuilding facilities for small vessels were avail-
able to the VOC in many places in Asia, the Company still sent prefabricated yachts to Asia. A
possible explanation is that the Dutch shipbuilders in Asia were already fully employed with
the repair and maintenance of the VOC ships and perhaps it was cheaper to do this instead of
acquiring local materials and organising construction in Asia. In the Netherlands, shipbuilding
was cheap and easy, with all requisite materials to hand, while there were numerous com-
plaints about the problems of shipbuilding under tropical conditions. The economic benefits
from shipbuilding for the VOC directors in the Netherlands might also be relevant. In total, 
small yachts operating in Asia were identified as afbreekboots. Normally they were used for
survey and discovery in and around the Indonesian Archipelago. On some occasions, these
vessels were also employed on voyages of exploration into uncharted regions. However, dur-
ing the expedition to the Gulf of Carpentaria in the north of Australia in , the prefabricated
Cleen Amsterdam (ID:) and Cleen Wesel (ID:) turned out to be too narrow in the beam for
use on such rough seas (Colenbrander , --; Coolhaas , p. ).
The printed travelogues give the dimensions for some of the prefabricated boats of the earlier
period because apparently it was thought that there was little familiarity with these vessels
(Wieder , pp. , ). They were of about  last. After , some had a fully covered
hold, with accommodation for the crew above this deck and could carry a cargo of about 
last (Coolhaas , p. ). Their length was comparable to the smallest yachts sailing inde-
pendently to Asia: from  to slightly over  feet. (see also figure -)
The Nieuwicheyt (ID:) is a good example of the confusing contemporary use of type-
names and also of the multifarious functions of the prefabricated vessels. The vessel in part
form was transported on the ships of the Nassausche fleet sent out by the Dutch Admiralties to
South America. It was assembled in  on the western coast of that continent, and it sailed
with the fleet on its own keel over the Great Ocean to the Spice Islands. In the journals of this
voyage the vessel is called roeychaloupe. After reaching Batavia, the Nieuwicheyt was called a
opgeboeide sloup (built up sloop). The vessel was apparently defensible enough to be used to
patrol in the Strait of Malacca and in , it even sailed with the fleet going to the Arabian
Sea, this time simply as a chaloupe. After returning to Batavia, the Nieuwicheyt patrolled the
coast of Java under the type-name fregat and in an emergency situation was selected to take a
letter to the Coast of Coromandel. In this last activity it was called a jacht and even adviesjacht.
When the Nieuwicheyt arrived back in Batavia, it was dispatched to load pepper on the river of
Banjermassin on Kalimantan with instructions to be careful there because ‘de sloep van boven
open en gants niet defencibel’ (the sloop was completely open above and not defensible) (Colen-
brander , p. ). If the name was not so unusual and the evidence from the dates of arrival
and departure so convincing, it could be that a number of different vessels named Nieuwicheyt
existed at the same time.
The policy relating to prefabricated yachts changed abruptly in . After this date, no af-
breekboots were sent to Asia. The Heren XVII had already discussed this change in  and
decided to send one small yacht to Asia as an experiment. The Roemerswaal (ID:) with 
crewmembers and of about  last arrived safe and sound in Batavia (Coolhaas , p. ).
In , two even smaller vessels were bought by the VOC in the Netherlands and sailed on
their own keel to Batavia. They were recorded as quel or galjot (galliot) with a capacity of only
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 last. The new charter decided on by the Heren XVII for small yachts was  feet long and 
wide, whereas the last one for the prefabricated yachts was  feet by  (NA .., VOC ,
fol. ; NA .., VOC , --). Sending these small vessels on their own keel was
possible due to the reduced threat from privateers. The advantage was that the larger ships
could carry more spare materials for the fleet in Asia (Coolhaas , p. ). The galliots are
included and discussed in Rate .
Flutes [Rate  and ]
Fig .: Abel Tasman’s ships of his discovery journey in , at anchor at Mauritius. Nationaal Archief.
On all illustrations which are attached to his journal, there is a clear distinction between the fluyt Zeehaan
(ID ) of rate , and the (war) yacht Heemskerck (ID). The yacht Heemskerck, (with the de flat
transom) is flying the flag of the main topmast as a sign that it is the Admirals ship; the fluyt Zeehaan
(with the round transom) is depicted as being smaller than the Heemskerck, even though its cargo capacity
is twice as large as that of the Heemskerck. Besides this discovery journey, the Heemskerck was also used in
the military actions to Goa andManilla; the Zeehaan was mostly used for cargo transport.
The illustration shows how the yacht is also shooting towards the back, but the fluyt is defenceless against
attackers from that side. The third vessel depicted could be the Swarte Arend (ID ), a yacht which
landed at Mauritius on its way from the Netherlands to Batavia. It is however, more probable that it is the
Klein Mauritius (ID ) – a pre-fabricated vessel (rate ) – which during Tasmans visit was also used at
Mauritius.
At the end of the th century in the Netherlands, a ship-type was in development whereby
shipbuilders tried to combine large cargo-carrying volumes with small dimensions for tax-pay-
ing purposes. At the same time, they wanted to construct a vessel that was easy to sail and
could be managed by relatively small crews. With a ratio of one to five (unconventional for
that period) , or even six between beam and length, and very full lines with bulging bow and
stern sections, they succeeded in this task. In a short period around , this ship-type – ori-
ginally called (Hoornse) gaing  but later fluit – became the most successful cargo ship of north-
western Europe. Within the flute concept it was possible to develop different kinds of flutes
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with features specially suited to certain cargoes (like wood or grain) or specific regions (e.g. the
Northern Atlantic for whaling or the Baltic Sea for trade). However, it took longer for the VOC
to use this ship-type in Asia.
Fig. .: The conquest of Laala by De Vlamingh van Outshoorn, September , . Anonymous.
Wieder F.C. Monumenta Cartographica The Hague Vol. V, pl. .
The illustration shows the attack on Laala (Ceram) by the Vlaming, van Oudshoorn on September the
th, . On the right hand the Sas-van-Gent (ID) of rate  is to be seen, and on the left, the small
fluyt Zaandijk (ID). This flute has at least  cannon ports at the back and must have had a deck
inside on which the cannon was placed. This was not the case with the flutes Edam (ID:) and the
Zeehaan (ID:), which left for Asia in an earlier period and of which was established that they were
vulnerable because of the lack of the cannon backwards. The third larger VOC-vessel depicted in the
middle of the illustration is the Cochin (ID). It is most probably a captured Portuguese vessel, which
is mentioned as being a yacht with various data about the amount of lasts. Surprisingly, the Cochin still
has a holy figure on its transom
The first demand from Asia to send flutes came in December  from Jan Pieterszoon Coen,
in his position as Director of Trade. (Colenbrander , p. ). He called these vessels by the
old fashioned name he knew – gaing – and asked for them because the Company had a short-
age of sailors in Asia. The advantage of the flute, that is, that it could be sailed by a small crew,
also meant that these vessels had little accommodation space, which made them less suitable
for bringing many people to Asia. Before this request reached the directors in the Netherlands,
they had already decided to send flutes to Asia in their Assembly of September . The
Chamber Hoorn was ordered to build an experimental vessel of  feet long and  wide,
with a hold depth of  feet (NA .., VOC , fol. ), which was described as a ‘hand-
same bequaeme fluyte’ (a handy and suitable flute), but also named both a galiasse and a pinasse. A
comparison of dimensions of this and other vessels of the same period bought or built by the
VOC shows that this flute was extremely narrow with a somewhat shallow hold (NA ..,
VOC , fol. ). However, the vessel turned out to be suitable for the VOC’s purposes in
Asia. On a request from the Directors to be advised of the outcome of this trial in order to
decide on whether to continue this experiment, the Administration in Asia replied that the flute
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was useful and seaworthy (Colenbrander , p. ). Some modifications were made to make
this prototype, named Galiasse (ID:), fit for its task: the accommodation space was consid-
ered inadequate, the superstructure in the bow and the stern was extended in Asia, which con-
sequently reduced the sailing capacity. The Galiasse proved to be unsuited to military action.
After an engagement on the Chinese coast in , when the Galiasse was used to attack Ma-
cao, the ship had to be abandoned because of leakage (Groeneveldt , pp. , ). The
dimensions were also possibly less suitable for the intercontinental voyage or the routes in
Asia because the flutes built later for the VOC were not as narrow.
After this first experiment, the Directors regularly raised the possibility of sending flutes to
Asia in their meetings, but although Coen kept asking for them, no more were sent out until the
s. This delay highlights an interesting ambiguous situation the VOC was in during this
transition period: although the general goal was to establish a permanent organisation and a
fleet in Asia, in practice the focus was often still on local interests in the Netherlands. Each
Chamber preferred to send out homeward-bounders or returning yachts above the cheap flutes
that needed only a small investment and little equipment. In  it was again decided that the
Chamber of Hoorn would equip a flute – the Wapen van Hoorn (ID:) – but when a vessel
sailed out under that name, it was actually a homeward-bounder of  last (Colenbrander
, p. ). In , two charters were drawn up for the VOC to build two flutes of about 
feet long (NA .., VOC , --). There is no evidence that these flutes were built in
that year or the next. They were certainly not sent to Asia. In July , it was decided to buy
three flutes; two were indeed bought, the Edam (ID:) and the Gorcum (ID:), and sent to
Asia with the emphatic advice to use them in Asia and not to let them sail back to Europe again
(Colenbrander , p. ). This tension between the parochial interests of the Chambers and
the objectives of the VOC seems to be the reason why no flutes had been sent to Asia. Each
Chamber wanted vessels that returned with cargo. Apparently the situation had still not chan-
ged by , when Governor-General Brouwer identified this as the reason for the reluctance of
the Chambers to equip flutes (Coolhaas , p. ). That the VOC bought and dispatched
some flutes to Asia in the early s seems to be more the result of a sudden need for greater
cargo-carrying capacity to Asia, than meeting the requests from Asia for flutes. Cheap flutes,
which were freely available on the Dutch ship market, could meet this need. Shortly after ,
these flutes were partly used in Asia in a way that suited the VOC’s politics. In an attempt by
the VOC to reduce costs, the Dutch colonists (vrijburgers), who were independent of the Com-
pany, were encouraged to take on the role of the cargo traders of Asia. Together with the exist-
ing local shippers they brought the required products to the VOC rendezvous point in Java and
from there the VOC could confine itself to the transport of goods to the Netherlands. The flute
could play a role in this system and indeed one of the first two flutes was sold to the vrijburgers
in . Two more flutes were sold to them in later years and in , Governor-General Van
Diemen suggested sending flutes to Asia to be used by private Dutch traders (Coolhaas ).
However, the Directors had by then decided to maintain their control over the intra-Asian
trade and to keep any profits for the VOC. After that political decision it was a logical step for
the Company to send flutes to Asia to use them as efficient cargo carriers on routes within Asia
appropriate for this type of vessel.
With the VOC’s firm position in Japan, and European traders from the Spice Islands being
eliminated, there was a large volume of cargo to be transported by the Company in areas
where no military confrontation with heavily armed ships was expected. Nearly all the flutes
that came into the service for the VOC in Asia after  made one or two voyages to Japan
early in their careers, often via Siam and/or Taiwan and often carrying very rich cargoes.
When flutes became too old to risk such valuable cargoes on the dangerous East and South
China Sea, they were then used to transport cargo on the easier waters between Batavia and
the Bay of Bengal or the Spice Islands. Flutes in good condition could be used for the pepper
trade on the west coast of Sumatra. Old flutes were used to fetch pepper without many prob-
lems from southeast Sumatra and Malacca. It was on these routes that the flutes were used
until they were no longer seaworthy. Only some of the largest flutes returned to the Nether-
lands for maintenance
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The VOC purchased most flutes sent out, but some were built on VOC wharfs, and there are
records that one vessel was built in  on the Coromandel Coast: the flute Pegu (ID:) (NA
.., VOC , fol. v). In Europe, flutes commonly sailed without cannon or with only
lightly armament. VOC flutes were regularly reported as being armed with a considerable
number of cannon. However, as they were constructed without a square stern it was difficult
to arm flutes with cannon shooting from the stern, which rendered them vulnerable to attack.
After the type-name gaing was replaced by fluit, this was one of the most consistent type-
indications of a VOC vessel of more than  last. A vessel was a flute, in which case it was
always mentioned by that name and never by another type-name, or it was not a flute. Most of
the flutes used by the VOC were larger than  last. Due to the equalisation system which
struggled with the administration of vessels that stayed in Asia, all VOC flutes had to be re-
corded as  last irrespective of their real capacity (see p. ) (NA .., VOC , --
, --). More realistic dimensions can be calculated by taking into account the vo-
lume of transported cargoes, values as shown in the Navale Machten and the numbers of lasten
recorded when a flute was bought.
In , when the threat of new hostilities between the Dutch, the English and the Portu-
guese was imminent, the VOC did not send any more flutes to Asia. Vessels with a greater
military capacity were thought to be required. After the war with the English, flutes were again
sent to Asia (Coolhaas , p. ). The demand from Asia at this time was for smaller flutes,
to be used in the Channel of Taiwan, the entrance to Fort Zeelandia, which was becoming ever
shallower (Stapel , pp. , ). The flutes in Asia now clearly fell into two distinct cate-
gories: the large flutes, growing larger and larger, up to  last, and small flutes. The largest
flutes were also used as homeward-bounders (NA .., VOC , --), and were in
service all over Asia, whereas the small ones were mainly deployed on the Batavia-Japan route
and in the area around Taiwan. Flutes of the smallest dimensions, specially suited for use near
Taiwan, were hard to buy in the Netherlands, and most of them were built by the VOC. Typical
dimensions were  feet long,  feet wide with a depth in the hold of  feet, or respectively
,  and ½ feet (Stapel , p. ). When fully laden these flutes could carry approxi-
mately  last and had a draught of one foot more than the depth of the hold, which allowed
them to reach Fort Zeelandia on Taiwan with a full cargo.
In the classification of the flutes, the same margins in dimensions are used as for the yachts, i.
e. the most realistic cargo capacities and not those from the egalisaties. Large flutes in Rate  are
considered to be of  last or more, and small flutes (Rate ) below that value. Vessels smaller
than  last were seldom consistently called flutes. VOC references often refer to them also as
boot(je) or galjoot. Other references confirm this ambiguity of type-names for these smaller ves-
sels (Hoving , p. ). For this reason a rate for flutes less that  last has not been created.
Vessels occasionally called flutes with a lastmaat below this value are included in ‘Rate  – mis-
cellaneous vessels’
Miscellaneous small vessels [Rate]
The VOC used a large number of small and very small vessels in Asia, which were sometimes
owned by the Company and sometimes used by or for the VOC in other ways. For many of
these vessels, nearly always of Asian origin, we only know the type-name. They were mostly
used for local transport in ports and on or to roadsteads. They are not included as the scope of
this study is limited to ships that were registered, those which can be distinguished by their
own name and those which made voyages from one port to another.
In total,  vessels of less than  last meet these requirements and are clearly not yachts.
Nearly all vessels over  last can be classified as one of three main vessel types: ship, yacht or
flute. The only other ship-type deserving a separate rate for classification is the jonk (junk), of
which many were found in the VOC sources. The complication is that this ship type includes a
diverse range of vessels: both small vessels, as well as others with a cargo capacity up to 
last. The reality is, however, that in Dutch sources many Asian vessels were simply described as
junks but were most probably of very divergent designs. The few junks known to have a large
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cargo capacity are included in Rate : ships; small junks are included in Rate : miscellaneous
small vessels.
Fig. .: Bird's eye view of Bangkok, Anonymous, Badische Landesbibliothek.
Vessels flying the Dutch flag at the former toll post Bankock on the River Menam in Thailand. The VOC
used locally rented vessels as well as ships built for the company after models of Dutch ships for trans-
port between the Gulf of Siam, where the large ships had to remain, and the capital Ayutthaya, higher up
the river. An example of a vessel built after Dutch examples is the ‘bark’ or yacht Amsterdam (ID ) of
rate , which also made voyages to Batavia. It probably looked like the four small vessels on the right, of
which one is painted as a -masted Dutch ‘bezaansjacht’, and the other with typical Dutch leeboards.
The two large Dutch ships which lay for anchor at the mouth of the river could be the homeward-bounder
Groot Mauritius (ID ) and the Wapen van Hoorn (ID) which were at the mouth of the river
together during the second half of .
These miscellaneous small vessels were used for a wide variety of utilitarian purposes such as
communication, cargo, and transport. Their purpose in military operations was to pursue the
smaller Asian vessels. They were not fit to encounter heavy fire because they were only lightly
armed and had little protection against cannon shot or boarding by the enemy. This rate gradu-
ally took over the role of the Rate  vessels (afbreekboots) that the VOC brought out from the
Netherlands. The Asian vessels in this category were often well adapted for service in a specific
region: in the waters around Taiwan small jonken that were rented, purchased or captured
served as logistical support around this important junction of shipping in the Far East.
A number of vessels with typically Dutch ship-type descriptions were built for the VOC in
Asia, apparently to Dutch design. Drawings often show VOC vessels in Asia with typically
Dutch leeboards. Boeiers, a vessel type originally built for the shallow waters of the Dutch coast,
were built and used by the VOC in the Ganges delta where similar conditions existed. But
boeiers also sailed between the Spice Islands and from there to the Kay and Aru archipelagos
east of Banda. Kaag and smack, were also ship-types of the Dutch coastal and inland waters
that were used on the relatively sheltered route from Batavia to Jambi where they were able to
sail upriver. Vessels named bark, were built in Siam to Dutch design and used by the VOC to
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transport goods between the capital Ayutthaya and the river mouth, where the large ships had
to anchor(NA .., VOC , fol. -v). Some of them were so seaworthy that they
sailed to Taiwan or Batavia and sometimes even on to the Spice Islands.
Fig. .: View on the harbour of Souratte (Gujarat) ca. , Anonymous, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.
Besides local vessels, ships with a typical Dutch appearance, were used for transporting goods from the
anchorage of Suratte (kom van Suali) where the larger ships stayed at anchor, to the unloading sites at
the beaches or to the city of Souratte itself, up the river. Many of these ships are not administrated in the
database because they were only used for such local transport and not mentioned by their own names in
the sources. All the ships which are depicted in detail seem to be modelled on Dutch ship types, but also
seem to be adapted to the tropical environment by having an sun tent on the back of the vessel.
Ship type ‘Kaag’ could be used as being a type depiction under details  and . In , a vessel named
Geldria (ID ) is mentioned in the ‘Navale Macht’ as having been a kaag and being ‘lost at sea’. The
vessel at detail  looks as having been modelled on a Dutch State yacht. Detail  could be called a ‘boeier’.
Two boeiers from  taken up in the database, the Ouglij (ID) and the Masulipatnam (ID ) are
evidently from India. The VOC had many small vessels built at local wharfs in the vicinity of Souratte.
After , when the VOC again started to send small vessels on their own keel to Asia, a
number of small ship-types not previously mentioned emerge in the historical records. Next to
the type-name ‘yacht’, these small vessels were most often referred to as galjooten (galliots)
which nomenclature was attributed to  different vessels. However, the same vessel-type was
also regularly called boot, fregat, sloop, quel and sometimes even a (small) flute or yacht. The
galliot could apparently have a single smack sail, or it could be square-rigged (NA ..,
VOC , fol. ). It seems that the small single-masted galjoot (of only  to  last) was also
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called a quel, whereas the larger, sometimes triple-masted galjoot of  to  last could also be
called a boot or a flute. The small quel could make the long sea voyage from the Netherlands
with only twelve or fourteen crewmembers. The galliots were specially used for local transport,
particularly in those places where the VOC controlled a large coastal area (like Taiwan, Ceylon
and, after , the Cape of Good Hope) and transport between smaller locations within those
areas was needed. Galliots were also built in Asia.
The th century publisher of a shipbuilding manual Nicolaes Witsen discusses all the Dutch
ship-types mentioned in this section. His reflections, translated below, on the design of a ship
for the high seas as well as in shallow harbours and rivers exactly illustrates the problems
encountered by the VOC (Witsen , p. ):
‘Over het bouwen van Boeijers, of Galjoots, die van hier na Rouan in Vrankrijk varen, werdt veel
geredekavelt; .. want zy moeten door zee, rivier, en water dat droogh loopt. Ter zee is een lang schip
met een diep gaande kiel nut.: op vlieten die ondiep zyn pryst men het platboemt vaar-tuigh: op
drooghtens loopt het lange Vaar-tuigh noodt van de lendenen te breeken; in zee het korte van niet
te konnen ryzen en van de golven bedekt te worden. Waar om niet zonder reden is de zelvige te
voorzien met styve lendenen, en kielen die in 't midden zwaar zyn, doch ondiep: waar tegen de
zwaerden dienen vergroot, om in zee het afdryven met een ondiepe kiel te beter te beletten; ook
moet men het vlak minder doen ryzen als de gewoonte is, om niet om te slaan, of ongeval te lyden,
wanneer de Scheepen op droogh zitten. In 't algemein is raadtzaam, geen Boeijers, of Galjoots, al te
zwaar te maken, omdat in dien gevalle de gaffel, of het zeil, als het quaat weer maalt, niet is te
beheeren, en de mast het schip zeer doet slingeren, in duiken, en water vangen. Maar het is te
raden, in stede van Galjoots of Boeijers van  last, Boots met drie masten te bouwen, welke
bequamer te redden, en gemakkelijker te beheeren zyn, ook min afdryven’. [There is a lot of dis-
cussion about the building of boeijers or galjoots sailing from here to Rouen in France…
because they have to pass through seas, rivers and waters which run dry. At sea a long
ship with a deep keel is useful; on rivers which are shallow the flat-bottomed Vessel; on
the sands the long Vessel is in danger of breaking, at sea the short will pitch too much
and be swamped by the waves. For that reason they must be sturdily built with a keel
that is heavy in the middle, though shallow; against this the leeboards have to be larger to
prevent the leeway caused by a shallow keel. Also the bottom must not be raised as is
usual to prevent capsizing or other problems will occur when the Ships are sitting on the
sands. Overall it is advisable not to make Boeiers or Galjoots too heavy, because in that
case the gaff, or the sail cannot be managed in bad weather and the mast will make the
ship roll and pitch and catch water. It is advisable instead of Galjoots or Boeijers of  last,
to built Boots with three masts which are easier to manage and make less leeway].
Availability of a suitable fleet: review of the composition of the fleet to

The efficiency and adaptability of the VOC fleet made possible the expansion of Dutch trade in
Asia. Trade contacts and shipping routes developed because the VOC had at their disposal an
efficient fleet comprised of ships suited to the varied requirements of the organisation. As ex-
plained in previous chapters, the VOC’s activities in Asia were diverse, the shipping regions
were extensive, and extreme nautical conditions could be encountered. The vessels of the fleet
needed to be equipped for adverse seas and weather conditions, and able to carry out a range
of different activities. These activities could be as varied as: long distance trade; local supply;
survey; personnel transport; military action and blockades. In many instances, a vessel had to
change from one activity to another very swiftly, when necessary.
As the VOC developed in size and complexity so did their fleet. For each ten year period up
to , the number of vessels brought into service and the total size of the fleet were analysed.
Vessels that came into service were: constructed in one of the VOC shipyards in the Nether-
lands; purchased on the lively Dutch market for ships; captured; or in some cases built in Asia.
Some vessels were only active for a very short time whilst others served for more than twenty
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years. Therefore, a vessel may be counted in successive periods. To determine the size of the
fleet at any given time, the entire career of each vessel had to be traced, including all voyages
and stays in ports. The analysis of vessel histories provided information about the lastmaat or
cargo capacity of each vessel at the time it came into service and throughout its career, supply-
ing data on the actual capacity of the VOC fleet per period.
Table .: The development of the VOC fleet up to  in ten-year periods
Table . shows the overall growth of the VOC fleet. In the first  years until , the total
fleet increases to  vessels. For the following  years, between  and , the number of
ships used by the VOC in each ten-year period was stable at around  active vessels. Between
- there was a drop in the number of vessels in use. It is only after  that the capacity
grew again to  vessels in service. These figures do not represent the size of the fleet at a
specific moment in time but the total number of vessels that were employed over a ten year
period.
In order to understand the policy of the VOC to adjust their fleet to the demands encoun-
tered, the figures in Table - have been refined to show the distribution of vessels by rate, this
is shown in Table -.
By classifying the vessels into rates, it becomes possible to uncover various factors at work in
the development of the VOC fleet in Asia. It is important to note that in the early years, almost
half the fleet comprised of rate  – unspecified ships and by  rate  comprises less than %
of the fleet. This change demonstrates the introduction of the differentiated fleet.
Although the rate  homeward-bounders were primarily intended for the shipping between
Europe and Asia, they also played a substantial role in intra-Asian shipping (up to % of
vessels). It seems a maximum number of - vessels of this rate was simultaniously in service
from  to .
Throughout the entire period the proportion of smaller vessels (rate -) is % or higher.
The shift in the ’s from rate  to rate  vessels within this important sector is an interesting
development. This change of vessel types indicates the replacement of European vessels for
Asian built vessels.
Although Table - shows the distribution of vessel types within the fleet for certain periods,
it doesn’t reveal the VOC policies governing the building of the fleet in the changing circum-
stances. For this information the distribution of vessel types brought into service during these
periods needs to be analysed (Table -).
The types of vessels that were brought into service by the VOC during the various stages of
its establishment in Asia are shown in Table -. The pattern of vessel types introduced is
linked to the VOC’s shipping policy. Nevertheless, the data only shows the general develop-
ments. A general development that can be seen in Table - is the increase in the percentage of
smaller vessels (up to rate ) brought into the fleet, reflecting the changing developments of the
intra-Asian shipping policy, while the number of larger vessels remains stable – those predomi-
nantly used for inter-Asian shipping. Another reason for this high input of smaller vessels is the
shorter lifespan of these vessels. By  rates - comprise more than % of the vessels
brought into service
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Table .: Vessel types in service in Asia up to  in ten-year periods for Rates -
Table .: Vessel types brought into service up to  in ten-year periods for Rates -
The boom of rate  vessels in the s is due to the high input of fregatten captured in Asia. The
introduction of the flute (rate  and ) from the s is an indication of a period when cargo
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carriers could replace more heavily armed vessels, and the decline of the flute in the s
reflects the resumption of military tensions in Asia.
As stated, the figures in Table - do not represent the size of the fleet at a specific moment in
time or developments that could take place within a ten-year period. An examination of se-
lected individual years indicates the size of the fleet in use in Asia at certain points. A recon-
struction has been made for , , , , and . The selection of these years is
based on  as the starting point, because this was the first year a Governor-General in Asia
actively pursued a policy of building an Asian fleet. After that, eleven-year intervals were cho-
sen in order to spread the reference years equally over the periods. As the exercise revealed
dramatic changes in the composition of the fleet in the analysed years, the additional reference
years of , ,  and were examined. This analysis showed that the VOC was able
to react swiftly to changing circumstances by bringing specific vessels into service in a rela-
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Table .: The status of development of the VOC fleet in the selected years
Table - shows a sharp increase in the size of the VOC fleet in Asia between  and .
This is related to the build-up phase of a permanent trade and shipping network in Asia to-
gether with the deployment of a fleet of ships to fight the English. Yachts of all sizes (rates , 
and ) were almost exclusively responsible for the growth of the VOC fleet in this period.
After a peak in , the size of the fleet stabilised at a slightly lower level in  and .
This drop was due to the VOC’s strategy of cutting costs by attempting to privatise parts of the
shipping in Asia; in line with that policy, to concentrate on the shipping between Europe and
Asia and leave the Asian trade to the vrijburgers. One of the first flutes (Gorcum (ID: )) that
the VOC sent in the s together with some captured Portuguese fregatten (e.g. Rendez-vous
(ID: ) and Nieuwe Parel (ID: )) were sold to the private traders. Also, one can observe the
growth of private shipping through the so-called vrijlieden-junks that were purchased locally. At
the same time, the number of ships sent from the Netherlands coming into service in Asia
shows a clear low in the 's. Between  and , the VOC sent  vessels to Asia to
build an extensive fleet that could counterbalance the fleet of the English. Between  and
, only  vessels were sent out. The absolute low was in , when only three vessels
were sent (average for ‘normal years’was  to ). In   ships were sent from the Nether-
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lands, but  of them were part of the Nassausche fleet that was sent by the Dutch government
via South America. In , five VOC vessels were sent to Asia. In , this policy of privatisa-
tion was abandoned and the number of ships sent from the Netherlands for service in Asia
showed a growth again to  vessels between  and . Between  and  the com-
position of the fleet did not change much apart from the introduction of the flute (rates  and )
and the rise of the smaller vessels, many of which were Asian. The flutes show the extended
possibilities of sending trade-orientated vessels to Asia; the smaller vessels indicate the VOC’s
progress in organising their shipping at a local level by using adapted vessels in Asia. In addi-
tion, the popularity of the afbreekboot (rate ) reached a peak in .
After  trade was booming. The size and compostion of the fleet in  reflects the pri-
macy of trade in this short and relatively peaceful period. The role of the big flutes grew spec-
tacularly. The role of retourschepen was also extended and they were employed more often in
Asia. As explained in chapter  on the logistical organisation, new retourschepen sailed on the
Taiwan-Malacca route, middle-aged ships on the Surat-Persia and Thailand-Japan routes and
the older retourschepen of rate  ships sailed between Batavia and Galle, and Thailand and the
Spice Islands.
In , the fleet had reverted to a war-orientated composition. More defensible middle-sized
and large yachts were employed at the cost of flutes and local vessels in rate . The flutes dis-
appeared at a fast pace because they had a lifespan of about ten years in Asia and so, from the
peak in , very few still existed in . Only the number of small flutes, needed for logisti-
cal support in the Far East, could grow (see chapter ). After the Anglo-Dutch war was over the
yacht was employed on trade routes, but the VOC resumed the sending of flutes to Asia (
flutes were dispatched between  and ). Thereby, the trade-orientated component of the
VOC fleet increased. An interesting development is the growth of rate . From  onwards,
the VOC brought even very small flutes (also called boats) and galliots into service. These
smaller utilities were sailed from the Netherlands to Asia or locally built. They became very
popular at Taiwan where the channel was silting up and they were also used around Ceylon
and the Coromandel Coast.
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6
The shipping and logistics in operation
Introduction
The composition of the VOC fleet, including the specific features of vessels tailored for opera-
tion in the Asia regions, is an important aspect of how VOC shipping functioned in Asia.
Knowledge of the logistical aspects of the VOC’s operation is of equal importance for a thor-
ough understanding of this complex organisation.
In this chapter the strengths and weaknesses of the VOC system in Asia are examined. The
methods the VOC used to solve bottlenecks and maximise their advantages is the focus in this
chapter. The VOC’s central focus must have been the efficient use of their fleet. Some of the
requirements for this are so basic and obvious that they probably would not be part of a con-
sciously formulated policy. For example, the stipulation that a vessel should stay afloat may
seem unnecessary and trivial, but it did determine to a large extent the VOC’s operation in
Asia. To keep VOC vessels in ‘floating condition’ an intensive programme of maintenance was
required. For this purpose, facilities and materials needed to be available at strategic places
within the Asian network. Moreover, the main goal of the VOC – shipping merchandise – was
connected to this basic requirement. The nature of the cargo and the way in which it was
loaded needed to be organised in such a way that the vessel was stable enough to sail, but not
with a draught that was so deep as to cause problems in shallow passages. Vessels that were
‘too stable’, risked being too inflexible on the swell of the sea and this could easily cause dam-
age to the construction and the rigging. Moreover, a deeper draught could limit the use of a
ship drastically – when a ship heels to one side while sailing, the gun ports can fall below the
waterline. This occurred on board the ship Wapen van Hoorn in . They had limited use of
their sails because the supplies of food, water and beer caused problems with stability. Only by
rearranging the cargo while sailing could they avoid to jettison these supplies (Colenbrander
, p. ).
Loading the vessel required expertise; the right combination of types of cargo including bal-
last products, and a system of control so that instructions were followed and cargo was not lost
to private trading by the crew. In contrast with the English and the Portuguese, the VOC did
not lose ships due to the replacement of ballast with the products of illegal trade. A striking
example of this practice was the sudden sinking of a ship of the English East India Company in
:
‘The same evening, in perfectly fair weather, while standing along the coast towards Da-
man, the former [ship Whale] suddenly heeled over and sank’. According to the Dutch
agent at Surat the ballast had been thrown overboard to make room for private trade and
the goods of native passengers. Woodcock, the ship’s master, on his return to England
denied this and furthermore declared that the ship carried  tonnes of stones and 
tons of pepper. However, the Court told him: ‘that all the depositions and circumstances
considerable in this do concur that she oversett by being overladen in her upper works,
carrying  peeces of ordnance, whereof four brass cannon of . weight apeece, be-
sides greate stoare of goodes for private trade, and that the ship was not stiff enough
under water’ (Foster , p. xxii).
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In , the founder of the Cape Colony, Van Riebeeck, complained about the poor way his
ship was loaded:
‘sijnde op 't hoogste beclaeghlijck dat de dienaers ofte sjouwers van d'E Comp in 't vaderlant soo
weijnich na de wel gevende ordre van d'E Heeren bewinthebbers passen op 't affladen ende stuwen
van de scheepen, waerdoor Comps goet ende sooveel sielen in prijckel worden gestelt, want soo
haest comt qualijck een degelijcke wint in de seijlen, off 't schip valt soodanigh op sijde, dat het
schijnt te willen omvallen’ [it is highly lamentable that the servants and dock-workers of the
honourable Company in the fatherland don’t follow the well given instructions of the
directors on the loading of the ships, so that the Companies goods and so many souls are
placed in jeopardy for as soon as the sails catch some considerable wind, the ships heel
over so much that it seems to capsisze.] (Bosman & Thom , -).
The fine tuning: loading the right combinations of cargo items and ballast products within the
right time and at the right place; was often critical and inextricably bound up with the organi-
sation of trade and shipping. To enforce the VOC’s trading position, military operations were
often necessary; this resulted in another set of specific requirements for the fleet and the VOC
staff. Sufficient qualified personnel needed to be available for both trade and military opera-
tions.
The above general aspects all had ramifications for the total logistical organisation of the
VOC in Asia. They determined the choice and the employment of the various vessel types. In
the following section, the logistical development is outlined. This process will be studied by
following the changes that took place during the development from the first Dutch voyages.
The development of the organisation of shipping is described in a chronological sequence start-
ing with the Voorcompagnieën and the early years of the VOC and ending with an analysis of the
complex fully operational intra-Asian network. The logistical organisation is discussed in dis-
crete facets such as ship’s equipment, crew, maintenance, cargo and ballast.
The early stage of Dutch shipping in Asia
Ships’ equipment
At the commencement of the Dutch-Asiatic shipping, the ships that sailed back and forth were,
to a large extent, self-contained. This means that, for a trip to Asia and back to Europe, food
supplies and spare materials needed to be taken and stored on board. Many spares were car-
ried in order to keep the ship in good shape during the intercontinental voyage followed by a
short stay in Asian waters and then the homeward bound voyage (all in a planned period of
two years). Vessels needed to have a minimum of two sets of sails including some extra sail-
cloth (NA .., VOC , fol. v), eight anchor cables of  fathoms (more then 
metres), eight anchors, an extensive selection of spare ropes, some barrels of pitch, tar and other
maintenance materials as well as timber for repairs to the ship. There are not many instances
recorded where a lack of spare materials is a problem. In general, the issue was the massive
volume that these materials took on board. Luckily the crew of these first voyages were still
relatively small compared to the later period, when space on board became a serious issue. In
the many ships’ journals of the period, the most commonly reported problem was the number
of anchors. Operating in still unfamiliar waters, the ships often lost anchors due to a lack of
good anchor rope or if they had to cut the ropes and were not able to later salvage them. In
, the Middelburg arrived in Asia with only one anchor left. It had lost nine anchors on its
voyage from Europe. The management in Asia complained about the poor quality of the an-
chors (Colenbrander , p. ).
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
Crew
The crew of the ship was possibly the most important aspect of the self-sufficiency of the expe-
ditions to Asia. At the beginning of Asian shipping, little experience existed in long haul
voyages and the size of the crew required had not yet been determined. On the first voyage to
Asia, the  crewmembers divided over a fleet of four ships (with a total of almost  last)
turned out to be too few to bring all the ships back to Europe. During the voyage, the size of the
crew was reduced to such an extent that one of the vessels needed to be abandoned. Of the 
crewmembers, only  survived the trip to Asia. The middle-sized ship Amsterdam (ID:) was
destroyed by purpose near Java (Rouffaer & IJzerman , p ). On the following expedi-
tions from the Netherlands to Asia the same problem arose. During the voyage, the fleet was so
under-manned that sailors from Java had to be employed to take the ships back to Europe (De
Jonge , p. ).
On the ship Lange Bark (ID:), so many sailors of the initial crew of  were incapacitated
that only seven were able to serve at the helm. The hopelessness of the situation was expressed
in the ships journal: Two were onboard who could climb the topmast, of which one earned a jar
of wine because he had hung the flag, (in my opinion) he would have deserved it more if he
had hung a black sheet (cited in Foreest & Booij , p. )
Although ships were almost never left behind exclusively due to problems with the crew, the
running ashore of the Liefde (ID:)in Japan (Adams , kolom ) and the Hendrik Frederik on
Ternate can be partly explained by the lack of capable crew. The burning of the unseaworthy
Haarlem (ID:) near Patani in  could also have been as a result of problems with the crew
(Foreest & Booij , p. ).
Almost every ship that was sent out by the Voorcompagnieën in this period had substantial
difficulties in returning to the Netherlands, because there were simply too few fit crewmembers
to sail. On the return voyage of the Tweede Schipvaart in , the situation was so pressing that
one of the ships even had to borrow crew from an English ship in order to sail safely through
the channel back to the Netherlands (Keuning , p. ). In the expeditions that followed,
the experience gained led to larger crews and a drop in mortality due to quicker routes and
more reliable staging posts.
However, the larger crews created new logistical problems. In order to house these extra
people and their supplies, the space on board needed to be rearranged. In particular, the stock
of food for two to three years required new facilities and specially adapted rooms were con-
structed. The bread rooms, for instance, were sheathed with tin to protect the bread. If the food
was consumed in the course of the voyage, these locations were used for the storage of cargo
for the return voyage, especially the more valuable and vulnerable products like spices, includ-
ing pepper (see e.g. Keuning , p. ; De Jonge , p ; Van Foreest & Booy , p.
). Although the larger crews solved the immediate problem, of keeping the ships sailing,
new logistical requirements were created of which the Dutch had little experience.
Ballast
Adaptations to the ship to house a larger crew and their supplies created adjustment problems
for the ballast of the vessel. Traditionally, the Dutch skippers were able to sail their ships with-
out cargo with only the necessary ballast to make the ships stable. The new problem was the
diversity of the equipment and variable nature of food supplies during the voyage. To find the
balance between cargo, equipment, supplies and ballast was a challenge for the Dutch skipper.
It is obvious that this was a process of trial and error. The early journals describe the difficulties
they had in stabilising the ships; sometimes the volume of the required items they had to carry
did not provide enough weight to stabilise the ship. Lambert Biesman, who sailed in the fleet of
Oliver van Noort, complains in  that they missed a favourable opportunity to sail because:
‘the ship was crammed with goods but [was] too unstable to sail’ (cited in IJzerman , p.
).
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An additional complication was the heavy armaments that these ships carried in order to be
ready for a confrontation with European enemies. In at least one case during this early period,
the combination of poor stability and heavy armaments was fatal. The Maan (ID:) capsized
because of insufficient ballast near Dover when it fired a salute (De Jonge , p. ). Often
ships made a stopover on the coast of England to take in extra ballast after they left the Nether-
lands. Based on the experience of the first days at sea, the skipper would send boats to collect
ballast stones to adjust the stability of the ship. This constant concern about stability would also
be one of the main logistical issues for shipping in Asia, as explained later in this chapter.
Logistics of the shipping route to Asia
Soon after the establishment of the VOC, ships were sent to Asia to serve in the shipping net-
work there. This study is focussed on the intra-Asian shipping and thus also on the logistical
aspects once trade and shipping were established there. In most instances, the shipping be-
tween Europe and Asia is not included within the scope of this research. However, there are
some important aspects of the intercontinental shipping between Europe and Asia that influ-
enced the shipping within Asia. In Asia, the origin of a vessel determined its features to a large
extent. Since more then half the vessels in the VOC fleet originated from Europe, they were
either large enough and fit enough to make the intercontinental journey on their own keel or
small enough to be transported on board another vessel. In the first decades of shipping to
Asia, all ships were used for both transport between Europe and Asia and for shipping within
Asia. Gradually, these two aspects of Dutch-Asiatic shipping were differentiated and the major-
ity of the fleet in Asia sailed from the Netherlands only once, or stayed in Asia for a longer
period and only sailed back to Europe for major maintenance. The VOC also used vessels that
were acquired in Asia. Some of these could be built in Asia and therefore did not need to meet
the requirements for the intercontinental passage. Others were captured from European com-
petitors who had also made the trip to Asia. Apart from the afbreekboots or other vessels that
were transported on board other ships, this applied to all vessels sailing on their own keel.
Ships from around  last sailed to Asia independently, and on some occasions without the
support of a fleet. The passage over the Atlantic and Indian Ocean required specific features
for the rigging, the strength of the construction and the accommodation on board. In the fol-
lowing section these aspects that directly or indirectly influenced intra-Asian shipping, are in-
vestigated.
The fitness of the arriving crew in relation with the duration of the voyage
By , the VOC had established the fastest route over the Atlantic Ocean to the Cape of Good
Hope and the route to Java over the southern part of the Indian Ocean. If the skipper followed
the prescribed course and if no extraordinary setbacks were encountered, a voyage from the
Netherlands to Batavia could be made in a minimum time of four to five months. This was, at
the same time, the maximum reasonable time span that a ship could stay at sea without taking
in fresh water and food. Water and other beverages took up a large volume but they were
sufficient for six months if strict rationing was followed. A limiting factor was, however, the
lack of fresh food that often resulted in the fast deterioration of the health situation on board
due to scurvy after three to four months. A period of five to six months at sea could thus be
critical for the safety of the voyage. In June , the yacht Tortelduif (ID:) arrived in Batavia
with an immobilised crew. After a little more then seven months at sea scurvy had taken its toll
(Heeres , p. ). Scurvy was a major problem on these long voyages. There were some
known remedies like fresh fruit (mainly oranges and limes). Places to provide this fruit were
desperately sought after on the first voyages; soon lime juice was also shipped on the outgoing
fleets. The ships’ officers were explicitly instructed to provide lime juice in the morning and the
evening to crewmembers who showed the first signs of scurvy (Commelin b, p. ). In
, the Gouda (ID:) brought in  glass bottles of lime juice (NA .., VOC , -
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) and the Sonne en Amsterdam four half amen ( litres) (NA .., VOC , uitrust-
ing ). A more intensive method was the growing of vegetables on board (Commelin g,
p.). Often, however, these measures were not sufficient to keep the crew fit on the long
voyages (NA ,., VOC , Resoluties Bantam).
Some ships made the trip to Java without a stopover, although passing the Cape of Good
Hope without taking on refreshments was not without risk. For instance, in January , the
Wapen van Delft (ID:) arrived after a voyage of  months with  deaths. In May , the
ship Nieuw Delft)ID  left the Netherlands and passed the Cape without taking on refresh-
ments. It then proceeded to sail along Madagascar and Mozambique, finally arriving in a deso-
late condition on the west coast of Sumatra.  people had died including the merchant, the
skipper and other officers. Eventually the ship had to sail to Batavia under the command of a
‘Maleytsche’ local steersman and arrived fourteen months after its departure in July  (Cool-
haas , p. ). Ten years later, in , the ship Hof van Zeelandt (ID:) also suffered many
losses when a storm forced them to bypass the Cape. In Mauritius twenty people were left
behind who were too weak to continue the voyage, another twenty-three died (De Hullu ,
p. ). The normal practice was that, on most voyages between Europe and Asia, ships made a
stopover. In the period examined, this system centred around one fixed staging post on the
Cape of Good Hope, officially established as a colony in .
The choice of seaway and the design of the rigging determined the speed and thus the dura-
tion of the voyage. Most vessels sailing from the Netherlands to Asia had three masts. Gener-
ally, the rigging of VOC ships was the same as was usual for large vessels on the northwest
European shipping routes of the period. Mainly square sails were used on the three masts and
the bowsprit. Each of the three masts was divided into a lower mast, extended with strike-able
topmasts and topgallants. The system of extendable topmasts made it possible to adjust the
length and the surface of the sails to the circumstances. Topmasts could be taken down during
periods of strong winds or high waves, thus saving the rigging. The topgallant sails in particu-
lar were useful in maintaining a minimum speed in regions of little wind.
This flexible rigging had big advantages for the transatlantic crossings with changing wind
and sea conditions and even the smallest VOC vessels were, therefore, capable of making the
voyage to Asia. There is no evidence in either the written or the pictorial references that other
rigging was in use for vessels sailing to Asia in this period. Even the smaller galjoten, sailing to
Asia from around  had three masts, contrary to the practice for these vessels in Europe
(NA .., VOC , fol. ). Apart from the flexibility of operating the rigging under var-
ious conditions, the composition of the masts in three parts offered an additional advantage.
The size of the masts’ parts was limited, which made it possible to carry sufficient spare spars
and made replacement during the voyage relatively easy.
A vessel needed to leave for such a long intercontinental voyage substantially over-crewed to
be able to buffer possible losses of crewmembers. This lesson was learnt during the period of
the Voorcompagnieën, when it became clear that a crew size based on a voyage in Europe could
cause serious logistical problems. The VOC sailed with twice the number of crew than was
required for a European cargo carrier. In addition, the ships were also employed for the trans-
port of the staff and soldiers required for the organisation in Asia. It was not unusual for these
ships to have triple the number of men on board on their way to Asia than on their homeward
bound voyage. For the return voyage, the VOC also had to calculate a safe number of crew-
members because people that were being repatriated after serving their contract in Asia were
often not willing to assist in the work. In addition, homeward-bound ships often had problems
with stowaways, which could also cause problems with the provisions
Consequently, the difference in the number of people on board made the cargo capacity on
the homeward bound ships much bigger than on the outward sailing ships. Some of the smaller
vessels were clearly unable to transport more than their own crew, enough water for a few
months and food that would make them self-sufficient for a year. Larger vessels needed to be
specially modified to serve as a ‘people carrier’. The transport of higher ranked personnel influ-
enced the spatial layout of the ships. Staff above a certain rank had the right to be housed on
the higher levels of the ship (‘above deck’). In some cases, extra temporary accommodation had
to be put in to meet this requirement. In other cases, the basic design of a certain vessel type, the
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flute, had to be modified. Flutes normally sailed with small crews, some were specially modi-
fied for the VOC with a more extensive superstructure in the stern. The extra deck in the hold
of the ship (the so called koebrug) constructed to reinforce the larger vessels, gave adequate,
although very uncomfortable, accommodation to the large numbers of soldiers sent to Asia
(Witsen , p. ).
Cargo and ballast of the outbound fleets
The expanding organisation in Asia and developing Asian fleet required a growing amount of
supplies, equipment and other goods. The new Governor-General Reynst mentioned, in ,
that the outward bound fleets should bring more equipment to Asia (NA .., VOC ,
--). He anticipated a serious shortage of sails and ropes to maintain the developing
Asian fleet. Although he considered the frugality of the management in the Netherlands, why
they did not send those goods in generous quantities, it soon became clear that the available
cargo space on the Asian-bound fleets was the bottleneck. From around , almost every ship
that left the Netherlands was fully loaded. From Asia regular requests were made to send addi-
tional older cargo carriers to meet local transport requirements (Colenbrander , p. ).
The VOC was sometimes forced to send ships with the sole purpose of carrying equipment to
Asia. Between  and , a few old cargo carriers were indeed dispatched. The VOC
bought these inexpensive old ships for the transport of provisions (and in  the Ambassador
of Persia!). These ships were not considered to serve any further purpose then one voyage to
Asia after which they could be abandoned or burned (NA .., VOC , -; NA
.., VOC , --).
The ships sailing to Asia were consequently so packed with goods that they had problems
with handling the rigging. On board of the Wapen van Hoorn (ID:), wine was stowed on the
upper deck in such a way that the sailors had to climb on the barrels in order to pull the ropes
(Colenbrander , p. ). The s was also the period when the VOC aimed at privatising
the Asian shipping, and it was reluctant to send larger cargo carriers that could remain in Asia.
This, of course, also limited the amount of goods that could be sent from the Netherlands. After
, when the VOC made the final decision to keep the whole organisation in its own hands,
the situation improved and flutes that were leased for the journey to the Atlantic Ocean and
back in , were commissioned for intra-Asia shipping (Colenbrander , p. ). Neverthe-
less, during the whole period up to  the over laden ships departing the Netherlands re-
mained a matter of concern. For the skipper it sometimes came close to the point where he had
to jettison the cargo in order to save his ship, which of course would have been an affront for an
employee of the VOC (Colenbrander , p. ). The demands for European goods by the
organisation in Asia were such that, when ships arrived in Batavia only partially laden, there
was reason for complaint. For example, in  the Chambers Rotterdam and Hoorn had failed
to efficiently load their ships. Batavia had asked the Directors in the Netherlands to make sure
that the departing ships were well packed with all the items they required in Asia. They were
upset because they had already reduced their demands (the so called Indische Eysch (Indian
demand)), and had not asked for items that took up a lot of space like roof tiles, bad (cheap)
wine, bricks, cement, socks, hats etc and had really hoped to receive yachts, masts, planks
and other timber. The ship Frederick Hendrick (ID:) that had arrived that year could have
brought a schone partij deelen (a fair amount of planks) (Coolhaas , p. ). Contrary to the
general belief that VOC ships departed for Batavia fairly empty (Gaastra , ) most ships
were, in fact, fully laden. Illustrative in this case is that Hendrick Decker, in his research on the
cargo capacity in , states that retourschepen were one or more feet lower -and therefore
more heavily laden- when they left the Netherlands than when they returned (NA ..,
Collectie Hudde , p. ).
An extra complication was that part of the cargo capacity of the ship was required to be used
for the ballast. Without enough ballast the VOC vessels would not be stable and could not sail.
This ballast consisted of various heavy materials. In  the VOC bought  barrels of
boulders and in  another  barrels from Voorcompagnie ships arriving from Asia (NA
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.., VOC , fol. , ), so this ballast was shipped around the full voyage. Wherever
possible, the ballast was made up of useful or commercial goods. Some metals from Europe like
lead and iron could be sold at a reasonable profit in Asia. Remarkable was the large quantity
of tintinago, obtained with the capture of Caraque St. Catharina (ID:) in , that was first
shipped to the Netherlands and then again shipped back to Asia as ballast because it could be
sold for a better price there (NA .., VOC , -). Ballast goods were sometimes kept
aboard because it was too much trouble to have it removed from underneath the grenier – the
cargo floor – that was constructed in the hold of the ship (Colenbrander , p. ). Worth-
less ballast stones were taken but so were usable bricks that could be employed for VOC con-
structions in Asia. As can be witnessed at the remains of the many VOC sites in Asia, millions
of bricks must have found their way to Asia as ballast stones. Already in , . bricks
(gebacken steen) were bought by the VOC to send with the fleet (NA .., VOC , fol. ).
For larger ships, there was always a trade-off between the limitations of the draught on de-
parture from the Netherlands ports and the need to have sufficient heavy cargo to maintain the
ship’s stability on route. On occasion, returning ships were loaded too deeply for the water-
ways of their own chamber and had to sail to the deeper harbour of Zeeland which then cre-
ated problems with the division of the cargo and the expenses for the equipage (NA ..,
VOC , fol. ).
Logistics of the shipping within Asia
State of maintenance of the fleet
If a ship stayed in Asia for a prolonged period, it usually required a lot of maintenance. Keep-
ing the fleet afloat was a serious logistical problem for the VOC and eventually, each time a
vessel was to be serviced, the question to be decided was whether it was still an economical
proposition to invest in repairs. In fact, the VOC was wearing out their ships on purpose
through a system in which ships were gradually employed on less dangerous routes to trans-
port less valuable goods. The ship Der Goes (ID:) was such a case. In , the ship got stuck
on the Coast of Coromandel because, although the planking of the ship had been maintained,
the stern and the keel of the vessel were too weak to transport valuable cargoes. It was then
decided to use the Der Goes for local shipping along the Coromandel Coast (NA .., VOC
, fol. ). It is amazing how long the VOC kept its vessels operational even after the techni-
cal state of a ship was considered hopeless. For instance, the yacht Ackersloot (ID:), on arrival
in Galle in  after  years of service, was considered to be completely unseaworthy. The
frames and other hull reinforcements were rotten. In the bow and on the portside, the ship had
only survived on the strength of the pine outer layer of planking. The yacht was repaired as
well as possible in Galle (NA .., VOC, , fol. -v). The repairs kept the vessel
afloat and it actually made a trip to Persia and then, after returning to Galle, took a cargo of
cinnamon to Batavia. Following this voyage, it served for routine work in the Strait of Malacca.
In , it was decided that it was not worthwhile to spend any more money on repairs. Never-
theless, the Ackerslootmade another trip, this time to Jambi to fetch a cargo of pepper. Finally in
, five years after the ship would normally have been considered to be unseaworthy, it was
finally laid up.
A temporary insufficient cargo capacity was often the reason for using unsuitable or even
unseaworthy vessels. Some of the vessels that were used at the end of their active service were
literally floating on their cargo. In , the ship s'Landts Mauritius (ID:) leaked so severely
that it could only make it back to Batavia by loading  beams into the hold to help it to stay
afloat (Coolhaas , p.). If a vessel was not deemed worthy of further repair, the VOC
would take it apart to recycle the useable parts. This seemed to be an unpopular job with the
sailors. In Banda in , it was decided to demolish the ship Wapen van Amsterdam (ID:)
that had first come out to Asia in , and the plan was to use the timber to repair and rein-
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force the quays. The ship was in front of Fort Nassauw, where it had broken into three parts
and:
‘door malitie (soo wij menen) van de matroosen, die den arbeijt van t'sloopen vreesden, tot t'water
bij nacht verbrant’ [by mischief (as we assume) of the sailors, who fear the job of demolish-
ing, are [the remains] burned down to the waterline] (Coolhaas , p.).
After as many useable parts as possible were salvaged from the ship, the remaining timbers
were often burned in order to retrieve the iron nails (Coolhaas , p. ).
All homeward-bounders arriving in Batavia were inspected, after which it was decided
whether the ship was fit to return. If not, this could mean that another use for these larger
vessels had to be found in Asia. As discussed previously, these older Rate  ships could play
an important role as well-armed vessels in the region of the Arabian Sea (see section ..). In
some cases, ships were not fit for those purposes either: in  the ship Tholen (ID:) was
inspected twice and judged unable to return to the Netherlands but also too weak to operate
with heavy armaments near Surat and was therefore sent on an easy route to the Spice Islands
(Coolhaas , p. ). If the ships were employed on the intra-Asian routes the heavy super-
structure of the ships could be removed (NA .., VOC , fol. -v). Eventually,
these larger ships ended up as floating warehouses, carpenters ship or as floating fortresses in
the Spice Islands (Coolhaas , p. ).
Ships were also inspected in the Netherlands, but it is remarkable that, after the VOC estab-
lished a regular building programme for the specialist homeward-bounders after , very
few of these ships ended their careers in the Netherlands. Sometimes ships that were consid-
ered barely able to make the trip from Asia back to Europe returned to Asia yet again and
continued to serve there for many years (De Hullu , p. ).
Servicing the hull and other parts of the ships
The biggest hazard the VOC faced to sailing in tropical waters was the shipworm or Teredo
Navalis. The Teredo Navalis was capable of assaulting the construction of a ship within a few
months to such a degree that the main construction elements would lose their integrity and the
ship would leak to such an extent that pumping could not keep the vessel afloat any further
(Colenbrander , p. ).
From the earliest days of the shipping in Asia, various protection systems were employed
(see Case Study -). From the resolutions of the Chamber Amsterdam, where detailed techni-
cal issues were discussed, and from the bookkeepers’ journals that listed the materials for the
work on the hull, it is possible to gain an insight into the experiments that took place to find a
new method to protect the vessel against the shipworm. The Dutch tried to protect their ships
against the shipworm by applying an extra layer of planking over the existing submerged hull
planking. In the first years this so called verdubbeling (sheathing) was sometimes placed in com-
bination with a thin layer of lead underneath the extra layer of softwood planking. Later tar
and hair were used for this purpose.
In , it was decided that ships should be covered with a layer of lead and a pinewood
layer on top (NA .., VOC , --). In the bookkeepers’ journal of , the materi-
als were listed for this work. For the ships Amsterdam (ID:) and Sonne (ID:),  rolls of thin
lead and another lb of unspecified thin lead were required (NA .., VOC ). In
, and again in , it was decided that ships under construction would be build with an
extra layer of oak and a top layer of pinewood planking without a layer of lead (NA ..,
VOC ). From  on, hair was utilised between the layers of planking:
‘Het grote gecochte schip doen verdubbelen met een eecken huyt daer haer onder geleyt
is ende gespyckert boven op de tweede huyt ende daer weder haer op met een vuyren
huyt wel becleet sonder loot’ [The big ship that we bought is sheathed with oak planking
under which hair was put and on the second planking nailed again with hair a pinewood
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layer of planking well covered without lead] (NA .., VOC , --, --
).
The Admiralty ships that were sent to Asia in  were sheathed and were protected on the
vulnerable areas of the hull around the waterline ‘between wind and water’ by lead sheathing
(NA .., Oldenbarneveldt ).
Case Study -. Sheathing
Many techniques have been tried over the centuries to prolong the life of ships’ timbers. The English-
man Sir Richard Hawkins described those he knew, writing c. about experience gained on a voy-
age which started in  (from Markham , p. ).
‘And for that I have seene divers manners of sheathing, for the ignorant I will set them downe which
by experience I have found best. In Spain and Portingall, some sheate their shippes with lead; which,
besides the cost and waight, although they use the thinnest sheet-lead that I have seen in any place, yet
it is not durable, but subject to many casualties. Another manner is used with double plankes, as
thicke without as within, after the manner of furring: which is little better then with lead; for, besides
his waight it dureth little, because the worms in small time passeth through the one and the other.
A third manner of sheathing hath beene used amongst some with fine canvas; wich is of small con-
tinuance, and so not to be regarded.
The fourth prevention, which is now most accompted of, is to burne the utter planke till it come to be
in every place like a cole, and after to pitch it; this is not bad.
In China, as I have been informed, they use a certain betane [probably bitumen] or varnish, in manner
of an artificiall pitch, wherewith they trim the outside of their shippes. It is said to be durable, and of
that vertue, as neither worme nor water peirceth it; neither has the sunne power against it. Some have
devised a certain pitch, mingled with glasse and other ingredients, beaten into powder, with which if
the shippe be pitched, it is said the worme that touched it dyeth; but I have not heard that it hath been
usefull. But the most approved of all, now adayes in England, with thin bourdds, halfe inche thicke;
the thinner the better; and elm better than oake; for it ryveth not, it endureth better under water, and
yeeldeth better to the ships side. The invention of the materialles incorporated betwixt the planke and
the sheathing, is that which avayleth; for without it many plankes were not sufficient to hinder the
entrance of of this worme; this manner is thus: Before the sheathing board is nayled on, upon the inner
side of it they smere it over with tarre halfe a finger thicke and upon the tarre anothe halfe finger of
hayre, such as the whitelymers use, and so naylec it on, the nayles not above a spanne distance one
from another; the thicker they are driven the better. Some hold opinion that the tarre killeth the
worme; others that the worme passing the sheathing, and seaking a way through, the hayre and the
tarre so involve him that he is choked therewith; which me thinkes is most probable; this manner of
sheathing was invented by my father, and experience has taught it to be the best and of least cost.
Almost every ship that left the Netherlands for Asia was sheathed. Only if it was expected that
a vessel would make a quick return trip, was the risk sometimes taken to send less protected
vessels (see e.g. NA .., VOC , fol. ; , fol. ). The quality of the sheathing the
materials in between the layers, and the state of the main planking determined to a large extent
the period a vessel could operate in tropical waters before it needed be sheathed again. The
triple-layered method of planking described above was found on the wrecks of the VOC ships
Mauritius (ID:), , and Batavia (ID:), , and the Anglo-Dutch yacht Avondster
(ID:). It has been suggested that, in the case of VOC ships, this construction is an adaptation
for the specific conditions encountered in sailing between Europe and Asia, and also within
Asia (Parthesius ; Van Duivenvoorden ; Parthesius et al. ). If the sheathing pro-
vided good coverage to the submerged hull, and if the materials were of good quality, the time
the vessels could sail without maintenance to the hull could increase by several years. The
cheaper pinewood served the purpose better than the more expensive oak because the ship-
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worm preferred the latter above the softwood pine. To nail the sheathing with iron nails with
big heads increased its effectiveness because the corrosion from the iron formed an extra layer
of protection (Coolhaas , p. ). The purpose of the layers of hair and tar was to prevent
the shipworm from reaching the main hull construction. Eventually every ship that sailed in
Asia for longer then two to three years needed to have new sheathing.
Careening
The sheathing covering the planking below the waterline could only be applied when the hull
was out of the water. For this purpose, the vessel could be careened, i.e. pulled over onto its
side, so that the carpenters could work on the exposed surface. Facilities to dry the ship without
pulling it on its side were limited in Asia where it was only possible in river outlets and bays in
a region with a substantial tidal difference. Careening could, however, be done on every shel-
tered coast. The only thing that was needed was an ‘op en neerhouder’ (up and down holder)
from which the vessel could be pulled onto one side. Often an old vessel was specially kept
near a harbour for this purpose; in  the ship Ter Veer (ID:) was sent on its last voyage to
the repair wharf Onrust near Batavia for this purpose (Colenbrander , p. ). Sometimes,
if circumstances required, active ships had to withdraw from shipping to help maintain other
vessels (NA .., VOC , --; Colenbrander , p. ). In other cases, the ves-
sels could only be partly repaired and sheathed (NA .., VOC , fol. ). It appears that
the Dutch vessels were better designed for this practice than the English. Careening was used
in the Netherlands as a common method to clean and repair the ship, as can be seen in the
many paintings of harbour scenes. On the otherhand, the English ships were built and main-
tained in dry docks. In the first decades of the th century the English had problems with
careening and lost two ships in attempts to renew the sheathing (Heeres , pp. , ). An
official of the English East India Company wrote in : ‘The Dutch in Jayakarta sheathed
three ships in  days, which are in the fleet off Mallacca, being at least  tons each. It
toucheth our reputation too near that we should not be able to do it there as well as they’
(Foster , p. ).
Partial careening was often practised to clean the hull of the barnacles that hampered the
passage and speed of the vessel. For instance, the small patrol boats operating in the Strait of
Malacca were regularly cleaned to maintain their speed. The big homeward-bounders were
often delayed by the sea-growth on their hulls, but there was little that could be done about it.
The VOC tried impregnating the underwater body of the vessel with a layer of grease and
tallow in order to prevent the growth of barnacles. Often the ships needed to be cleaned after
only several months at sea. If the occasion allowed, the ships were then partly careened to
scrape them clean and burn a layer of roet (soot) on the outside. The products to do the cleaning
and protection of the hulls were sent out on the ships to Asia.
Sheathing required a location where suitable timber and other materials were available and
where carpenters could be housed. If the ships were completely careened, they had to be com-
pletely unloaded, which meant that storage capacity on shore was necessary. Already, before
the establishment of Batavia in , vessels were sheathed in the bay of Jayakarta and on the
Spice Islands, but the English destroyed the facilities in the bay of Jayakarta on the little island
of Onrust. The facilities were partially rebuilt, but in  this infrastructure was again unable
to be used because of the attacks by the Javanese, with whom the VOC was at war at that time
(Coolhaas , p. ). Eventually Onrust would develop into a major maintenance centre.
From  on, ships were careened in Japan and up to  the VOC also had repair facilities
at their disposal in Japan (Coolhaas , p. ). In , the homeward-bounder Wapen van
Enkhuizen (ID:) was prepared for its return trip to Europe in Japan (NA .., VOC ,
-). However, the Japanese authorities would soon limit the freedom of the Europeans.
The crisis between the VOC and Japan over Taiwan around , made the maintenance of big
VOC ships virtually impossible. Middle-sized ships could be maintained on the Coromandel
Coast, in Siam and in Arracan (Coolhaas , pp. , ; NA .., VOC , --).
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The VOC directors felt the need to control many aspects of the organisation, this extended to
the choice of sites used for maintenance. They certainly did not want to spend too much money
on the repairs in Asia if they could be done in the Netherlands. Vessels that regularly sailed
back to Europe, retourschepen in particular were sheathed there, where enough materials and
carpenters were available instead of using the more expensive and scarce resources in Asia.
This policy also applied to bigger yachts and men-of-war, which, although they were due to
stay in Asia longer than the retourschepen, were deliberately returned to the Netherlands for
major maintenance. Governor-General Van Diemen (in Coolhaas , p. ) made the follow-
ing recommendations in his report of : ‘construction and repairs to the ships in India cost
the company big money and that the larger ships are not well maintained. It is therefore neces-
sary that all substantial repairs to the ships will be exempt as much as possible and it be or-
dered that the precious men-of-war and the larger yachts should be employed at sensible times
as homeward-bounders’. Smaller vessels could be maintained in Asia.
If sheathing to these ships was unavoidable, the VOC preferred to execute these works with
their own people in Batavia. The logistical challenge was to have enough craftsmen, timber, tar,
hair and nails available to sheath the vessel in a reasonable time. Given the extensive shipbuild-
ing sector, this was not a problem in the Netherlands. In Asia, Batavia eventually became the
best location for this work, since there was a regular supply of craftsmen and materials from
the Netherlands supplemented with materials from the region, like jatij planks from Siam for
the sheathing (Colenbrander , p. ).
Other repairs
Another common problem area was leaking at the waterline, or as it was known at the time ‘the
area between wind and water’. Here, the planking was easily affected by rot. This type of dam-
age could have major consequences because it was generally only discovered when the vessel
was heavily laden. More problematic was when the discovery was made at the time the vessel
had already left the port and was heeling on one side at a given point on its course with the
troubled spot submerged. The consequences could be that the ship took on water, which would
make it difficult to sail and put the vessel under serious threat. This happened with the yacht
Avondster (ID:) when it left for the second time to the Netherlands in . The yacht was
discovered to leak severely when it sailed over a certain side. Eventually it was decided to sail
back to Batavia because:
‘[…] desselfs ranck- ende leckheit, opdat bij voortzeijlen geroerde costelijck geladen schip
ende soo veele sielen niet als voorbedachelijck den zee ten proije te geven’. [The instabil-
ity and the leaking, by continuing the sailing this precious loaded ship and so many souls
not by purpose to offer as a price to the sea] (De Hullu , p. ).
Whether a ship could sail was dependant on how the ship was loaded and also on the condi-
tion of the crew – if they were not fit enough to pump the ship dry then the ship was lost
(Coolhaas , p. ; Colenbrander , p. ). Repairs, by the onboard ships’ carpenters,
were reasonably simple following partial unloading or careening the vessel. However, it was
first necessary to reach a port or anchorage. If the whale, a heavy construction element on the
outside of the ship, had to be replaced more specific skills for handling heavy timber and mate-
rials were required.
The ship’s internal construction was also in need of regular maintenance. One of the biggest
problems for the VOC was dry rot (decay of timber by fungus) exacerbated by the humidity in
the packed holds under tropical conditions. The only remedy – ventilation and pickle – was
difficult to combine with the VOC policy of keeping their fleet sailing rather then have it wait-
ing empty in a port. Only in the Netherlands could vessels stay idle for a longer period. In Asia
the VOC must have weighed the cargo capacity against the longer lifespan of their fleet.
Construction problems could also occur inside a vessel due to heavy sea conditions. In 
the flute Trouw (ID:) was caught in a storm near Taiwan. Apart from the external damage,
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various deck beams and deck planking of the orlop deck came loose and knees broke (Blussé,
Milde & Ts`Ao Yung-Ho , p. ). Another cause of internal damage could be the firing of
heavy cannons. An example of that is the ship Erasmus (ID:) that:
‘met alle dit schieten soo verswackt ende ontramponneert / dat het te verwonderen is /
also veel balcken / knien / inhouten / balckhouten / 't welck de principale stijfte van 't
Schip maken / in stucken geschoten zijn’ (was with all the shooting so weakened and
destroyed, it is a wonder that, so many beams, knees, [and other internal timbers] that
normally gives the ship its strength, has been shot in pieces (Commelin a, p. ).
Once again this type of repair required specialist materials and expertise. The Erasmus did not
make it to the Netherlands and was left behind at Mauritius. The leaking of the Dolfijn (see
Case Study - in section .) was probably caused by combat near Taiwan.
Supply of materials for maintenance
The regular supply of the requisite materials was essential for the maintenance of the fleet.
Most of these products were shipped from the Netherlands and therefore impacted on the car-
go-carrying capacity of the outbound ships. There was a constant need for all shipping related
products such as rope-work, sails and anchors. Naturally, the VOC tried to find local products
that could replace the European materials but, according to their judgement, the quality was
unacceptable and the price too high. The VOC in the Netherlands liked to control the deliveries
and, of course, the associated profits. Where items such as timber and anchor cables made
shipping from Europe impractical due to their sheer bulk, the supply of these items was sought
in Asia. The VOC was the main transporter of spare materials that were exclusively intended
for use on board their own fleet. The regulation of the required quantities and qualities needed
in Asia compared to what was actually sent was an ongoing issue of concern for Batavia. In
, Coen complained (as he usual did) that there were too few ships in Asia and that, there-
fore, his warehouses were packed with spare materials: ‘Now that we have no ships here are
the warehouses full with big cables and heavy anchors’ (Colenbrander , p. ). In ,
Governor-General Van der Lijn indicated that spares available were insufficient for the fleet
and that through: ‘deficiency of these the Company would suffer big disadvantage and would
fall into scarcity’ (Coolhaas , p. ).
For anchor cables the VOC tried to utilise local products. From Surat and Coromandel the so-
called vijger ropes were imported to Batavia but as it turned out they did not meet VOC stan-
dard. In , Batavia asked for more ropes from the Netherlands because those from Surat
were inadequate owing to the speed with which they rotted and yet still cost  guilders
(NA .., VOC , fol. ). Good quality hemp rope was available in Japan, but the prob-
lem still existed in that there was no tar available to impregnate them (Coolhaas , p. ).
The superiority of the European products (with associated economic benefits) was evident
throughout the whole period under study. After the VOC established itself in Ceylon and on
the Malabar Coast, enough cayer rope (made from the outer fibres of the coconut) was avail-
able, but large quantities of hemp rope was still shipped to Asia. There is evidence to suggest
attempts were made to produce rope with local raw materials. In , two years after the
fortified city of Galle on the south tip of Ceylon was captured from the Portuguese, a request
was made for European ropes to be sent via Batavia (NA .., VOC , fol. -). In ,
the VOC established a ropewalk in Galle where mainly the heavy anchor ropes were produced
from the local coconut fibres (NA .., VOC , fol. ). Around , Galle had become
almost self-sufficient in their rope production and only lighter ropes were requested from Bata-
via. They even produced enough to send ropes to Batavia. These ropes were reasonably well
received, and though Galle produced fuses, these however, failed to meet the VOC standard
(NA .., VOC , fol. ).
The development of Japan as a regional centre of maintenance where Asian materials and
expertise were available looked promising for a while. The head of the VOC in Japan, Jacques
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Specx, in particular was the driving force behind this development. Coen, however, saw in this
a threat to the development of Batavia as the central point in Asia. In arguing against the devel-
opment of Japan, he indicated that maintenance costs in Japan were too high and that there was
too little control over expenses. In the ’s, the VOC had set up a ropewalk and even cast
wheels for blocks in Japan (Colenbrander , p. ; Coolhaas , p. ). In , the
VOC completely refurbished and refitted the Junk Fortuijn (ID:) with a Dutch rigging. Specx
was aiming for a regular maintenance programme for VOC vessels rather than ad hoc repairs
on passing ships. This would justify the available facilities and craftsmen (Coolhaas , p. ).
The competition between Coen and Specx was dissolved by the political tension between the
VOC and Japan over Taiwan. When the Dutch had regained a favourable position in Japan,
Batavia was definitely established as the centre of all intra-Asian activities.
Hemp from Bengal was shipped in large quantities to Batavia where in c. the VOC es-
tablished a yarn spinning mill and a sailcloth-weaving mill. This project was not a success due
to a lack of manpower and problems associated with the huge cargo capacity (volume) that
was needed to ship over the raw materials from Bengal (Stapel , p. ). An attempt to
establish a weaving mill in Bengal was also unsuccessful (Stapel , p. ).
Nails for the sheathing and other maintenance work were annually requested from the Neth-
erlands by Batavia. VOC posts requested barrels of nails, coils of rope and bundles of sailcloth
from Batavia on a regular basis. These were intended for passing ships that had used their
stock of spare materials. The production of ironwork was attempted in Coromandel but again
dismissed due to the high costs and uncertain quality.
The VOC was overall dissatisfied by the quality of the Asian products. It is unfortunate that
they were unaware of some special qualities of the local products, such as locally used woods
that had better resistance against shipworm attack. An awareness and understanding of local
materials and their use could have helped solve some of the VOC’s logistical problems (Cool-
haas , pp. , ; Coolhaas , p. ; NA .., VOC , fol. v).
The spars and masts were essential parts of the VOC shipping machinery amd sourcing them
locally caused specific problems. In times of distress, it was possible to retrieve a mast from a
forest but, for common use, the Asian masts were considered unsuitable. Timber from Mauri-
tius was too heavy, too ‘green’ and cracked when dried (NA .., VOC , fol. v).
Although a mast from the Moluccas turned out to be satisfactory, in general, despite some
experiments with jatti wood, most Asian timber was deemed to be useless (Coolhaas , p.
; Stapel , p. ).
The bottleneck to the availability of European spars again lay with transport. The ships
needed some special fittings to load and unload this cargo. Timber that would be long enough
for spars and masts could only be loaded through a special hatch in the stern of the ship – the
lastpoort. The normal hatch in the deck allowed loading of larger barrels, cannons and anchors,
but were limited in size by the deck beams, which could not be more broadly spaced without
undermining the integrity of the hull construction. The lastpoort was common in the stern of
flutes with their big empty holds, they were however more difficult to include in the larger
VOC ships with their various chambers for storage of weapons, bread and powder and other
accommodation. In some instances, masts were loaed on the koebrug (the deck in the hold), but
here they passed a danger to the stability of the ship due to the increased weight higher in the
ship (Stapel , p. ; Witsen , p. ). For transport in Asia, older ships were some-
times fitted with a lastpoort (NA .., VOC , fol. v). These ships were sent to destina-
tions like Siam, Jappara, to the coast east of Batavia and to the Spice Islands. The timber col-
lected there was also used in the construction of buildings at the VOC settlements.
Loading the fleet: ballast and cargo in Asia
Finding the balance between profitable cargo and necessary ballast was a complex issue in
Asia. Many Asian products like spices and pepper were very light and could therefore only be
shipped in combination with heavier cargo or ballast. The availability of profitable ballast was
a constant concern, especially since the VOC was rather peculiar about the return they expected
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back: %was considered the minimum profit for these ballast goods that were not perishable
and that could be stowed underneath the cargo-floor (so it would not reduce the cargo capa-
city!) (NA .., Archief Geleijnessen de Jongh , p. ). However, it was not always possible
to find ‘paying ballast’. The fact that ballast was inaccessible for a prolonged period before it
could be sold, made the VOC consider the financial losses in this type of trade. Stones turned
out to be efficient ballast because it cost the VOC only the labour to collect them and these
materials were useful at most destinations. Also the bricks transported from the Netherlands
and other stone building materials were used as ballast in Asia. A striking example of this is a
well-known portico for Batavia found on the wreck of the ship Batavia off the coast of Western
Australia. Tombstones were also transported from the Netherlands, such as the  tombstones
of three by seven feet that were requested for the new church in Batavia in  (Coolhaas ,
p. ). Coral stone was also used as a building material; it was only shipped in older ships
because of the possibility that the sharp stones would damage the cargo floor (De Hullu ,
p. ). The simplest form of ballast was sand but this product was only used as a last resort, as
in the event of leakage, water would be difficult to pump out and identifying the source of the
leak was impossible (Elias , p. ). Sand was used on the Avondster (ID:) when no other
products were available to make the vessel stable (SLNA, /, --),
On a logistical level, the difficulty in the choice of ballast goods lay between the importance
of short loading and unloading periods in combination with the unloading of the ballast from
underneath the cargo floor. It was not uncommon for saleable ballast to remain in the ship,
even when replacement ballast was available, due to a lack of sufficient time for the unloading
and reloading (Coolhaas , p. ).
Assembling the ballast for the fleets bound for Europe was also an important assignment for
the Asian organisation. For the homeward-bounders, the VOC organised ebony wood from
Mauritius (NA .., VOC , fol. ), saltpetre from Coromandel and Bengal (Colenbran-
der , p. , ), copper from Japan (NA .., Archief Geleijnessen de Jongh , p. )
and sugar from Taiwan. These products also served as ballast goods for the vessels sailing from
these places to Batavia. Ships sometimes sailed specially via Mauritius to collect ebony, which
was considered very useful and practical ballast. It could be obtained without cost from the
woods on Mauritius. It could be sold for a good price in Europe and was not perishable. It
could also be stowed directly on the inner planking of the hold in between the frames without
utilising any of the cargo space (Colenbrander , pp. -). In that respect saltpetre and
sugar were problematic. A separate type of ballast was the broken anchors and cannon that
were shipped back to the Netherlands for recycling. The quantities of these could be large; as
for example, in when  cannon were shipped back to Europe (Colenbrander , p. ).
Local goods could be used as ballast between destinations within the intra-Asian shipping
network. Sugar was used between Taiwan and Japan. Stone ballast was used to destinations
where useful ballast could be acquired, for example vessels travelled to Japan with stone and
returned with copper. As with grain in Europe, rice could be shipped without additional bal-
last. Rice was much heavier than the spices and pepper, and thus a ship that was only partly
loaded with rice was stable enough to take an additional cargo of these lighter products. Rice
was, for this reason often loaded as useful ballast product on intra-Asian routes (De Hullu
, p. ).
Crewing the fleet in Asia
During early shipping, problems encountered with the crew were due to long intercontinental
voyages. Within Asia, owing to the longer voyages and more hostile circumstances relative to
routes in Europe, also a larger crew was required. The developing intra-Asian shipping net-
work required a considered policy regarding the manning of vessels. On Asian routes, the size
of the crew that was capable of manning the vessel did, on a number of occastions, drop below
a critical number. The aim of the organisation was to have a reasonable surplus of crew in
order to buffer against unforeseen circumstances. Crewmembers falling ill was hardly an un-
foreseen circumstance and, therefore, the VOC established hospital facilities strategically lo-
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cated within the intra-Asian network: first in Batavia and later at Ceylon. Sailors who had
recovered would replace incapacitated crew arriving at a certain trading post; often other staff
were placed on board passing vessels.
Of course, many of the nautical tasks onboard could be conducted by other staff. However,
the safe operation of the fleet was imperative and depended on the presence of sufficient quali-
fied staff: sailors that could sail the ship, skippers and navigation officers that had knowledge
of the sailing areas and ships carpenters and boatswain that could repair the ship during the
voyage. The Witte Beer (ID:) , on route to Asia in  experienced problems due to a lack of
specialised crew; the upper-steersman died, the skipper turned out to have no navigational
skills at all and those on board had to rely, for a safe voyage, on the accompanying yacht Swarte
Beer (ID:) (McLeod a, p. ).
Only occasionally did the VOC use the services of local sailors, one example is the ship Wa-
pen van Delft that sailed to Batavia in  with a local steersman. The VOC preferred to sail
their ships with a European crew and there was never a policy to employ local sailors (NA
.., VOC , --). This policy of a European crew in combination with a relatively
high mortality rate, forced the VOC to transport large numbers of sailors to Asia and to various
posts in the Asian network. Apart from the crew, other passengers were present on board dur-
ing most voyages. Soldiers, administrative staff and management were also shipped from the
Netherlands and then employed in the many VOC forts and trading posts. Soldiers and other
staff were regularly transferred. Military personnel were often moved around in the region in
anticipation of military activities. Therefore, the number of people on board the ships in Asia
generally exceeded the required crew.
Food and supplies for the people on board were an important aspect of the logistical organi-
sation of intra-Asian shipping. However, even with a larger number of crew and passengers, it
was possible to make almost all voyages within Asia without having to make a stop for food
supplies. Only the longer voyages over the Indian Ocean to Surat and Persia and back could be
tight (Coolhaas , --). Shortages in drinking water did, however, create problems.
The water supply would become critical especially if the ships were used for the transport of
Portuguese prisoners or slaves. The ship Den Briel (ID:) had to call at Jortan to take on water
when it transported ‘ souls of slaves (male and female) very skinny and poor destined peo-
ple’  of which died within a short time (Coolhaas , p. ). The transport of groups of
Portuguese prisoners created the same problems, as did the transport of animals like elephants
and horses. For the transport of elephants, ships had to make refreshment stops to provide
fresh vegetables (Colenbrander , p. ). The large volume of water that had to be trans-
ported created a new problem for the VOC: the wooden water-barrels normally used weren’t
suitable in the tropics. Asian storage pots (martavans) provided the solution (Stapel , p.
). This type of container is described in the VOC archives and was excavated from the
wrecks of the Witte Leeuw (ID:) (Pijl-Ketel ) and the Avondster (ID:) (Parthesius
). In , the Leeuwin (ID:) and the Der Veer (ID:) had to transport  Portuguese
prisoners (male,  female and  children) to Batavia, for the storage of drinking water a
‘fair amount’ of martavans were placed in the hold (NA .., VOC , fol. -).
The preparation for and the employment of the required sailors to be sent to Asia to serve on
the ships was a logistical challenge that must have been mind-bending for both the directors in
the Netherlands and the management in Asia. Before , there was a constant shortage of
sailors who remained in Asia with the fleet. The VOC forced sailors to serve longer in Asia
than their contract stated. The active policy of Governor-General Coen to establish colonies
and to privatise aspects of the Asian shipping network should be seen in the light of this prob-
lem (Colenbrander , p.). In , this bottleneck had not been lifted and there was still a
shortage of staff for the Asian fleet. Governor-General Brouwer complained that they had an
excellent fleet of ships in Asia but that through a lack of staff ‘these marvellous ships can not
contribute to the benefits of the VOC and to be detrimental to the enemy’ (Coolhaas , p.
). By the s, the problem with sailors reluctant to stay longer in Asia must have been
solved because in , the arriving sailors were returned immediately with the fleet to Europe.
At this time, the VOC could not recruit enough sailors in Asia that were prepared to sail back to
Europe. There was discussion as to which staff would serve the VOC’s interests best in Asia: the
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‘old staff’, those who had been in Asia for some years being both experienced and acclimatised,
or the new arrivals coming from Europe. Governor-General Van der Lijn clearly favoured keep-
ing the old staff in Asia in concluding his letter to the VOC directors on this subject he wrote:
‘Echter verstaen wij dat de Comp van 't oude volck in India meerder dienst can trecken,
als van nieuw in 't landt comen ende dat het evenveel is, off de retourschepen met out
ofte nieuw volck thuysgebracht worden’ (We understand that Company receives better
services in India from the old people, than the new coming into this country and that it is
alike, that the retourschepen is brought home with old or the new people) (Coolhaas
, p. ).
Despite all the complaints about the availability of staff, the management seemed to have been
able ‘to tie the ends together’ because there are only a few references to ships being laid up for a
period owing to a lack of crew. If there was not enough crew for a longer voyage on a more
demanding route, there were still plenty of possibilities for finding employment for a ship. A
ship could be sent on a short or easy trip where a smaller crew was required. No records were
found in which the loss of a ship was directly ascribed to a lack of crew. Vessels could, how-
ever, face serious problems if illness or exhaustion reduced the number of capable crewmen.
Sometimes it was not possible to continue to manoeuvre the vessel – as was the case for the
flute Reiger (ID:) which drifted past Galle because the crew could not sail the vessel into the
bay (NA .., VOC , fol. ). Most of the time the vessels under threat could sail on
easy courses with the trailing wind to friendly coasts or destinations to seek help. The mini-
mum crew that was required to sail the vessels was remarkably low (that means operate the
vessel in a technical sense). The minimum crew size ranged from less than  to  for the
smaller yachts, and from  to  for the larger vessels. As the rigging was divided over
more masts and many sails, this made it lighter and easier to operate. Serious problems were
caused if the heavy anchor needed to be handled under difficult circumstances. Often a short-
handed crew had problems weighing anchor, they would have to ask for assistance from other
ships or cut the anchor cable. It could be fatal if the crew was not able to pump out incoming
water and therefore, the vessel had to be abandoned. Striking in this respect is the history of the
Dolfijn (ID:) that sank at the entrance of the Bay of Galle in . The yacht had arrived from
Surat leaking seriously and had anchored awaiting instructions from the shore. Although it
was still possible to save the ship by sailing it into the harbour, the yacht sank because the
crew was too exhausted to weigh anchor after many days of constant pumping (see Case Study
-).
Case Study -. The wrecking of the Dolfijn
Although the Dolfijn was leaking when it had called at Surat in , the local VOC official did not
allow the crew to conduct any repairs. He ordered the skipper to sail to Galle to make his needs
known there. There is a certain logic to this since Galle was developing as a logistical centre for the
VOC. However, when the commander wrote a letter about the rich cargo they were about to send with
the Dolfijn to Batavia, his wish that ‘The almighty would bring this [ship], free from disasters to the
right destination’ was not granted (NA .., VOC , fol. ). Understaffed and leaking, the
Dolfijn, with a rich cargo, left Surat in northwest India for Galle on th April .
During the voyage, the crew had to pump, day and night, to keep the ship dry. On the third of May,
the skipper discussed their difficult situation in the ‘scheepsraad’ (council of officers). On arrival at a
VOC post on the Indian coast, the Dolfijn asked for assistance from a Dutch merchant stationed there.
The Dolfijn requested  to  local men to pump the vessel in case of emergency. The locals, however,
asked too high a price: one pagood per month, free water, firewood, and rice, plus the use of a galley
and six months' pay in advance. The ship left for Cochin without assistance, but with  packets of
opium. The Dolfijn arrived on May the th, ‘lek maar behouden’ (leaking but safe). Once again a request
for assistance was turned down. The ship was told to sail on to Galle, and her problems intensified.
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
On May , the ship was near Galle, in bad weather, when the leak worsened. In order not to miss the
entrance to the Bay of Galle, the skipper decided to anchor in thirteen fathoms of water. To keep the
ship dry, the crew deployed a fourth and a fifth pump. When the time came to sail, the crew were so
exhausted after constant pumping that they were unable to lift the anchor, and had to cut the rope. The
Dolfijn sailed to the entrance of the bay, where they again anchored, and fired several guns as distress
signals. The situation became untenable, five pumps were not enough to keep the ship afloat and
buckets were also needed. The only sensible course of action was to sail the ship into the bay as quickly
as possible in order to save the crew, money and cargo. Again, there was a problem in lifting the
anchor, because the crew were either fully occupied with pumping or were completely exhausted.
Another problem arose when the pilot came on board. He explained that it was impossible to enter the
bay because the ship was lying directly in front of a shallow reef and the wind was not favourable.
Aware of the seriousness of the situation, the VOC sent help on a sloop from the shore, but by the
evening the ship had to be abandoned, since water was already lapping the galleries at the side of the
cabin. In a final attempt by the skipper of the Dolfijn to save the money, he loaded the chests on the
sloop. However, when he heard the moaning and shouting of the crew still on board he realised that it
would be impossible to save both the men and the money. The situation became critical when more
and more crewmen jumped on board the sloop, endangering both the cargo and crew, so the skipper
threw twenty chests overboard. When the crew were safe, the skipper went back on board, risking his
own life, to pick up the last six chests of money from the upper deck of the sinking ship. After he had
handed over the chests, he fell overboard and was already drowning when someone rescued him with
a hook. Injured but alive, the captain and crew could do nothing more than watch the Dolfijn go down.
By the next day, only the tops of the masts could be seen above the water.
Being the third ship in four years to be wrecked in sight of Galle, some procedures for dealing with
disasters must have been in place. People were therefore probably not too astonished to see, days after
the shipwreck, a man in the company of VOC officials carrying a strange device of leather hoses and
leaving the fortified city for a diving experiment in the bay. In late May , some of the dignitaries of
Galle had condescended to be present at a demonstration by a man who claimed that he could dive to
deep sites using a leather hose for air supply. The test was conducted with a hose seven and a half
fathoms long that was tightly wound around his arms and probably connected to a bodice pulled
over the upper part of the body. Expectations and hopes were high, if the trial was successful, the VOC
could salvage some of the four and a half ‘tons of gold’, i.e. . guilders, that were lost when the
ship was wrecked on May  (NA .., VOC , p. ). This sum, being equivalent to the
annual profit of the important trading post Surat, was huge by contemporary standards (Coolhaas
, p. ). The demonstration turned out to be very disappointing; soon after the diver was lowered
into the water he signalled that he wanted to be pulled up. In the diary of one of the officials present,
the situation was explained thus: ‘because by binding the weights to his body to make him sink he was
too suffocated and incapable to accomplish his mission.’ (SLNA /, fol. ). The diver also
claimed that the water had entered the hose and the bodice. The conclusion was clear: this diving
device would not be the solution to recover the twenty chests of money from a depth of twenty-five
fathoms. The VOC officials must have been desperate because a few days earlier an unsuccessful
attempt to salvage the money was made. On that occasion, the officials sent a corporal by boat to the
site where the Dolfijn’s topmast was protruding from the water. On the wreck site, the corporal used
his specially designed long drill to reach the money chest sitting on the seafloor. This attempt failed
too: the long drill broke due to the great depth and the rough seas and also because the ropes, sails and
broken masts blocked the way (SLNA /, fol. , ). In the hope of retrieving some of the cargo,
the VOC posted guards on the fort and the beaches in case some of the valuables washed ashore.
It is surprising that the archives do not reveal an attempt to salvage the chests of money from the
Dolfijn with the assistance of pearl fishers. On other occasions, they were used to salvage valuables
from shipwrecks. For the salvaging of money from the Batavia wrecked in  on the Houtman Ab-
rolhos off the west-coast of Australia, pearl divers were specially brought there from Batavia (Roeper
, p. -) These divers were called ‘Guseraten’ (from Gujarat in India) (Colenbrander , p.
).
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A possible explanation of why the VOC relinquished the money can be found in a description by a
th century VOC official of fishing pearl and chank shell (used in Hindu and Buddhist rituals) in the
Gulf of Tutucorin. According to Joan Nieuhof, who was involved in the pearl fishing industry as a
VOC merchant in the ’s, fifteen fathoms was the maximum depth the divers could reach. ‘The
local divers are able to dive four times longer then our own people. They are able to dive to a depth of
three to fifteen fathom but not deeper […]’ (Nieuhof , p. ). According to another th century
observer, the divers reached a depth of ten fathoms (Baldeus , p. ). The wreck of the Dolfijn at a
depth of  fathoms would have been too deep.

Knitting all the threads together: the
logistics of the network
Batavia as the spider in the web of logistical organisation
West Java and Sunda Strait had been, since the commencement of regular Dutch voyages to the
Asiatic region, an important place of call, but it was certainly not self-evident that this location
would become the headquarters of the VOC from which all activities would be coordinated.
Even in , when Jayakarta was captured as an outcome of the skirmishes with the English,
it was not clear if the VOC directors would reach the consensus that central rendezvous was
necessary. The focal point of the Dutch activities in Asia for the early period was the Spice
Islands. There was a monopoly on the spice trade to be gained subject to the use of force to
exclude European and Asian rivals from the market. All other Asian products for both the
barter trade on the Spice Islands and for the European market could be obtained on various
locations throughout Asia. Pepper, the most important product in th century trade to Europe
(in terms of volume), was already purchased prior to , by the Dutch at different locations
such as Bantam on West Java, Atjeh on Sumatra, Patani on the east coast of the Malaysian
peninsula but also Johore, South Borneo and the west coast of India. Pepper was a product in
demand, which could be obtained in large quantities and used at all times to load the holds of
the European bound vessels. The big profits were, however, made through the trade in spices.
Although the strategic interest to obtain these goods for Europe was centred on the Spice Is-
lands, this location was impractical from a purely nautical point of view. Due to the monsoonal
cycle, the Spice Islands were only accessible for six months a year while return shipping was
only possible the other half of the year. This made it difficult to assimilate this location, from
which the VOC had to obtain their barter goods in order to acquire the spices, into the intra-
Asian network.
Although the Spice Islands were the VOC's political-military centre in the s, the region at
Sunda Strait served as a transhipment centre due to the suitability of its location as a shipping
link between Europe and the intra-Asian network. Shipping contacts in the northern part of the
Indian Ocean could be maintained all year round through the Strait of Malacca or the Sunda
Strait. The ports of the Sunda Islands that face the Sea have relatively sheltered conditions with
the effects of the monsoons diminished compared to other Asian shores. From the earliest
Dutch voyages to Asia, ships could expect to find good anchorage here and a place to assemble
their fleet. Early in the th century, the need for a warehouse arose; a place to store goods to be
reloaded onto other ships. In , Wybrand van Warwyck, the Admiral of the first VOC fleet,
was allowed a stone building and a yard in Bantam. The problem with this location was, that
Bantam charged high import and export taxes. A location with the same logistical advantages
but independent from the local authorities would have been ideal for the VOC. When Gover-
nor-General Both, the first in the region, was appointed, the infrastructure to facilitate the se-
paration of VOC shipping into European-Asian and intra-Asian did not exist. The political-
military centre was, as a consequence located in the Spice Islands; it was the end of the s
when the Dutch secured their position in the eastern part of the archipelago. Governor-General
Both therefore went directly to the Spice Islands when he arrived in Asia. In addition, a lower
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placed director-general (responsible for the trade and the shipping) tried to organise the logis-
tics of the intra-Asian trade and the retourvaart to Europe while travelling back and forth be-
tween Bantam and the Spice Islands.
The focus on the region of west Java intensified when, in the s, a new direct route be-
tween the Cape of Good Hope and Java was explored. Instead of following the African coast to
the north, the ships sailed south and then east between º and º S latitude, using the prevail-
ing westerly winds, the roaring forties and the current. After approximately  Dutch sea
miles ,they turned north towards the Sunda Strait between Sumatra and Java. This new route
was successful: the trip was shorter and the conditions improved for both ship and crew. In
 this route, ‘Brouwer’s Route’ became the prescribed route for all VOC ships. Initially, there
were problems with knowing when to turn north and off the ‘roaring forties freeway’.
Although the th century sailors were able to determine the latitude of the ship, the longitude
was based on dead reckoning by the skipper and mates. The accidental grounding and the
wrecking of the Batavia off the coast of Australia in  was partly due to a miscalculation of
longitude. Another problem with the route was if a ship arrived in the monsoonal season on
the wrong side of Sunda Strait, it was forced to sail with the winds for some months before it
was able to reach its destination. With fine-tuning of the routing and growing cartographical
knowledge of the west coast of Australia, Brouwer’s Route became the best route.
Prior to , the VOC’s preference was for Jayakarta to be the administrative centre and a
place for storage and transhipment, this was mainly due to the dispute with Bantam over taxes.
The bay of Jayakarta with the ‘thousand islands’ was ideally suited for both shipbuilding and
repair. The combined attack of the English (triggered by the VOC themselves, as a result of
their aggressive monopoly policy in the Spice Islands) and the Javanese on the initial VOC post
in Jayakarta turned out to be a blessing in disguise. After the VOC regrouped at the Spice
Islands they were able to recapture Jayakarta and establish a sound independent base. This
independence ultimately led to the establishment of VOC headquarters at this location. Whilst
the VOC were no longer required to pay taxes and duties on their trade, they did, however
have to deal with hostile neighbours. Nevertheless, as long as they were able to control the
situation by ‘dividing and ruling’ and as long as they were able to keep ahead in military
strength, they could develop their logistical centre without interference from the local rulers.
In , Jayakarta was renamed Batavia by the VOC forces led by Jan Pieterszoon Coen.
After , Batavia became the administrative and logistical headquarters of the VOC. From
that time, all major decisions relating to administration and logistics were made there. The
Sunda Strait became the central hub for the link to Europe and Batavia and was, in effect, the
‘traffic-control-centre’ for intra-Asian shipping. The departing ships regularly received detailed
instructions about their voyage and goals. Batavia VOC officials often diverged from these
instructions when the specific vessels were not available. It seems that the VOC was able to
control shipping and trade to a large extent. If unforeseen circumstances occurred, it appears
the system was flexible enough to adjust to the situation as demonstrated in the reconstruction
of a planned and implemented season of intra-Asian shipping (see Case Study -).
Case Study -: Orders and Obeyance , Taiwan 
The orders and the obeyance of orders sent from VOC headquarters in Batavia demonstrate the flex-
ibility of the VOC. An interesting case study is the implementation of instructions for the ships on the
north-eastern route sent in  to Taiwan.
These instructions for the Taiwan VOC post were sent with the homeward-bounder Nieuw Enckhuy-
sen on -- (NA .., VOC , fol. ). Once in Taiwan, a ballast-cargo of sugar was loaded
and the ship returned directly to Batavia. In Batavia, an additional cargo of pepper was loaded. The
ship had arrived late and could not join, as planned, the return fleet which had departed on th
December . It left with  other ‘late’ ships on st January . The Nieuw Enckhuysen arrived in
the Netherlands in August .
The instructions that the Nieuw Enckhuysen brought to Taiwan included a number of assignments for a
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number of vessels.
The flutesWitte Duyf.Witte Paard Overschie, Trouw, Os and Koe were listed in the instructions with the
assignment to sail directly from Taiwan through Strait of Malacca to the Bay of Bengal and the Ara-
bian Sea and to return to Batavia. TheWitte Duyf disappeared and never reached Taiwan to even
receive the instructions. The other ships apparently made their voyage as ordered, arriving in Batavia
between May and September .
The instructions also included orders that the flute Swarte Beer return from Taiwan as fast as possible
with sugar for ballast for the return fleet waiting in Batavia. This order was not followed, apparently
because the flute could not reach Batavia before the expected departure of the fleet to Europe. Another
explanation is that local VOC officials were reluctant to employ this flute on ‘ordinary’ sugar transport;
in a travel journal of  the Swarte Beer was praised for its ‘excellent features’ (Plas , p. ). The
Swarte Beer eventually sailed from Taiwan via Tonkin (Vietnam) to Japan and via Siam to Batavia. The
sugar that the Swarte Beer was assigned to carry to Batavia, was probably shipped by the flute Sant-
dijck.
The Santdijck was one of four flutes instructed to sail, as a fleet, from Taiwan via Siam to Batavia. Only
the Hillegaersberg sailed the prescribed route. The Santdijck, in August , sailed directly to Batavia to
meet the return fleet. The Pellicaen stayed near Taiwan and sailed directly to Batavia much later, in
February . The last flute, the Potvis was lost on its outward voyage to Taiwan.
VOC officials ordered two other ships already in the region to take the place of the missing ships on
the route Taiwan-Siam-Batavia. The yacht Hulst and the Maasland replaced the flutes Pellicaen and
Potvis. The flute Maasland had been involved in local trade between Taiwan and Tonkin since .
Four other vessels included in the instructions did not call in at Taiwan on their outward voyage from
Batavia to Japan. The flute the Liefde sailed via Siam on its outward, as well as, homeward voyage,
although a stop in Siam on the return voyage was not included in the orders from Batavia. Together
with the homeward-bounder Vrede, the Liefde was in Batavia on time to ship Japanese cargo to
Europe. The Vrede did not sail back to Europe. In the East Chinese Sea, its masts had to be cut in a
furious storm. The ship was repaired in Batavia and sailed with the next return fleet at the end of .
Another two vessels, the flute Koning van Polen and the yacht Robyn did not call in at Taiwan, but
sailed directly to Japan. The return voyage was, as ordered, via Siam to Batavia. The Koning van Polen
carried a cargo of Siamese rice to Malacca before returning to Batavia, the Robyn left some silver in
Siam to buy new cargo from Japan and returned with the remainder to Batavia.
Two more flutes sailed from Batavia on the north-eastern route in . The Kampen and the Witte
Valk were ordered to work the silk-trade between Tonkin and Japan. They indeed did stay in this
region, theWitte Valk even until , before returning to Batavia.
With the damage to the Vrede and its temporary unavailability a replacement was necessary, which
prompted an evaluation of the fleet by VOC Batavia. In addition to the Vrede, the ships Nassauw and
Wesel were not available for the fleet. These ships were decommissioned on the easy route to the
Spice Islands and were resepectively demolished there and used as a timber carrier. Due to the absence
of these ships, there were no suitable capitael (large) ships available for: shipping in India; the blockade
of Goa; and the inevitable war with Portugal. It was suggested that the place of the Vrede should be
taken by the flute Reiger.
[The directors in Batavia made the following assessment of their fleet which provides an insight into
their view of the VOC shipping capacity in Asia and their efforts to optimise the shipping organisa-
tion.]
In Asia are:
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 ships: Vrede, Snoeck, Maastricht, Nassouw, Banda […]  yachts small and big, under which  that are
almost off.  flutes of which  almost off,  refurnished Moorish yachts that sail between the trading
posts at the Coromandel Coast,  stone carriers,  chaloups, joncks, pilot boats etc, this are vessels that
are no part of the intra-Asian trade and are only used for communication and assistance with loading
and unloading.
They request a number of  swift sailing flutes and yachts of  to  last to operate in the shallow
waters of Tonkin, Taiwan, etc. Also  strong and very swift sailing galjoten are required for Ceylon and
the river Ganges but also especially for the canal of Taiwan. They mention the possibility to build
chaloups in Asia but according to them there is a lack of compass timbre. (Coolhaas , p. )
The stranglehold that VOC Batavia had on the Asian shipping network became even stronger
after the directors in the Netherlands decided that all return shipping would be routed through
Batavia. Initially, some retourschepen were still sailing directly back to Europe from the Coro-
mandel Coast, Surat or Persia. This was eventually forbidden by the VOC in the Netherlands
mainly for safety reasons, but this centralising policy was very much welcomed by VOC Bata-
via in order to reinforce their central role. From  the number of homeward-bounders avail-
able in Batavia was sufficient to make it desirable to employ them in between their return voy-
age to Europe, on the Asian routes where a reliable supply of (bulk) cargo was available. In
 the number of homeward-bounders in Batavia was so high that the best suited vessels
were sent back to the Netherlands and the remainder were permanently reassigned to the in-
tra-Asian network (Coolhaas , p. ). The management in Batavia was, in principal,
bound to the directions they received from the Netherlands for the return cargo. However, to a
certain extent Batavia was able to influence the policy by their implementation of the return
shipping. Often they diverged from the directions using unforeseen circumstances as an accept-
able excuse (Coolhaas , p. ; Colenbrander , p. ).
Obsessively, they tried to meet the prescribed division of cargo for the various Chambers. It
was only in exceptional circumstances that management in Batavia had to report that they were
not able to meet the required ‘egalisatie’. In such cases, it was common to blame the Nether-
lands organisation for not sending a suitable fleet of retourschepen that would enable them to
distribute the cargo among the various Chambers in accordance with agreed formula:
‘Soo lange bij Uwe Ed. aldaer in 't herrewaerts seinden van goede retourschepen geen
nader ordere gestelt wert, is't ons onmogelijck de gerecommandeerde egualiteyt in 't
overseinden van de retouren aan de respective cameren t'onderhouden’ [As long that
your Hon. over there no system applies for the sending of good retourschepen, it will be
impossible for us to meet the requirements of the recommended division of cargo …]
(Coolhaas , p. ).
An extra complication in this planning was that the homeward-bounders did not have standar-
dised dimensions (NA .., VOC , --).
The internal organisation of the VOC with its strict division of activities between the various
Chambers was often a burden. The authorities in Batavia would have been gravely concerned
with meeting the requirements of proportional division of the cargo for the various Chambers
in the Netherlands. Further examination is warranted into how the ‘egalisatie’ driven organi-
sation in the Netherlands fit into the establishment of the VOC in Asia which had a separate
mission and was only confronted with the consequences of the egalisatie policy through: the
ships that were granted for the Asian fleet; the restrictions in developing their own ship build-
ing programme; and of course, the complex organisation of the return cargo.
The ballast that was required for the specific design of the Dutch vessels formed an impor-
tant logistical aspect of the organisation. In this aspect, the VOC demonstrated a commitment
to search for an optimum system. Merchants within the intra-Asian network were permanently
looking for suitable goods that could be used as ballast. Their challenge was to find ‘paying’
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ballast that would contribute to the profit rather then being an expense. The choice of ballast
played an important role in the efficient loading of ships, ensuing that the cargo capacity was
most advantageously utilised by valuable products. Three criteria: optimum weight; optimum
volume and maximum profit drove the intra-Asian network. For the fleet that was sent to
Europe, an additional consideration was the proportional division of cargo amongst the var-
ious ships sailing representing the separate VOC Chambers. It was of utmost importance that
the Asian organisation provided enough cargo and ballast in Batavia for the retourvloot. It can
be said that the VOC succeeded in synchronising the cargo capacity of the vessels sent with the
supply of cargo within certain region. It was rare that ships sailed with an underutilised cargo
capacity; on the contrary, ships were sometimes overloaded. The VOC even used less suited
vessels like men-of-war to serve on the trading network at the expense of their military capacity
(NA .., Admiraliteit Amsterdam , --).
Success of the VOC: Attuning the organisation and the various
networks
In order to assess the efficiency of the VOC, we have to study the link between the Europe-Asia
shipping network, and the intra-Asian network including the main logistical aspects. It is ap-
parent that the intra-Asian network provided the European-Asian network with the return
cargo for the European market. Less obvious, but of equal importance, was the contribution
from Europe of new vessels, equipment, supplies and new staff for the organisation in Asia. By
taking the various aspects of the shipping and trade into account conclusions can be drawn as
to whether the VOC was successful in overcoming bottlenecks and taking advantage of oppor-
tunities.
The retourschepen attached to the European-Asian network were examined. Most vessels ar-
rived in Batavia from Europe between June and October. It would take some time to unload the
supplies and other goods from the vessels. The new non-nautical staff that arrived with the
fleet needed time to recover from their intercontinental journey. Most soldiers were needed at
the Spice Islands. As shipping from Batavia to the Spice Islands was only possible from No-
vember, soldiers had time to recover in the hospital in Batavia; only healthy soldiers were sent
to the harsh conditions of the Spice Islands. Although the VOC tried to finance the return cargo
through intra-Asian trade, currency and bullion were still required and had to be provided by
the Netherlands. A small part of this money was used to pay staff, but the majority was re-
quired to buy silk and textile in China, Surat and the Bay of Bengal. Late arrival of this money
had consequences for the progress of trade; missed opportunities could cause delays of a year
(Coolhaas , p. ; Coolhaas , p. ).
Retourschepen that were not available to participate in intra-Asian shipping and were intended
for a direct return voyage to Europe, could commence reloading, assuming of course the avail-
ability of the return cargo in Batavia. The unloading and the loading of the Dutch vessels was
complicated by the fact that they required a minimum amount of ballast in order to maintain
stability even while vessels were stationary. This was sometimes difficult to achieve and could
lead to a loss of available cargo space. If ballast and cargo was incorrectly loaded, stability
could be seriously compromised; some ships did have to abort their journeys and return to
Batavia. Sometimes, there was no other option and ‘paying ballast’ from the Netherlands (or
visa versa) remained on the ship. For efficient loading of the ships sufficient ballast products
needed to be available at the roadstead. The organisation of the VOC needed to anticipate
requirements by having both sufficient ballast and cargo available in Batavia.
The departure date of the retourschepen was dictated by the VOC in the Netherlands and
based on the desire for the fleet to return to Europe before or at the start of the European
autumn. This met with nautical and commercial requirements: that is, before the autumn
storms and before the northern winter ice would prevent European distribution to the buyers
of the VOC products. This timing however, created problems for the VOC in Asia. To arrive at
this time, the fleet had to leave Asia around the turn of the year. This meant that loading had to
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commence long before December, with the ballast requirements already met. The most lucra-
tive ballast was sugar from Taiwan and copper from Japan but ships from this region had
problems reaching Batavia in time as they could generally only sail from the Far East after
September. A partial solution for this problem was found in the sending of the early arrival
retourschepen to Taiwan or even Japan to collect their return ‘ballast’ themselves. They could
keep part of their European cargo specially shipped for Japan on board and could supplement
that with products like pepper and sandalwood from stocks in Batavia. Silk from Persia, which
was also traded in Japan, arrived in Batavia in August, but this was too late to fit in with this
arrangement. These ships would return to Batavia in November-December with the bulk of
their European cargo in their hold and only needed to be ‘topped up’.
The timing of shipping was not as critical for the important spices from the eastern region.
There was a guaranteed supply of these spices and purchasing costs were low, both of which
allowed the VOC to keep excess stocks without putting a financial burden on the VOC. Their
only concern was to keep these products out of the hands of others and the VOC therefore put a
lot of energy and resources into the protection of their monopoly. As a result, the provision of
new soldiers to this region was important. As discussed before, the timing of the arrival of the
ships from Europe with new soliders left enough time for the soldiers to recover and their
transport to the Spice Islands. There was a constant demand for soldiers and food at the Spice
Islands and some ships had to sail in November early in the season, when the west monsoon
began to blow. The logistical bottleneck, however, was that ships leaving for the eastern region
at the turn of the monsoon would be trapped for many months before they could return to be
deployed on other routes. Smaller defendable vessels were needed at the Spice Islands to pro-
tect the monopoly against other traders coming to the region once the weather permitted. The
transport of soldiers and supplies required larger vessels. Regular retourschepen could not be
employed because they would not be able to return in time for the departure. The solution was
to send the cargo carriers that were specially sent to Asia carrying staff and supplies as well as
older retourschepen that would not return to Europe and were to end their careers in Asia. The
use of the newer stronger retourschepen in local transport and communication could be justified
if the voyage to the Spice Islands was combined with a more extended and demanding trip to
the Philippines, Taiwan, Siam and back to Batavia (Coolhaas , p. ).
Often, other ships sailed to the Spice Islands later in the season , after the arrival of the sol-
diers and the supply of rice from other regions in Asia. Soldiers were often transferred between
posts (Coolhaas , p. ). The VOC made optimal use of their ships by sending them at the
end of the western monsoon in March, so they could return with the change of the monsoon in
April. Good cargo carriers, such as flutes, made a speedy return trip to the Spice Islands. Other
less fit vessels would delay their return, thus ensuring a constant supply of spices to Batavia
from May until October. This supply was largely used for the retourvloot. Ideally they would
arrive in Batavia after the retourschepen had already loaded their heavier cargo and pepper, the
vessels could then simply be ‘topped up’ with this cargo.
Important cargo for the return fleet also came from the western regions. Many of the vessels
used in this region came as part of the blockade fleet to Goa and were sent at the end of the
monsoon season to other destinations like Surat, Persia and the Bay of Bengal.
To bring silk to Batavia in time for the return fleet, the vessels left Persia between March and
June on a direct voyage to Batavia. The complication was that the bullion these ships carried
from Persia was not intended for Batavia but for the Indian market. It was, therefore, more
efficient to sail via Surat and the Bay of Bengal to Batavia.
Shipping to the Bay of Bengal was possible all year round. If vessels left Batavia early in the
year, they could make it back in November, in time to deliver some of their goods as return
cargo for Europe. However, for the trade in this region bullion was required, so the departure
date of these vessels from Batavia depended on the arrival of money with the European fleet
(often in July/August). The bullion that came from Taiwan to these western regions only ar-
rived through the Strait of Malacca from December, too late to use in trade in the region of the
Bay of Bengal for products intended to reach Batavia before the end of the year. Consequently,
products that were bought with this money could only be shipped to Europe with the return
fleet the following year. To use this trade capital as lucratively as possible, a sub-network was
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established for the interim period: sugar was purchased in Bengal and shipped to Persia, ves-
sels returned to India and Bengal from Persia with cargo and bullion, the bullion was used to
buy textile and indigo. In addition, the opium trade from Bengal to India proved profitable..
Cinnamon and textile for the return cargo to Batavia was almost always available; shipping
between Coromandel Coast/Ceylon and Batavia was possible all year round.
The complex shipping around Taiwan
Further away from Batavia, at the northeastern corner of the intra-Asian network, the needs of
the retourvloot were also felt. There, the VOC had to deal with local circumstances that often
required specific vessel types and effective organisation. The VOC proved able to maximise
their shipping around the arriving and departing fleet for Europe. Through flexible employ-
ment of a differentiated fleet, they were able to attune and synchronise as much as possible the
needs of both systems. This same efficiency can be seen in the organisation of shipping at the
local level.
The nature of the organisation in Taiwan was determined by local (indirect) trade with China
and strict regulated trade with Japan. The Chinese goods assembled in Taiwan had to be sent to
Japan in a short time frame due to the strict dates that were set by the Japanese authorities and
the monsoon conditions. Subsequently, the goods returning from Japan had to be sent off as
soon as possible to Batavia together with the Chinese goods for the retourvloot or to the re-
tourschepen in the Pescadores that had sailed on from Batavia to the Far East. The retourschepen
could not be loaded in Taiwan because: the entrance to Fort Zeelandia – a canal – was too
shallow and the roadstead too dangerous to dock at. These factors made logistical organisation
very complex. The larger ships anchored at the Pescadores, a group of islands off the coast of
Taiwan. Small vessels carried the cargo from the fort to the larger ships. These smaller ships
with a limited cargo capacity were not as suitable as the large ones for the shipping between
Taiwan and Japan. The weather and sea conditions could make it very difficult to sail in and
out of the canal. It was a logistical challenge to have sufficient vessels with a limited draught
but reasonable cargo capacity and good sailing capabilities available for a short period. The
VOC’s answer was to use small flutes and local vessels. Outside this busy season, only a few of
these small flutes could be used for the shipping with Tonkin (Coolhaas , p. ; Case
Study -) Most of these vessels therefore, left the region for Batavia in March, at the end of the
northeastern monsoon, with the last products purchased from China. Most of these flutes
would make a stopover at Siam to load timber, sapan and rice for Batavia (Coolhaas , p.
).
There were strong military demands on the VOC in the Taiwan region, first to remove the
last pockets of Spanish power and later, to cope with the aggression of the Chinese pirate Cox-
inga. For these reasons, soldiers had to be shipped from Batavia. Part of the fleet assigned to
sail to Japan and Taiwan had to wait for the arrival of soldiers from the Netherlands, who were
shipped directly after their arrival.
The shipping of food supplies was also an issue for Taiwan, but the area was less dependant
on Batavia than the Spice Islands. Some food came from China and large quantities of rice and
oil were shipped from Siam. A few ships left Batavia early in the shipping season for Taiwan
and in April/May for Siam; they sailed almost empty with some Persian silk that had arrived
the previous year; food supplies for Taiwan; deerskin for Japan and a ballast of boulders. On
the return voyage, some ships made a stop at Siam and used the precious metals from Japan to
buy wood and rice. If loading at Siam did not take too long and they made the voyage to
Batavia in good time, these ships could sail directly to the Spice Islands with rice at the end of
the west monsoon period.
The smaller vessels needed for the busy loading season left for Taiwan in April/May at the
start of the southwest monsoon. They could transport any currency that had arrived late from
the Netherlands to buy Chinese products. After all the vessels had arrived in the region in
September, the loading had to follow a set sequence. First, the retourschepen that had sailed to
Taiwan to collect some of their return cargo had to unload any cargo intended for the Asian
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region and then reload for the return journey. In a very short period, there was a lot of traffic
between the Pescadores and Taiwan with vessels carrying pepper and ballast stone from the
retourschepen to Taiwan. The ballast stones were used for reinforcing the pier and jetties at Tai-
wan. Chinese and Japanese merchandise – lacquer and porcelain – with a ballast of sugar were
then loaded for the return voyage.
Following the retourschepen, the vessels for the direct route, that is via Malacca to the Coast of
Coromandel and the Arabian Sea, needed to be loaded with the precious metals from Japan,
some Chinese goods like porcelain, and sugar for Persia. These ships would need to pass the
Strait of Malacca before the end of December for an easy voyage into the Bay of Bengal and to
Persia. The ships used from , –when this route opened, until  –when there was a truce
with Portugal, were heavily constructed and heavily armed in order to protect the valuable
cargo against both the sea and the European enemy. From  until , robust ships were
required, but the threat of enemy attack was not a problem until after .
As the only enemy on this route was in the Arabian Sea, there was a strong temptation to
send the ships heavily loaded and therefore less suitable for military action. Vessels were sent
like this from Taiwan to Malacca or Galle, where the cargo was redistributed and the ships
were prepared for military action before continuing the journey to the Arabian Sea. Overall,
the most significant complicating factor in the loading system used in Taiwan was, that all the
vessels were present in this region of the East China Sea during the typhoon season (Coolhaas
, p. ). As a result, a number of the larger VOC vessels that were anchored in the shelter
of the Pescadores were shipwrecked, as were some smaller vessels.
Organising the shipping on a local level around India
A similar attuning of the various shipping and trade systems took place in the Indian Ocean,
the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The benefits of the VOC’s differentiated fleet and their
ability to adjust to changes in circumstances to maximise trade opportunities is clear in this
region. In the Arabian Sea changes were driven by a military confrontation with the Europeans.
Particlarly around Goa the VOC felt the need to employ their military against Portugal. How-
ever, the blockade of Goa also served a clear commercial purpose; the VOC justified the the
high costs associated with the blockade with the profit they expected from higher pepper prices
if the Portuguese could not ship to Europe. The main Portuguese city in Asia was, unlike the
VOC headquarters in Batavia, subject to the influence of the monsoon. Shipping to and from
Goa was only possible between September and May. From , the VOC implemented an
active policy to disrupt Portuguese activities in the Arabian Sea through a blockade of Goa.
This blockade occurred annually from  until  when the Netherlands reached a truce
with Portugal; the blockade resumed again after .
How did this military activity fit in with the VOC organisation? To begin with, there were
the blockade vessels waiting in Batavia for both sailors and soldiers arriving from Europe. The
blockade fleet left Batavia, well maintained, supplied and manned with soldiers in July-Au-
gust. They hoped to reach Goa just before the first Portuguese ships could leave for Europe,
after being stuck there for half a year during the monsoon season, or to catch the first arriving
Portuguese vessels that normally tried to reach Goa fromMozambique around this time. As the
wind conditions were unfavourable for sailing to the west coast of India from Batavia, the
Dutch vessels had to make a significant detour over the Indian Ocean, sometimes taking  to 
weeks and leading to a late arrival at Goa. The Dutch fleet would leave the region again at the
end of the northeast monsoon in April, when the Portuguese started to lay up their ships for the
following six months. Some VOC vessels would stay active in order to prevent those smaller
vessels of the Portuguese from leaving with supplies and soldiers for destinations like Ceylon.
What was the additional value of the blockade fleet for the trade organisation of the VOC?
On their way to the blockade, the vessels were almost fully laden with soldiers and military
equipment and carrying some cargo for Surat and Persia with more to follow on the ships sent
after September when the voyage from Batavia or from Taiwan was easier to make via the
Strait of Malacca. During the period December-January, well armed vessels from the blockade
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fleet could be employed to escort less defensible cargo carriers on their voyage to Surat and
Persia. If the ships were not needed anymore for the blockade, they could pick up cargo on
their way to Batavia, where they would be maintained and prepared for the next blockade
season. For lighter cargo such as pepper from the Malabar Coast or cinnamon from Ceylon,
they would keep their ballast. If they were sent to the Coromandel to collect the saltpetre that
served as an excellent ballast product for the retourvloot, they had to unload their original bal-
last.
The ships that ended up in Persia could make their return voyage direct to Batavia from
around May but there were often navigational problems with this route and it could take four
to five months before they reached Batavia. It was safer to sail via Galle to make a stopover for
horses which were traditionally shipped from this region. From here, an extra trip into the Bay
of Bengal was also possible in order to spend the money recieved from trade in Persia. How-
ever, the VOC also had to work around the necessity for the Persian silk to be in Batavia in time
for transport to the Far East or the retourvloot.
In the Far East and in the Arabian Sea, special fleets were stationed and an organisation set
up on a seasonal basis. The total blockade fleet would annually leave the region of the Arabian
Sea and only a few smaller flutes would stay behind in Taiwan. In other regions, the VOC had
to maintain a fleet and a specific organisation on a more permanent basis. This applies for the
smaller utility vessels that were needed at certain destinations where they had to maintain
communication and assist with the loading and unloading of the arriving ships. For reasons
discussed in chapter , these vessels are not fully recognised in this study because they were
often purchased locally and hardly made any voyages outside the region where they were sta-
tioned. It is clear that this fleet of smaller vessels played an important role in the VOC in Asia.
This study has shown the VOC focus of employing their own fleet in Asia. The role of Asian
vessels appears very limited; further research into the smaller utility vessels might show a
broader role, a different picture.
On a larger scale, the VOC required vessels locally. For example, well-armed small yachts
would stay for long periods on the Coast of Coromandel. These yachts needed to be armed in
order to protect the VOC’s interest, initially against the Portuguese and then later in conflicts
with local rulers. The draught of these yachts was less than  feet so that they could enter the
river outlets to be maintained locally. In order to be able to sail against the monsoon winds they
needed to be swift and good sailing vessels. Their area of operation was from Galle, where they
patrolled part of the year, to far into the Bay of Bengal.
Since textile had to be collected from various harbours along the Coast of Coromandel med-
ium sized yachts and flutes were active in this region. These vessels also collected cargo from
Bengal and Aracan. They gathered the cargo that could not be collected by the larger ships that
were unsuitable for the sailing along the coast.
Knitting all the threads together: the logistics of the network 

Part 2




An analysis of the development of VOC
shipping in Asia until 
The general development of VOC shipping is described in chapters  and . This chapter pre-
sents and interprets the data collated relating to the development of the VOC network in Asia.
As explained in chapter , the database contains, for the period examined, a total of .
voyages between  destinations in  Asian areas; these have been extracted from the total of
more then . voyages held in the database. All the records of local voyages and of the wait-
ing time of a vessel are excluded for the analysis of the development of Dutch shipping in
Asian waters until .
These exclusions have been made for a number of reasons. In the first place, the sources
available for the reconstruction of local shipping are very diverse and not consistent for all
destinations. It is, therefore, possible that the shipping in some areas is relatively over-rep-
resented. In addition due to concurrent research for the Avondster Project, (Parthesius, )
shipping in Galle was studied in greater detail than other areas. For general shipping, (between
areas) this focus has no effect because with a few exceptions, all of the voyages are also found in
the general references. Shipping within a particular area is not seen to have contributed to the
development of the intra-Asian shipping. Analysis of local shipping provides an insight into
the use of specific types of vessels by the VOC and this is covered in chapter .
From analysing the data, the total growth of VOC shipping in Asia can be calculated/estab-
lished. These figures relate to shipping within Asia, and therefore do not include the arrival of
ships from Europe, which were part of European-Asian shipping. Apart from a few exceptions
over the years, the first stop was west Java, with Batavia as the central rendezvous from . A
ship’s journey is included only if its first port of call was in Asia and it then sailed to another
destination within Asia..
This chapter presents and explains the quantitative data from the database relating to the
development of the VOC network in Asia. The applied methods are described in chapter  on
the database.
Table .: Development of the intra-Asian shipping in frequency (arrivals on a destination in Asia) and
volume (tonnage in lasten)
From the data in Table - it can be seen that up to , the frequency shows a steep growth,
consistent with the initial developmental phase (see chapter .). From  until , there is

a more steady growth: the existing network is further developed and intensified (described in
chapter .). In the period -, the intensity of the total of intra-Asian shipping decreases
slightly. If the volume of the shipping is considered, the same development can be seen though
with some slight deviations. The total volume of the shipping grows until  but less than the
frequency. After , the growth stagnated somewhat, but there was a steep growth again in
volume between  and , although there was only a smaller increase in the number of
intra-Asian voyages. The volume of shipping stabilises again between  and . These
developments will be explained in relation to the composition of the VOC fleet in Asia (see
Part  chapter  and Part  chapter ).
From this database it is possible, for the first time, to analyse the development of the VOC
shipping in Asia quantitatively. This analysis has been carried out in ten-year periods from
 to  on the frequency of arrivals and ships’ tonnages in  trading areas grouped in 
main regions.
From the data in both Table - and Table - (see section .), the development of the total
shipping network can be seen. In the period under consideration, % of all the arrivals (and
% of the total cargo space involved) of VOC intra-Asian voyages were in the region around
the Java Sea, with Bantam (in the early years only) and Batavia being the most important har-
bours. The prominent position of this region is clear for both the inter-Asian and intra-Asian
networks. A constant growth can be seen in the arriving shipping volumes in this area over the
whole of this period, indicating a constant growth in the available Asian goods in Batavia for
transhipment to Europe.
Over the whole period, the Spice Islands were also an important destination as one of the
core businesses of the VOC. Ambon (Area ), Banda (Area ) and the Moluccas (Area )
together represent almost % of all arrivals and the total shipping volume. The region does
show some fluctuations in the numbers of visiting ships and their cargo space because of the
effects of large military actions in some periods, but otherwise maintains a consistent high level
between  and .
For other regions, like the important pepper ports on Sumatra (Areas ,  and ), the
increase in shipping is clearly visible during the VOC’s development phase. Shipping to other
destinations like the Arabian Sea and the Far East emerged later in the process, but was in some
decline already in the last -year period under consideration. The growing importance of the
Bay of Bengal (VOC's vette weide – the plentiful meadows) is clearly shown in numbers of visits
and volume amounting to nearly % of total VOC-shipping in Asian during the last -year
period.
Besides developments instigated by trade, other aspects such as a military emphasis on a
given region are also reflected in Table - and Table -. Changes in the arrivals and volumes
of shipping to the Strait of Malacca (Area ) are indicators of changes in the nature of the
shipping. When the VOC intensified its attempts to ban Portuguese shipping through this im-
portant connection between the Far East and the Indian Ocean around , they sent smaller,
well-armed yachts to this region. Table - shows the frequency of arrivals in the region grow-
ing rapidly, but there is a decline in the average tonnage to  of the ships in the s and the
s and even in the absolute shipping volume arriving in the area (as can be seen from Table
-). After , when the situation had stabilised, the average tonnage again increased to va-
lues around  in the period between  and . Although some general trends can be
clearly seen, a more detailed analysis will reveal much more of the manner in which the VOC
shipping in Asia developed during the first half of the th century. These detailed analyses
will be given below.
The seven main regions are for this purpose divided into  areas, mostly following the th
century VOC concept for these geographical units. For this reason, some differences do exist
between the modern state and region names used to identify the areas in the tables. The exact
definitions of the areas can be seen from the description in section ... The matrix that is
formed by the number of arrivals and the associated volume per -year period is depicted in
the follow section where the main developments that can be derived from these figures are
described.
























Table .: Number of arrivals and associated volume per -year period for the Arabian Sea.


















Table .: Number of arrivals and associated volume per -year period for the Bay of Bengal.





























Table .: Number of arrivals and associated volume per -year period for Sumatra.






Strait of Malacca (61)
Table .: Number of arrivals and associated volume per -year period for Strait Malacca

















Table .: Number of arrivals and associated volume per -year period for Java





















Table .: Number of arrivals and associated volume per -year period for the Spice Islands






























Table .: Number of arrivals and associated volume per -year period for the Far East.
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The above maps and tables show the enormous fluctuation that sometimes occurred during the
development stage of the VOC shipping network. Some percentages of growth might seem to
be out of proportion, such as in region , the pepper-harbours of southeast Sumatra. However,
these figures indicate how extensively shipping was organised after an initial moderate start
that frequently had the character of exploration. Changes in the trade or military policy in a
given period might also create these enormous fluctuations. Thus China became a destination
for the VOC men-of-war in the s after they captured the Spice Islands; in that period ship-
ping to China grew by more than .%, while shipping to the Spice Islands dropped. The
combination of increasing percentage frequency and the volume of the shipping are interesting
indications of the nature of the shipping and the composition of the fleets – subjects that are
discussed in detail in chapter .
Development to  in ten-year intervals
In the following section the outcome of the above analysis will be discussed in more detail, as
will the most important features of the development of the VOC network in Asia by -year
intervals. The expansion of the Dutch presence in the various regions is represented in develop-
ment maps for each period.
The period to 
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Map .: Development of the frequency of the intra-Asian VOC shipping to 
This period covers the development of the Voor-Compagnieën and the first years of the VOC. In
the period up to ,  arrivals at various destinations have been recorded in the database.
Table - clearly shows that, right from the outset, west Java (Area ) was the most frequent
destination for Dutch ships with a total of  arrivals. For this period, the destination harbour
within the area is almost exclusively Bantam. The table does not contain the arrivals from
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
Europe, but already the importance of this area for voyages between Asian destinations is evi-
dent.
The most important objective of Dutch shipping during this period was to purchase pepper
and spices. The destinations of the first voyages around Africa were the harbours of west Java
that were, more or less, outside the Portuguese sphere of influence. The Dutch had hoped for
an easy access to pepper and spices at this location that would make a quick and direct return
to Europe possible. Problems with the purchasing of the Asian products soon led to expansion
to alternative destinations in the region to collect cargo, after which the ships returned to Ban-
tam to start their return voyage from there.
From the earliest years of Asian trading, the city of Patani (at the eastern coast of the Malay
Peninsula, in Area , the Gulf of Thailand) was a frequent destination to purchase pepper (
visits). The pepper market of Sumatra was also potentially important, and various missions
were sent to Banda Aceh (Atjeh), Area , to establish a relationship with the local ruler. During
this period,  arrivals of VOC ships from other places in Asia were recorded to Atjeh. In ,
the ship Leeuw (ID:) stopped at Poeloe Weh – a visit that now provides an early example of
Dutch ship building in Asia. With materials that they had brought with them, they built a small
yacht to operate in the local trade (Unger : ). The pepper harbours on the Sumatran west
coast, south of Atjeh (Area ), were not frequented by the Dutch as this point in time ( arri-
vals in Area ). Only in  did the ships Verenigde Landen (ID:) and Hof van Holland (ID:)
sail to this area specifically to search for pepper and a few other ships put in to these locations
for refreshments. It is interesting to note that the first trade mission from Asia to the Nether-
lands took place from Atjeh when, in , a trade mission from the ruler of Banda Aceh was
sent to the Netherlands, facilitated by the VOC (NA VOC : fol. ). However, relations with
the local rulers could not be sustained in the longer term.
The  arrivals in the Straits of Malacca were the result of the conflict with the Portuguese.
The purpose of these visits was primarily military action against the Portuguese, rather than
trade.
Although the Dutch had initially hoped to find all the products they sought in Bantam,
spices were also purchased in the areas where they were produced. From west Java, ships
sailed directly to the Spice Islands in the eastern parts of the archipelago. For the islands Ter-
nate, Tidore (Area ,  arrivals), Ambon (Area ,  arrivals) and Banda (Area ,  arri-
vals), a total of  arrivals of Dutch ships have been recorded for this period, which makes
this region the second most important destination for the VOC.
During this period, there was a consistent drive to develop trade with China. Every few
years, ships were sent to China but were not successful in gaining entry into the Chinese mar-
ket (Stapel :  & NA .. VOC : fol. , ). A total of  ships sailed to the coast of
China on different occasions but could not get permission to trade. In , Admiral Matelief,
who sailed to China with three ships, declared that it was impossible to trade in China since the
Portuguese were obstructing him and his ships were too weak to resist them (Jonghe :
p. ). In addition, alternative explorations to Cambodia ( arrivals) and Vietnam ( arrivals)
to purchase Chinese products were not very promising because of the influence of the Portu-
guese and the local political instability. However, since the VOC were not officially allowed to
trade with the Chinese merchants, no regular shipping could be developed to this destination.
For that reason, Patani, also an important port of call for Chinese ships, had to serve as a sub-
stitute location for the purchase of Chinese products together with the pepper from the Malay
Peninsula. An alternative (and, in one way, very successful) source of Chinese merchandise was
the capture of Portuguese ships. In  and , three large Portuguese ships were captured.
The auction of the cargo of two of these ships resulted in huge profits in the Netherlands (Pijl-
Ketel , Jörg  & ).
Initially, the Dutch followed the route to Asia that had first been developed by the Portu-
guese. This route prescribed that, after rounding the Cape of Good Hope, ships followed a
northerly course along the east coast of Africa and crossed the Indian Ocean in the direction of
India. The Portuguese had various strongholds along the way that became a target for the
Dutch fleets when the VOC adopted a more offensive stance after . Subsequently, more
ships visited the Portuguese areas. Table - shows visits to the Portuguese strongholds on the
An analysis of the development of VOC shipping in Asia until  
west coast of India (Goa, Area ), the Malabar Coast (Area .) It was part of the VOC’s mili-
tary strategy at that time to confront the Portuguese in their own strongholds (Westera :
). Following , when both this strategy and the sea route to Asia had changed, a steep
decline in visits to these places can be seen. It was only in the s, when the VOC started the
yearly blockade of Goa and an operation to drive the Portuguese from Ceylon, that a sharp
increase in the VOC presence in this region could again be seen.
In this early period, Mauritius played a strategic role for the VOC. It served as an important
rendezvous for homebound fleets, it produced ebony and it also reinforced the claim that the
VOC monopoly included this part of the Indian Ocean. In this period, the Island was visited 
times. Apart from the raids on the Portuguese strongholds in Mozambique in  and ,
most visits in this region were focused on finding a staging post for Asian-bound fleets. Most
landfalls on the African coast, Madagascar and the Comores turned out to be unsuccessful.
Once the offensive policy was abandoned and after the sea route to Asia was redirected to the
southern Indian Ocean, Mauritius continued to be visited after  to take on refreshments
and also cargoes of ebony-wood. Some unintended visits to Madagascar were made following
shipwreck. These voyages are not included in the analysis of the development of the intra-Asia
shipping network of the VOC. They are considered to belong to the outward or homeward
bound voyages, as are the incidental landfalls on the western shores of Australia (in later peri-
ods) and on some of the Great Ocean Islands.
As a derivation of the early sea road to Asia over the northern part of the Indian Ocean, a
couple of places were visited for trade on the coast of India. Textiles were purchased around
Surat (the Area , the Gulf of Cambay in north-west India –  arrivals) and on the Coromandel
Coast (the east-coast of India, Area  –  arrivals). From here the ships sailed to the Straits of
Malacca (Area ) for military operations where their presence could also be combined with the
purchasing of pepper.
Extensive military actions were also undertaken in the Spice Islands in order to reinforce the
Dutch position in this important market. At the end of this period the VOC had stabilised its
position in the southeastern part of the Spice Islands – Ambon/Ceram, (Area ) and Banda
(Area ) – though with some more problems with local inhabitants. They could now concen-
trate on fighting the Spaniards in the northern part (Area  – the islands in the Molucca Sea,
dominated by Ternate and Tidore) and the Philippines (Area ) in order to consolidate their
monopoly in cloves.
The period -
As shown in Table -, the total amount of shipping in Asia grew in this period by % in ship
movements and % in volume over the previous period. A number of noteworthy develop-
ments were taking place. Between  and  one can see a significant increase in visits to
destinations on Sumatra, as reflected in Table -. This relates to all the important pepper har-
bours that were rarely if ever visited in the earlier period. For example, the southeast coast of
Sumatra (region ), where Jambi and Palembang were the important harbours, shows  arri-
vals, while in the pervious period only  visits were made. This shipping route came into ex-
istence from , when director Coen tried to find a solution to the unreliability of Bantam’s
rulers in applying the pepper and price policy. For that reason, he sent a consignment of textiles
to Jambi on a Siamese junk with a Dutch merchant and ‘with a minimum of commotion and
with silent drums’ (Colenbrander , --). Without delay the Dutch started to build a
trading post although they still had to deal with some logistical problems related to the ship-
ping: to reach Jambi they needed a special ship that could sail up river (see chapter ).
The smaller harbours under the influence of Banda Aceh on the west coast of Sumatra (re-
gion ) were visited  times. The  arrivals in the previous period were mostly incidental
landfalls or a search for refreshments along the coast. After , West Sumatra became a reg-
ular destination for the pepper trade. This was in line with the policy of the VOC to avoid
Bantam and to collect pepper directly from the production areas since the prices in Bantam
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
were considered too high. This shipping also had a negative effect on the trade with Atjeh,
where arrivals fall by % to  visits in this period.
In the eastern part of the archipelago, the actions against the Spaniards in the Philippines
(Area  – Sulu Sea) were not very successful; attempts to intercept the Spanish silver ships
from Mexico failed time after time. However, the expeditions were still lucrative because of the
VOC’s capturing of Chinese jonks on their way to the Philippines ( visits). The shipping to
this area was principally military in nature. In part  it has been described how the sale of the
cargo of the captured junks became a kind of trade route in itself.
Shipping from Java to Japan by the northeastern route over the South China Sea was initiated
at the end of the previous period and intensified during this period. Thailand, then known as
Siam (Area ), was an important area on this route for the collection of deer and ray skins for
trade with Japan so as to acquire products from China and the tropical forest for shipment to
Europe.  arrivals are shown for this period. Some ships made landfalls on the coast of China
but mostly on an incidental basis. In this period  visits were made to Japan. On the route
between Japan and Siam and vice versa captured or bought large junks were used, but this
practice, over which he had no control, was not approved by the commercial director Coen in
Batavia.
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Map .: Developments of the frequency of the VOC shipping <
In the western part of the Indian Ocean, on the west coast of India (Areas  and ), the strong
emphasis on fighting the Portuguese in their strongholds declined. The regions around Goa
and the Malabar Coast were visited only three times, as against  visits in the period to .
Military expeditions to Malacca ceased which resulted in a decline of visits to the Strait of
Malacca by nearly % to  visits. This decline is not extraordinary since it was, after all, the
period of truce with the Iberians. Although the truce was not strictly adhered to in Asia, it
obviously had some effect on the military operations in this region. In any case, the VOC be-
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came more involved in developing its own headquarters on Java and was busier than ever
reinforcing its position against the English.
Frustrated by the half-hearted attitude of the directors in the Netherlands who were reluctant
to make the English their enemy in Asia, the newly appointed Governor-General Coen suc-
ceeded at the end of this period in removing the English from the region of the Spice Islands.
Initially, the VOC lost its strong position in west Java to the English in -. After re-
grouping on the Spice Islands, a Dutch fleet returned and established Batavia as the VOC
stronghold independent from Bantam. By the same token the region of the Spice Islands was
then for the most part free from Portuguese and English influence.
The route from the Cape of Good Hope to Java mentioned earlier, following the southern
Indian Ocean (the so-called Brouwersroute), also resulted in the first involuntarily encounters
with the unknown coast of Western Australia; since these encounters do not fall within the
ambit of intra-Asian shipping, these early landfalls are not shown in the tables above. Chang-
ing the route from the Cape to Java after , also meant a change in the route to Surat and
Coromandel. From then on, most of the visits to these destinations were undertaken as an
intra-Asian trip from Java rather then a stopover on the route from Europe. Ships were sent
directly from Europe to this region on only a few occasions. The coast of Coromandel devel-
oped into a substantial provider of textiles for the VOC; the number of visits to this destination
grew to . On the other (western) side of India, Portuguese influence still was too strong; the
visits to Surat stayed at a marginal level with only three visits in this period. There was, how-
ever, an attempt to develop trade in the far western parts of the Indian Ocean to Persia and
Mocha. In , when the VOC sent merchant Pieter van den Broecke to investigate the possi-
bilities of trade, his assessment was that there were promising opportunities for trade in Indo-
nesian products (NA .., VOC , - point ). Up to , two VOC ships visited this
region on intra-Asian voyages as an overture to the flourishing trade ahead. Three other ships
sailed to this area directly from Europe during this period.
In the Lesser Sunda Islands (Area ), Solor and Timor were also new destinations ( visits)
with the sandalwood from these islands being an important product for the intra-Asian trade.
The Dutch could never completely dispel the Portuguese influence in this region; the VOC did
not give it the highest priority and the influence of the local Catholic Church was a significant
force in favour of the Portuguese. Shipping in the eastern parts of the archipelago on the Spice
Islands shows a steady growth: the number of ships visiting Ambon and Ceram, Banda and the
Molucca's all more then doubled in comparison with the previous period.
The Period -
The total amount of VOC shipping in Asia grew again in this period by % of ship movements
and % of volume over the previous period, as shown in Table .. Again, the significant
fluctuation that sometimes occurred during the development stage of the VOC shipping net-
work is evident. With the establishment of Batavia as their central headquarters, the position of
the VOC in west Java was now reinforced. A notable development was the increase in the
number of visits to east Java – Bali (Area ) and the visits to Macassar (main destination on
the island of Sulawesi, Area ), which had already commenced in the pervious period. This
development was linked to the changing position of the VOC on the Spice Islands. The Dutch
had succeeded in establishing a monopoly on trade in that area but this brought with it the
obligation to take over the supply of food and other products since local shipping and trade
were banned. The above-mentioned harbours, therefore, became an important stopover to load
supplies for the region controlled by the VOC.
From Batavia, some direct shipping routes in the region around Java were developing, nota-
bly to Timor to collect sandalwood, which started in the previous period, and to Borneo, to
collect products from the tropical forest, pepper and diamonds. Products (especially sandal-
wood) collected in the archipelago were partly used as barter for trade with the Asian main-
land where they were exchanged for goods for the European market, as well as for products for
intra-Asian trade, like textiles in Coromandel and deer skins in Thailand. Trade to the region of
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the Bay of Bengal was further expanding eastwards to Bengal (Area ) and Aracan (modern
Myamar, Area ). After a few exploration voyages in the previous period, the number of visits
to these two areas grew to nearly . The most important destination in this region remained
the Coromandel Coast with again a large increase (of around %) to  visits.
After the VOC had settled a peace agreement with the English at the beginning of this peri-
od, hostilities with the Iberians again intensified. It seems that the direction for military action
was linked to available military capacity, with action moving back from the region of the Spice
Islands, where the VOC fought the English, to the Portuguese strongholds in the Strait of Ma-
lacca again. By pursuing the Portuguese and their allies in this region, the VOC hoped to con-
trol this very strategic connection between the Far East and the Indian Ocean region. Since the
Sunda Strait was already controlled by the VOC, they could then exert complete control over
the shipping routes between east and west Asia. The frequency of the VOC shipping in this
area was double that of the previous  years and even higher again than in the first period.
The volume of these ships, however, was even lower than in the previous period, indicating the
change in ship type already mentioned in Part .
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Map .: Development of the frequency of the VOC shipping <
The increase in the number of visits to China (Area ) was spectacular. In the previous period
there were only four visits, against  arrivals on the China coast and  arrivals in the region
of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Area ) for -. The background to this spectacular growth
was the extensive military campaign launched by the VOC when they had freed up their mili-
tary capacity by settling their position on the Spice Islands. No longer did the VOC confine
itself to a blockade of the Philippines, (which in the early s was even conducted with a joint
Anglo-Dutch fleet), to intercept trade between China and the Spanish, but they actively en-
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gaged in action on the coast of China itself. These actions were not very successful, but they did
lead to the establishment of the earlier-mentioned VOC stronghold on Taiwan. The VOC, how-
ever, remained excluded from the Chinese market itself and had to find alternative sources of
Chinese products.
Apart from the military actions, a regular shipping route between Batavia and Taiwan and
Japan was developing with an increase in the frequency of the stopovers in this region: Thai-
land, Cambodia and Vietnam (Areas ,  and ) were visited  times, which represented an
explosive growth. Thailand, where Ayutthaya high up the Menam river in the heart of the
country had now replaced the semi-independent Patani on the peninsula as the place for VOC
trade, and had become an important destination to purchase merchandise for Japan together
with rice and timber for the VOC settlement on Taiwan. A picture emerges, during this period,
of shipping specifically intended to cater for the supply of consumable products and building
materials for the VOC settlements. Food was shipped over long distances; for example, Japan
was supplying rice and wheat for Batavia (the need for food in Batavia had also grown because
of problems with the local authorities of Bantam and Mataram).
The frequency of shipping to Japan nearly doubled and the number of the VOC ships sailing
to Hirado (Firando) increased by more than %, despite the fact that the VOC’s shipping to
Japan totally ceased for three years in - because the Japanese did not accept the VOC’s
authority on Taiwan. Eventually the conflict was settled to the VOC’s advantage since shortly
after the -year hiatus they gained a favourable position over their other European competitors
as the only Christian nation allowed to trade with Japan. This policy of isolation by the Shogun
brought strict regulations but an overall benefit for the VOC. In the previous period some
attempts were made by Specx to make Japan a VOC logistical centre but this was no longer
practical or feasible. The restrictions linked with the position of the VOC in Japan were too
strict, the function as a staging post could be taken over by Taiwan.
At the other end of the Asian network in the northwestern regions of the Indian Ocean (Ara-
bia with Mocha as the most important harbour, Area  and Persia with its port Gamron, Area
), later called the Westerkwartieren, shipping had also increased substantially. After some ex-
perimentation with shipping to Persia and Mocha in the previous period, this route now be-
came well established with  arrivals. Together with this development, there was also a sub-
stantial increase in shipping voyages with Surat as both a final destination and as a stopover for
voyages to or from Persia and Arabia ( arrivals).
The Period -
In the previous periods, the trade and shipping networks of the VOC had started to take shape.
In the period after , shipping intensified and the emphasis on certain destinations changed
for various reasons. The total shipping in Asia increased less spectacularly than in earlier peri-
ods but, nevertheless, still increased by % for ship movements and % by total volume.
In general, all the regular shipping routes were more or less in use by the VOC in the -
period. No new destinations were added and only in a few cases did the actual harbour within
a destination sometimes change. For core destinations like the Spice Islands, the frequency and
volume of shipping could vary according to the type of ships that were sent. Because the mili-
tary operations against the Iberians had been shifted away from the Philippines to other areas,
shipping to the Moluccas and the Sulu Sea dropped considerably. Regular shipping took place
to Sumatra (pepper for textiles) and from Batavia to Taiwan and Japan. The only new route that
came into service was the direct one from Taiwan, through the Strait of Malacca (avoiding a
stopover in Batavia) to the Westerkwartieren and the Bay of Bengal. The trade position of the
VOC in Persia improved considerably. Precious metals and copper from Japan and China, and
sugar from Taiwan and China, were exchanged for silk, other textiles, indigo and saltpetre
along this route. This development is reflected in an increase in arrivals of % to the region of
Taiwan, % for Persia and % for northwest India. Only Arabia proved to be less profitable
than previously expected and the frequency of voyages dropped to about one ship every year.
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Map .: Development of the frequency of the VOC shipping <
The VOC’s military actions were redirected from China (visits dropping to half the number in
the previous period) to the Portuguese stronghold of Malacca, which showed a % increase
with  arrivals, Goa, with  arrivals as against only  in the pervious period, and Ceylon with
 visits. Large men-of-war were sent to these latter regions, in most cases to organise a block-
ade. The volume of the shipping to the Strait of Malacca did still remain relative low. Some of
these ships were also used for trade with VOC-friendly ports in these areas.
The Period -
The total amount of shipping in Asia in - again showed an increase of % over the
previous period and the volume increased by almost %. The reason for this and the pre-
viously noted differences between frequency and volume will be explained later in the compo-
sition of the VOC fleet in Asia. Significant changes during this decade were the capture of the
Portuguese strongholds of Malacca and Galle. Malacca became a strategic rendezvous on the
route from Taiwan to the Westerkwartieren. Galle gradually developed into an important em-
porium for the transhipment of products from Bengal, Coromandel, Surat and Persia. The de-
velopment of both areas can be seen very clearly in the figures; shipping volume to both areas
increased five-fold over the previous ten years surpassing Taiwan and the Spice Islands in im-
portance. The VOC had a well distributed network of destinations where products could be
exchanged and transhipped from ships occupied in local and regional trade to ships engaged
in inter-regional and intercontinental shipping to Europe. Independently of their function as
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emporia, these ports also played a significant role in the trade of local products, which were
important for the intra-Asian trade. However, the disadvantage in this development was an
increased burden on the VOC’s logistical organisation to supply these places with food. In fact,
a direct route between Malacca and Siam was established for this express purpose.
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Map .: Development of the frequency of the VOC shipping <
The Period -
The number of voyages within Asia declined in this period by %, and the volume by %
compared with the period -. The loss in shipping activity in the areas around the Chi-
nese Sea was not fully compensated for by the growth in other areas. During this decade, the
capture of Ceylon from the Portuguese was finally accomplished. The VOC then concentrated
on extending its influence in South India on the Malabar Coast (Area ). The sharp increase in
visits to this area had already begun in the previous period (and increased in this one), while
the purely military actions at nearby Goa (Area ) do show a declining tendency. The Malabar
Coast was only partly visited for military reasons, but this destination did become important
for its pepper and also as a food supplier for Ceylon. The increase in the Malabar pepper trade
is mirrored by a sharp decrease in visits to the pepper harbours at Sumatra (Areas  and ).
During this period the English, especially in the regions of Surat, Persia and Arabia, replaced
the Portuguese, as the traditional enemy.
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Map .: Development of the frequency of the VOC shipping <
The interests of the VOC in the Bay of Bengal are clearly illustrated in the consistently high
level of voyages to the Coromandel Coast (Area ) and the doubling of visits to the northeast-
ern area of this Bay (Area , approximately modern Bangladesh and Area , approximately
modern Myanmar).
The establishment of the VOC stronghold on the Cape of Good Hope would bring an impor-
tant improvement in the logistics of intercontinental shipping in the future. For the time being,
however, it could hardly supply itself with food and labour and for that reason was also cause
for some renewed interest in the region of Eastern Africa, Madagascar and Mauritius.
On the traditional route to the Spice Islands, the Island of Sulawesi (Area  with Macassar,
modern Ujung Pandang as most important destination) showed consistently steady growth as
an important stopover for supplies but also in serving its military purposes. The VOC put pres-
sure on the local rulers in an ongoing conflict about the "smuggling" of cloves. In the s this
would lead to some VOC expansion in this region.
The situation in the Far East became more difficult for the VOC, where shipping to Taiwan
and Japan already showed a steady decline. Regulation of trade with Japan became stricter
(less copper could be exported) and it became more difficult to get Chinese products as a result
of the internal situation in China and the actions of Coxinga, the self-styled pirate king of Tai-
wan. Soon the VOC would lose its stronghold in Taiwan to this Chinese warlord and Taiwan
would cease to be a VOC destination. That development does, however, fall just outside the





The complex activities of the VOC in Asia are reflected in the composition of the fleet in Asia. In
order to further examine the logistical development of the VOC and to assess how successful
they were in their attempts to maximise their organisation we have to look more closely into
where the VOC fleet was employed in Asia. In Chapter . the composition of the total VOC
fleet up to  is described. Based on the classification of the vessels into the ten rates, a gen-
eral description of the features of the vessels was given.




: miscellaneous vessels (<  last)
: small yachts (<  last)
: small to middle sized flutes (- last)
: middle sized yachts (- last)
: big flutes (>  last)
: big yachts (> last)
: ship (>  last)
: big men-of-war
: homeward-bounder
In this chapter, the use of these ships for the activities of the VOC is explored further; the nature
of the shipping to the main regions is examined in more detail and the vessels used in these
regions are analysed.
By looking at the features of the ships, the requirements of the region and the functions of the
VOC together, a better insight can be gained into the complexity of building up a fleet that
allowed the company to run their activities and business as efficiently as possible. The central
aim in this chapter will be to examine the specific circumstances in the regions of the VOC trade
and shipping network that could put requirements on the vessels that the VOC had in service.
During the development of the VOC shipping in Asia, the demands placed on ships were
constantly changing. Although the physical-nautical conditions in the various destinations
stayed the same in principle, within a given region, the condition of a harbour could change,
as was the case in Taiwan where the entrance canal silted up, limiting the size of incoming
vessels, or the harbour itself could be re-assigned, as for example, in Japan where the initial
trading post in Hirado was moved to Nagasaki in .
More often, the political-military circumstances in a region dictated the features of vessels
sailing to these destinations. That did not simply mean the choice between sending men-of-
war or trade vessels. It often involved a process of fine-tuning the best vessel that could meet
the military needs, often in combination with the wish to trade. Accordingly, small patrol ves-
sels replaced the men-of-war that fought the big Portuguese ships in the important Strait of
Malacca in the period up to . After some losses of large Caraques to the Dutch, the Portu-
guese provided better protection to their bigger ships and organised their other shipping on a

smaller scale. By replacing the big men-of-war with smaller swift sailing and shallow draught
vessels, the VOC was able to frustrate the Portuguese and the local shipping which also used
smaller vessels, and chased them for their loot.
The nature of trade and cargo in the various regions was also subject to change. The rate of
the vessel to be sent depended on the availability of cargo. Was there sufficient cargo to be
taken on in one place to justify the deployment of a large vessel, or did the cargo need to be
collected from various places and ports. In which case could this be achieved more efficiently
by smaller vessels?
Interpretation
The following are the main parameters that can reliably be said to have influenced decisions on
the composition of the fleet in certain regions:
– Nautical-physical conditions in a region, like exposed versus sheltered waters, special
weather conditions such as typhoon systems, narrow passages, shallow harbours etc.
– Political-military conditions in a region. This can be translated into the basic requirements
for vessels with a military function and the type of warfare (offensive, defensive, well-
armed European competitors, coastguard functions, etc) that could be encountered.
– Type of cargo and logistics of the trade. The type of cargo could also determine whether
special vessels were needed for transport (e.g. elephant trade versus bulk trade in pepper).
The Arabian Sea (Westerkwartier) (Areas -)
This region ranges from the Maldives in the southeast, the west coast of India to Persia and
Arabia in the west. Conditions in these waters are characterised mainly by an exposed open
ocean with a regular and predictable wind pattern. In general these conditions did not require
special characteristics of visiting vessels. Only the harbour of Surat in northwest India (by the
VOC named Suhali's com, the Bay of Suvali) had a shallow entrance with limited access. Since
the city of Surat was located inland on a river that was difficult to navigate, the medium-sized
and bigger vessels needed the assistance of smaller vessels to take their cargo ashore. Because
they often had to load and unload precious metals, they needed reliable protection and sup-
port. In some cases, smaller vessels escorted larger ships to the Surat area specifically for this
purpose. Although the nautical-physical conditions allowed every seagoing vessel to operate in
this region in principle, the political-military realities did not. There was a constant risk of con-
frontation with heavily armed Portuguese or English vessels. The VOC exacerbated this al-
ready highly militarised situation by their initial raid on Goa in the early period and their an-
nual blockades after . Visiting vessels, therefore, needed to be heavily armed or be escorted
by another defensible vessel. At some times these convoys could be easily organised because of
the presence of a fleet of well-armed vessels for the Goa blockade. Nevertheless, it seemed most
efficient for the VOC to attempt to combine the employment of a defensible vessel with a trade
mission at the end of a blockade period or when the Portuguese force was considered to be
fairly weak, such that, an early departure was possible for some of the blockade fleet. Combin-
ing the actions of blockade and trade mission was feasible because the type of cargo in this
region did not require specialised cargo carriers. The vessels only needed a degree of flexibility
owing to the diversity of the cargo, which could range from silk and horses from Arabia, pep-
per and rice from the Malabar Coast to the transport of elephants to India. A yacht like the
Avondster (ID:), which could transport soldiers and equipment, was rejected as a ship for
the blockade but it could easily be employed elsewhere in the region, including the transport of
elephants to the coast of Malabar. The route between Surat and Persia was the only region in
the shipping network where the VOC allowed the transport of goods for private traders. The
heavily armed vessels, initially the men-of-war (rate ) and later the big war yachts (rate ) met
the requirements for this trade that had to be based on trust by the private traders. The VOC
was reluctant to provide this service, but this trade could provide an essential supply of money
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from Persia to Surat. The VOC tried to keep the profits for themselves but they had to accept
that they could not control the situation in this region especially because the English facilitated
the private trade with the consequence that ‘therefore the Moors will never be pushed from the
bench’ (Coolhaas , p. ).
These activities placed emphasis on the military capabilities of the vessels that operated in
this region. Therefore, generally speaking, one would expect defensible medium-sized and big-
ger ships to operate in the area. Trade was a secondary aim for these vessels. The pure trading
vessels such as the flute could only operate in convoy. The smaller long haul traders were not
suitable for this region.
Table .: The activity level of the various types of VOC vessels in the region of the Arabian Sea per -
year period to 
Table - shows the composition of the VOC fleet in this region up to . In the early period
the fleets sailing from Europe to Java often visited the west coast of India to attack the Portu-
guese headquarters in Goa. The composition of these fleets was not specially selected by the
VOC for this region but reflected the typical unspecialised fleet of the time. In the period -
 the sailing route from the Netherlands to Java was redirected to the southern part of the
Indian Ocean. After  no fleets departing from the Netherlands passed this region anymore.
From the s a start was made with shipping to Persia and Surat. The bigger well-armed
vessels above rate  were responsible for most of the activity in that period.
The vessels of rate  of the VOC, the men-of-war, were very active in this region. From 
on these men-of-war were gradually replaced by the retourschepen; firstly, in the Anglo-Dutch
‘fleet of defence’ and, after the cooperation ended between the two countries, as part of the
VOC strategy to patrol against the Portuguese in the whole region from the east coast of Africa
up to their headquarters in Goa. The retourschepen sometimes combined their military task with
an experiment in direct shipping between the region and Europe.
Between  and  and again after , shipping in this region was determined by the
annual blockade of Goa. During the blockade and in the period of the truce, middle-sized
yachts were also used in the region. The flutes, which were the pure cargo carriers, sailed to
Surat and sometimes Mocha in convoy with defensible vessels. In , for instance, the flute
Raropwhich was wrecked near Negombo in Ceylon a year later, had to be escorted fromMocha
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to Surat by an armed yacht because the flute needed its canons in the hold for ballast (NA
.., Geleynssen de Jongh ). During the period -, peace with Portugal made it
possible to increase the relative proportion of flutes to other vessel types in the shipping in this
region.
From  the retourschepen took on the role of rate  men-of-war because they were both
suited to and available for this purpose. The role of the middle-sized yachts was unchanged as
good defensible and well-sailing yachts for the blockade of Goa. Due to the shipbuilding policy
of the VOC, as well as that of the Admiralty in the Netherlands of building bigger (war) yachts,
these ships started to play an important role in the region after  and in turn replaced the
retourschepen.
Table .: The activity-level of the various types of VOC vessels in the separate destinations in the Ara-
bian Sea region. - (areas in the first row of the table: . Arabian Peninsula, . Persia, .
Pakistan and northwestern India, . Goa Area, . Malabaar, . Maldives)
Looking at the separate destinations in this region, there are no major differences in the role of
certain types of vessels. So in general it can be concluded that this whole region required defen-
sible vessels larger then  last that were able to combine military functions with trade. Con-
voys had to be organised for the pure merchant vessels.
Bay of Bengal (Areas -)
This region comprises Ceylon in the southwest, the Coromandel Coast in the west, Bengal in
the north and the Andaman coast in the east. In this region no heavy sea and weather condi-
tions were expected. Most of the destination ports were subject to monsoon seasons but, pro-
vided the skippers’ navigation was good, shipping to and from this region was possible
throughout the year. As was the case with Galle, which was also, in theory at least, accessible
all year round, only a slight miscalculation could take a vessel a mile downwind of the entrance
and make it impossible to reach the harbour. So shipping between harbours within the region
was strongly monsoon-dependent. The shallow river mouth of the Ganges and some destina-
tions in certain seasons on the Coromandel Coast required shallow-going vessels.
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Although many other international traders were present, as they were in the Arabian Sea
region, no large-scale military confrontation with European competitors was expected during
this period. In most cases, the skirmishes that did occur were with smaller Portuguese vessels
(often private traders) when Dutch vessels cruised the area for booty. The VOC was the aggres-
sor in most of these instances. There were campaigns to remove the Portuguese from Ceylon
and some locations on the coast of Coromandel, but also to patrol against enemy traffic in the
waters south of Galle. As explained earlier, this was a strategic region because it formed a
“wind shed” between the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Ships sailing between these re-
gions had to orientate on the southern tip of Ceylon.
Since the VOC initiated the aggressive actions they were, therefore, able to select the vessels
they thought most suited their operations. From a military perspective big well-armed vessels
were not necessary, but on the other hand vessels that were too small would have been too
vulnerable. Medium-sized vessels with a normal armament were, therefore, most suitable, ac-
companied by smaller boats to pursue their quarry into shallow waters.
The products shipped in this region were diverse. Once the VOC was established in Ceylon
ample cinnamon was available. This product was shipped on almost any available vessel that
was leaving the region for Batavia. Other cargo like the shipping of elephants to India required
vessels that were or could be adapted for this special but not irregular transport (see Case
Study -).
For most other local and regional shipping of which foodstuffs and areca nuts were the most
important, all smaller vessels were found to be suitable. There was also enough cargo, mainly
textiles, available in various destinations on the Coast of Coromandel. Although the VOC also
organised local shipping on a smaller scale to take the cargo to a central place, in general trade
goods had to be collected from various harbours, which made the medium-sized vessels most
suited to this purpose. The cargo from Bengal, comprising mainly saltpetre, silk and other raw
materials, could be shipped by bigger trading vessels.
The slave trade in the region required bigger vessels like the retourschepen and big flutes. In
 the retourschip Gouden Leeuw (ID ) was explicitly sent to this region ‘[to get] a crowd of
slaves (that small ships cannot ship)’ (Colenbrander , p. ). It becomes clear from the
database that there was regular shipping for slaves in this period from at least  when the
Gouden Leeuw already sailed on this route. After  other retourschepen took over the role as
slave carriers. In  and  the Wapen van Rotterdam (ID ) and the Wapen van Enkhuizen
(ID ) made three journeys to the region to ship slaves and rice to Batavia.
In view of the parameters described above, one can expect a diversity of vessels with an
emphasis on the medium-sized trade vessels in this region.
Case Study -. Elephant transport
One of the earliest elephant transports by the Dutch must have been in  when the King of Candy
honoured the Dutch Prince Maurits with two elephants . It is unknown what happened with these
elephants, but soon the shipping of rare and unusual species to the Netherlands became popular. The
Prince of Orange was a fancier of exotic animals. When Prince Maurits was offered a leopard in 
he announced that he would also like a little elephant or a cockatoo. His successor, Prins Frederik
Hendrik requisitioned these animals from the VOC. To please him the VOC shipped on the return fleet
of , [: ‘a schoon gespickelt hert (beautiful spotted deer), steenbockie (serow), two beautiful white birds
called kackatuwa (cockatoo), a young elephant and two Suytlantse catten (cats from the Southland)
(Coolhaas , p. ). The young elephant was called Hanske and would travel Europe as public
attraction for  years. Loading the elephants was quite complicated. To ensure that the elephant was
not spooked by the whole manoeuvre the walking path on the sides of the jetty were covered with
branches and leaves. The small vessel that was to take the animal to the ship on which it was to be
transported was also covered in greenery (L’Honoré Naber b, p. ). Hoisting the elephant on
board was the next challenge. In  an elephant escaped during a similar operation in the Bay in
Galle and swam ashore (NA .., VOC , fol. -). Once the problems of getting them on
board were overcome, it is surprising how many elephants could be shipped. On one occasion up to
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twelve were taken on board the Neptunus (ID:) a medium-sized yacht of  last (Colenbrander
, p. ).
Keeping the animals alive must have been the skipper’s biggest concern. Vessels often had to make
refreshment stops to take in fresh vegetables and water. Shipping live elephants also made demands
on the available space for victuals. The requirements for the transport of  elephants were recorded in
 in his journal by a German crewmember who wrote that, in order to be able to transport the
elephants on the flute Heemstede (ID:), the accompanying vessels had to carry several hundred
‘Pisang Bäume’ (banana trees) that were known to be a food favoured by these animals. During the
journey it transpired that owing to a shortage of drinking water two elephants died and the crew also
had to suffer (L’Honoré Naber a, p. ).
Table .: The activity level of the various types of VOC vessels in the Bay of Bengal region per  year
period to 
In the period up to  this region was only visited by VOC-fleets which on their outward
vayage to Java and the Spice Islands tried to attack the Portuguese strongholds at the Indian
westcoast and Malacca. At a few occasions yachts were split of from these fleets to visit the
Indian east coast. In the period that followed, safety and confrontations with the Portuguese
were still major issues. The frequent presence of bigger, well-armed vessels in this region can
be explained as follows. In the s, the bigger yachts (rate ) travelling more or less directly
between the Netherlands and the Coromandel Coast were still popular. These ships sailed di-
rectly from the Netherlands to Coromandel and vice versa. Sometimes they sailed via Batavia
back to Europe or from Batavia via Coromandel to the Netherlands. The growing contribution
of the retourschepen (rate ) was for the purpose of these trips between Batavia and the textile
market on the Coromandel Coast but also as military vessels around the southern tip of India
This latter function influences the statistics disproportionately. For instance, the Dordrecht (ID
) patrolled the border of two regions between  and  and made three arrivals in a
short period. The role of Ceylon as a junction of shipping routes also explains some other
anomalies in the expectation of the types of vessels used in the Bay of Bengal as, the activities
of the men-of-war (rate ) can be explained through a visit of the Nassausche fleet on their way
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to the Arabian sea. The retourschepen gradually played a more important role in Asia as the fleet
of these big vessels grew and the VOC had more choice in using ships in various stages of their
careers.
After  the composition of the fleet shows a greater emphasis on trade and, therefore, on
medium-sized yachts and flutes. For the local trade a sharp increase in smaller vessels can be
observed. The preference for medium-sized yachts was already evident as early as . A
skipper and a merchant, probably experienced in shipping in Asia, advised the directors of the
VOC to employ smaller swift-sailing vessels to the Coromandel Coast rather than the big ships.
For efficiency these vessels had three decks, so the hold could be used for cargo, while the
second deck could be used for victuals. As an experiment a vessel of  feet was bought in
Amsterdam (NA .., VOC , fol. ). These rate  vessels turned out to be successful.
They went through a steady growth and became the most intensively used vessels in the re-
gion.
After  the VOC became more proactive in their military actions, mainly in Ceylon, and
well-armed yachts were required; both the rates  and  show a sharp increase in the periods
after , partly due also to the re-gathering of the Goa blockade fleet in Ceylon.
Table .: The activity level of the various types of VOC vessels in the separate destinations in the region
Bay of Bengal, - (areas in the first row of the table: . Gulf of Manar, . Ceylon, . Coro-
mandel coast, . Northeastern India, Bangla Desh, . Myamar, . Andaman Islands)
From the differences in the activity levels of the rates for the various destinations in the Bay of
Bengal region (Table -), it becomes clear that Ceylon was the pivotal point for shipping and
the connection with other regions (e.g. for blockade fleets to Goa and ongoing shipping be-
tween east and west). The role of the smaller vessels also becomes apparent from the detailed
analysis of the local shipping from Ceylon. In the years of Galle’s isolation immediately follow-
ing its capture from the Portuguese and when it was without a hinterland, some small vessels
were essential for the supply of foodstuffs and for communication. These vessels also took part
in the blockades of Colombo.
As expected, the contribution to shipping of yachts and flutes as pure cargo carriers in this
region is prominent. The greater role of yachts in Ceylon compared with other destinations is
mainly due to military action around Ceylon. Flutes were suitable for the local cargo but the
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main reason for their presence was the direct route that was opened between the Far East and
the Bay of Bengal; flutes were the ideal vessel for shipping from Taiwan (see below).
Rate  retourschepen made a substantial contribution to the activity level for both Ceylon
(Area ) and the Coromandel Coast (Area ). The role of rate  vessels in the slave trade to
the Coast has already been explained above. This trade was later shifted from the Coromandel
to Bengal and Aracan, and big flutes then replaced the retourschepen. After  the retoursche-
pen were more active in military matters in the Arabian Sea. On their journeys to and from this
region they visited the Bay of Bengal, traded at the Coromandel Coast and, between  and
, engaged in military activities in Ceylon including the transport of troops. An example of
military actions by a retourschip in the region was the ‘s Hertogenbosch (ID:). In  the ship
left Batavia for a trip to Europe via Mallaca and Ceylon. On New Year’s Eve of that year it
anchored on the roadstead of Colombo and fired  shots on the city. The next day the ship
and the flute Rarop ran aground near Negombo. The flute was wrecked but the ‘s Hertogenbosch
was able to free itself and sail back to the Netherlands (NA .., VOC , fol. ). This
must be considered an irregular action since it seems impractical to send a loaded retourschip on
such a military mission. Most ships of this rate visited Ceylon between  and  on their
voyages to and from the blockade of Goa. Around  these ships were also used for troop
transport to Ceylon.
After , when the direct route between Taiwan and the Arabian Sea was established, even
new retourschepen were employed. Various ships like the Banda (ID ), Vrede (ID ) and
Schiedam (ID ) made an ‘Asian grand tour’. In general they sailed from Batavia to Taiwan
and from there through the Strait of Malacca and along Ceylon to Persia. On their return trips
they visited Galle (after ) and sailed via the Coromandel Coast back to Batavia.
Since this trade included valuable items such as silver from Japan and silk from Taiwan the
ships needed to be strong and easily defendable. After the truce with the Portuguese in ,
strong though less easily defensible flutes could replace these ships. Around  the Malabar
pepper market increased in importance. Between  and  Galle was visited by older
retourschepen like the Banda (the same return ship as above, now considerably older, but still
going strong), Maastricht (ID ) and even the Nassau (ID ), built in  and more then 
years old on their trips to load pepper on the west coast of India and cinnamon in Galle. Com-
pared with the rich cargo transported from the Far East, pepper and cinnamon did not repre-
sent much value for the local market; these products only became valuable on the European
market, so the VOC could take its chances by using less reliable cargo vessels (Maastricht did
indeed sink on its voyage back to Batavia owing to the worn-out state of the ship).
After the war with the Portuguese was resumed in , retourschepenwere sent from Batavia
for military activities in the Arabian Sea. On the return trip back to Java they picked up cargo in
the Bay of Bengal region.
Sumatra (Areas -)
This region includes the whole of the island except the regions of the Strait of Malacca and
Sunda. Within the region there are three principal areas. Banda Aceh in the north was an im-
portant pepper harbour in the early period but unreliable due to the political situation. The
VOC developed their main pepper sources on the southeast and the west coasts. The conditions
on the west and the east coasts were completely different. The pepper harbours on the west
coast were exposed to the ocean, but the weather patterns were predictable. These conditions
required well-constructed vessels. The conditions on the southeast coast were much more shel-
tered. The bottleneck there was the accessibility of the harbours. The pepper had to come from
locations up river. The logistics of this destination called for smaller vessels often in combina-
tion with bigger vessels that could take in cargo on anchor off shore. Apart from the earlier
period around Banda Aceh, there was almost no military activity in this region and hence no
requirement for a military function.
The cargo consisted of pepper to be exchanged for textiles. On the west coast, trade was
divided between various harbours, which could best be done with medium-sized flutes and
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medium-sized and big yachts. On the southeast coast all ship types could be expected as long
as smaller vessels were available for carrying the cargo from the shore to the bigger ships.
Table .: A representation of the activities of the various types of VOC vessels in the region Sumatra per
-year period up to 
In the period to , activities were mainly focused on the then important destination, Banda
Aceh. The emphasis was on defensible vessels that could operate in an area of high political
tension and military confrontation with the Portuguese. From , in the second period, the
VOC started some experiments with smaller vessels to develop the pepper harbours in other
parts of Sumatra. Consequently, an increase can be observed in rates  and  and later, after
 in rate . As a bigger capacity cargo carrier, the rate  flute was popular. The heyday of
Sumatra’s pepper trade was up to . After that pepper came more and more from the coast
of Malabar. The relatively high component of the rate  and  vessels can be explained through
their military function in the neighbouring region of Malacca. The southeast coast of Sumatra
was close to Batavia and also along an important intersection of all the major routes. The ship-
ping in this region, therefore, also reflects the total VOC shipping in Asia.
As Table - shows, in Area , South East Sumatra, all rates are represented. Apart from the
defensible vessels that could take in pepper on their way to Batavia, the flutes on their way to
Taiwan also sometimes stopped over for pepper after . Even ships in a poor condition
could often make a short trip to fetch pepper. The high component rate  Retourschepen are
specifically linked to the logistics of cargo loading at Batavia. From the reconstruction of the
cargo gathering of the retourschip Hollandia (ID:) in Chapters  and , the problem of having
the right cargo available at the right time to be able to load the return fleet for its departure
around the turn of the year became clear. With the passage of time a system was set up in
which the retourschepen sailed with the right ballast from Batavia to Jambi on the southeast
coast to load pepper. Returning to Batavia, the rest of the available cargo space could then be
filled with products that had just arrived from other regions such as the silk that was rushed to
Batavia from the Far East.
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Table .: A representation of the activities of the various types of VOC vessels in the separate destina-
tions in the region Sumatra - (areas in the first row of the table: . Atjeh, Nicobar islands, .
Sumatra westcoast, . Sumatra southeast)
Strait of Malacca ()
This region includes modern Malaysia and Singapore. All the waters in this region were more
or less sheltered. Some areas of the Strait of Malacca were cluttered with small islands that
required manoeuvrable and shallow draught vessels if the VOC patrolled in these areas. The
strategic value of Malacca was high. The strait was an important connection between the Far
East and the Indonesian Archipelago and the Indian Ocean. Sunda Strait, the second important
connection was already under the control of the VOC. Controlling this important seaway was
an important strategic goal. Right from the start of Dutch shipping in Asia the Strait of Malacca
was an important military destination. To begin with the military confrontation was on the
level of big ships. In later years the character changed to patrol activities aimed at disrupting
the traffic and capturing smaller vessels. After , when control of Malacca was taken from
the Portuguese, the position was safeguarded by the patrol of small, swift sailing and well-
armed vessels. The requirements for suitable vessels for this important task were thus changing
over time.
Up to  the military component of the fleet was the most important. This is reflected in
Table - that shows a big component of the small yachts of rate . These swift sailing fregatten
were ideal for chasing passing traffic. The middle size yachts of rate  also took part in the
blockade. As was the case in the blockade of Goa the ships taking part in action around Malac-
ca could be used for trade after they had finished their task.
After  the military component of the fleet became less prominent and one can see a
growth in cargo vessels such as the flute. Given the central role of Malacca in the whole traffic
network it is to be expected that the database will reveal all types of vessels including many
cargo carriers. Many of these vessels are recorded on their stopover for transhipment. Before
, the cargo from this area consisted mainly of looted goods. More regular merchandise
following the capture of Malacca was pepper and pewter. Like Jambi, Malacca was brought
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Table .: A representation of the activities of the various types of VOC vessels in the region Malaysia by
-year period up to 
into the system of loading the retourschepenwith pepper before they left for Europe. The pewter
trade to destinations in western Asia did not call for special vessels, and pewter cargoes could
be picked up by most available (or passing) bigger vessels. The safeguarding of the production
areas along the Strait of Malacca where the VOC strived for a monopoly required small, armed
vessels. It were these smaller vessels in particular that stayed in a region (rather than arriving
there from another area) that are not visible in the database statistics. For instance, we know
that the vessel Punto de Gale (ID ), which was probably captured during the raid on Galle in
, was active in the Strait of Malacca between  and  but its activities are not re-
corded in the statistics because they did not involve inter-area trips.
Case Study - The fleet at Malacca
In the period - the fleet in the waters of Malacca was operating under the command of Jacob
Coper. It was his task to have a fleet of various types of vessels ready at the moment the monsoon
would allow easy passage through the strait.
‘The waters east and south of Malacca till mid-May, when the southern monsoon is blowing forcefully
and no enemy vessel from the North can be expected, needed to be occupied […] and be alert for the
Portuguese vessels that in principle will arrive with the northern monsoon from the coast of India, St
Thome and Ceylon’ (Colenbrander , p. ).
To make his fleet fit for the anticipated chase, Coper had his vessels beached and the hulls cleaned and
maintained with materials received from Batavia: ‘[…] the yachts as much as possible prepared, … …
on the th [May] [we] sailed with the whole fleet to Malacca [where we] stranded a certain Portu-
guese ship of about  last coming from Goa […] [and chased] a certain Portuguese ship of about 
last […] and ran it aground and scuttled it’ (Colenbrander , p. ).
For purposes of pursuit the Commander had at his disposal smaller swift sailing vessels, often cap-
tured from the Portuguese. During his term as Commander, Coper used various captured rate  and
rate  vessels. His fleet in  consisted of  vessels: one prefabricated rate  vessel, three vessels of
rate  and nine medium-sized yachts of rate . Five vessels of this fleet were captured from the Portu-
guese. For the Commander and the crew it probably meant long months on relatively small vessels. To
Fleets per region 
keep their seamen on the job the VOC sometimes employed unorthodox measures. Jacob Coper had
been given permission to return to Batavia with his men to crew a retourschip to return to Europe. The
directors in Batavia were afraid that the blockade would become inefficient after his departure so they
decided to: ‘ order [Coper] to stay with his fleet and to prevent his arrival here he can stay with his
wife whom we will send from here, which the Honourable Gentlemen believe to be the biggest occa-
sion for him to long to stay there’ (Colenbrander , p. ). Now in the company of his wife, Jacob
Coper ran a successful campaign in Malacca against the Iberian enemy.
Spice Islands (Areas ,  and )
This region encompasses Ambon and Ceram, Banda, and the Moluccas. In this analysis the
destinations and stopovers on the route to the Spice Islands are also considered. This route
stretches from East Java and Bali (Area ), the Lesser Sunda Islands (Area ) to and Sulawesi
(Macassar, Area ). The central pivotal point was Ambon, the location where almost every
vessel sailing in this part of the region would pass. The area east of the Banda islands, with
destinations around the Arafura Sea (Area ) is also included in this region.
Table .: The activity levels of the various types of VOC vessels in the Spice Islands region per  year
period to 
As the waters to and in this region were sheltered and there were good anchorages near the
various destinations, in principle there were no limitations of a nautical nature such as strong
monsoons or hurricanes. Nevertheless, it did take the Dutch time to discover the best an-
chorages; in the first period they lost the ships China (ID:) and Walcheren (ID:) and in the
second, various ships missed Banda. Every rate of vessel from an open sloop to the biggest
retourschip had access to these waters. The only serious limitation was caused by the monsoon
system, so this region was only accessible during that season. Although some experiments were
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carried out with smaller vessels that could sail against the favourable winds, or along alterna-
tive routes, most vessels had to stick to the monsoons.
The political-military aspects of the fleet composition were developing and changing over the
whole period. In the early years of the VOC in Asia the power in this region had to be wrested
from the Iberian competition and protected against possible English influence. After the mono-
poly was established around , no further threat was expected from the European competi-
tors. The VOC’s main concern was to maintain its power base in relation to the local rulers and
against traders that could break through the VOC’s exclusive rights to the trade in spices by
smuggling. Banning the local trade placed the VOC under an obligation to organise the supply
of essential foodstuffs and other products to this region themselves. This, together with sup-
plies for the extensive group of military personnel in the many fortifications, took up a substan-
tial volume of transport capacity, which was however balanced by the availability of enough
cargo to be shipped out of the region. The spices, mace, nutmeg and cloves were available in
constant quantities and made shipping with large cargo carriers efficient.
Table .: The activity level of the various types of VOC vessels in the separate destinations in the Spice
Islands region - (areas in the first row of the table: . Bali, east Java, . Lesser Sunda Islands,
. Sulawesi, . Ambon, Buru, western Ceram and adjacent islands, . Banda Archipel and eastern
Ceram, . Arafura Sea, . Molucca Sea)
The general development of this important region that formed the VOC’s core business right
from the start, is characterised by a shift from a highly military operation to a situation where a
minimal military presence made a maximal impact on trade possible. In Table - the transla-
tion of this development into the activity levels of the various vessel types is clearly visible. Up
to  the vessels that were capable of military action (i.e. the big yachts, ships and specifically
the men-of-war) were responsible for -% of the shipping activities around the Spice Is-
lands. These vessels were involved in full-scale confrontations with the Spaniards, Portuguese
and the English. After the VOC got the upper hand around , smaller vessels replaced these
bigger military vessels to protect the monopoly against private traders. Only at Ternate was at
least one man-of-war stationed against a possible Spanish attack from the Philippines. After the
situation had stabilised, the VOC began the process of differentiating their fleet. The principle
was to send textiles, (the main barter items for spices), supplies and staff on the big cargo car-
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riers. Retourschepen rate  were not ideal for this purpose as long as they were employed on
the route back to Europe since they could not arrive back in Batavia in time for the departure of
the fleet to Europe around the turn of the year as the monsoon was only favourable from
around April. Therefore, the older rate  cargo carriers from the early period or comparable
old cargo carriers that were explicitly sent to remain in Asia played an important role in trans-
port in the s. After  flutes and the older retourschepen that were no longer fit for a
return voyage took over this role. The vessels that were only suitable for the transport of goods
and cargo were dispatched around the change of the monsoon in order to avoid a long delay in
the region while they waited for favourable winds. This also fits in with the ambition of the
VOC to use their fleet all year round. For instance, flutes returning from the Spice Islands just
after the turn of the monsoon in April could then still make a trip to the Far East.
For multi-purpose vessels like the middle-sized yachts (rate ) the situation was the opposite:
they had to stay in the region for as long as possible during the favourable monsoon season.
Their main task was to secure the monopoly against private traders. So some middle-sized
yachts arrived at the earliest possible time after the turn of the monsoon to prevent other ships
from entering the region. They returned to Batavia at the latest possible time, or they stayed in
the region. The activity level of the rate  vessels were stable at around  ship movements per
-year period but reached a high in the s. Locally, most of these vessels operated between
the destinations of Ambon, Ceram () and Moluccas () where many small islands produced
the desired cloves. To protect the harbours and also ensure that the monopoly was not broken
the VOC needed the smaller vessels of rates  to . During the period up to , small yachts
like the fregats in rate  played an important role in the establishment of the VOC’s power base
at a local level. Similarly to the situation in the Strait of Malacca, these vessels were well
equipped to control the shipping.
In the analysis of the activity level in the various destinations (Table -) in this region, it is
clear that Ambon served as the central destination in the Spice Islands. After the situation had
stabilised in this region there was little need to send militarily equipped vessels to destinations
like the Banda Islands, far away from the mainstream of shipping. It is important to note that
destinations on the route to the Spice Islands were visited as stopovers and to collect supplies,
but they could also be independent destinations from Batavia.
The "Far East" (Areas -)
This region centres on Taiwan (Area ) and Japan (Area ) as the main destinations. China
(Area ) and the Philippines (the islands at the Sulu Sea, Area ) were derivative destinations:
the VOC was active in the waters of the Philippines in their attempt to frustrate the traditional
trade between Chinese merchants and the Spaniards who exchanged the sought-after Chinese
products like silk for silver fromMexico. So China was, in a way, the main reason for the VOC’s
presence in the region but the actual amount of Dutch shipping to China was minimal due to
the Chinese ban on the Dutch from landing on the Chinese coast. The VOC, therefore, found an
alternative destination in Taiwan that they could control; firstly, as a regional emporium for the
exchange of products, and later also for some local products like deerskins and sugar. Thailand
(Area ), Cambodia () and Vietnam () were alternative destinations for the purchase of
"Chinese" products en route to Taiwan and Japan. Thailand was also a trading source for food
and wood for Batavia. Sarawak (Area ), the area on the north coast of Kalimantan was only
visited by some wayward large ships from the Voorcompagnieën and very few small vessels in
later years. All these areas are situated along the shores of the South and East China Seas, but
are, for reasons of convenience, also often called by their traditional name "Far East" in this
book.
As the waters around China, Taiwan and Japan were considered dangerous due to the ty-
phoons, strong well-built ships were required. The Chinese coast, although only visited occa-
sionally for military reasons, demanded easily manoeuvrable vessels to negotiate the narrow
channels between the many islands. Physical conditions in Taiwan also put severe limitations
on visiting vessels. The entrance to this VOC post was so shallow that only vessels with a
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draught of less than  feet could enter and bigger ships had to anchor in the rougher waters
outside or at the Pescadores. In the early stage of the Dutch presence in this region there was an
unsuccessful military attempt to establish a position on the Chinese market. After the Dutch
had set up a post in Taiwan – the backdoor to the Chinese market – confrontations only took
place on the instigation of the VOC until .
Given the physical characteristics of the Chinese coast with its small islands, well-armed
swift-sailing vessels were required. In the s the destinations Vietnam and Cambodia were
engaged in internal power struggles in which the VOC involved itself. Well-armed yachts
could best counter this type of conflict in which large confrontations with heavily armed ships
were not expected.
Table .: The activity level of the various types of VOC vessels in the region of the South and East
China Sea per -year period to 
A military capacity was required for the (also unsuccessful) attempts to intercept the Spanish
silver fleet from Mexico to the Philippines. At the end of the period studied the tensions around
Taiwan were increasing and military reinforcements in the shape of heavily armed war yachts
were required. On a political level, the favourable position of the VOC in Japan above the other
European competitors came at the cost of restrictions on their visits. The Japanese authorities
set the conditions of trade but they also tried to minimise the threat of the VOC ships. It was a
common rule to remove the rudder of the vessels arriving at the trade post Deshima in Naga-
saki. The restrictions practised by the Japanese and their effects on the VOC vessels can be
learned from an incident in  on the arrival of the yacht Hercules. In the s, as a result of
the first Anglo-Dutch war, the VOC was left with a surplus of big war yachts in their Asian
fleet. These ships were constructed at the cost of the flutes that were the ideal traders for this
region and did not raise the suspicion of the Japanese authorities because of their light arma-
ments. After the conflict was over these war yachts had to serve as regular trading vessels.
When the Hercules (ID:) arrived in Japan the local authorities felt uncomfortable with this
clearly well armed yacht and referred to the VOC’s obligation to send unarmed vessels (NA
.., Factory Japan , fol. ).
Mainly trading items for the Japanese market and supplies for the post at Taiwan were col-
lected from Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. There was a direct route between Thailand and
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Batavia for the collection of supplies for the VOC headquarters. This route did not call for the
use of a particular vessel type or require specific vessel features.
Enough bulk goods like sugar and silk were available from Taiwan to justify the use of big
ships for this trade, but the shallowness of the harbour entrance meant that they had to be
loaded at the Pescadores. Flutes were suitable as carriers since military confrontations were
not expected.
Copper, precious metals and some luxury items were shipped from Japan. The copper could
stay in the ships for shipping to other parts of Asia but part of the cargo of precious metals had
to be unloaded in Taiwan to purchase silk and part was shipped on to Batavia or, following
, directly to the Coromandel Coast and Surat. Flutes and bigger yachts were suitable for
this purpose.
Smaller vessels were needed to facilitate the distribution of cargo. The smaller flutes turned
out to be ideal for that purpose. The VOC’s voyages to and from Taiwan were highly monsoon-
dependent. The loading took place in a short period between August and December. The small
flutes stayed near Taiwan during the season, with an occasional short trip to Japan and back
and sailed back to Batavia in the off-season. It was sometimes difficult for the vessels that had
to wait for the auctions in Japan in October/November to reach Batavia in time for the depar-
ture of the return fleet at the end of December or early January. Fast sailing vessels were appro-
priate for this purpose.
Table . shows that after the VOC gave up its aspirations towards China, the military
needs were lifted to a large extent and they were able to differentiate their fleet in this region.
Up to  there was a clear emphasis on military and bigger vessels. This changed dramati-
cally after the establishment of the VOC stronghold in Taiwan with a fleet focused on trade.
Apart from the sporadic military confrontations and the military vessels heading for the Philip-
pines, the Far East was suited to dedicated cargo carriers. This general image should be
nuanced a bit, especially for the transition period in the s when some developments took
place at the level of the separate destinations. For the military operations, Japan was the pre-
eminent base for the bigger vessels to capture the big junks sailing between China and the
Philippines, until the Japanese authorities became more restrictive about the kind of vessels
that were allowed to visit their harbours. Closer to the Chinese coast most of the smaller or
middle-sized yachts were employed. Note also the almost complete absence of the flute, which
vessel type could not play a role in the military action in China and the Philippines. As is the
case with the smaller vessels in the Strait of Malaccathe smaller vessels needed as utility vessels
around Taiwan, i.e. the vessels that brought cargo from Taiwan to the waiting fleet at the Pes-
cadores, are not revealed in the statistics since they rarely left the region.
The heavy sea conditions required strongly built new ships. The possibility of typhoons was
the pre-eminent threat, and no ship was able to withstand those conditions. The most suitable
combination of vessels was big flutes and retourschepen as trade ships together with smaller
flutes and other small vessels to facilitate the loading and unloading of cargo near Taiwan.
Retourschepen often sailed on the Batavia and Thailand route. In Table - the important role
of this rate  vessels in the shipping to Thailand becomes clear. The newer retourschepen could
also sail direct or via Thailand to Japan. In Thailand there was usually enough cargo of prod-
ucts for the Japanese market in combination with food supplies and building materials for Tai-
wan, for these bigger ships. On the return trip these ships often called at Thailand again to load
supplies for Batavia. The need for these supplies depended on the political situation in Java. A
stopover in Taiwan was often inevitable for the redistribution of cargo for the various destina-
tions: China, vietnam, Batavia and later also the direct connection with the Arabian Sea and the
Bay of Bengal. The central role of Taiwan in this region becomes obvious in Table - where it
is shown to be by far the busiest destination. It was a shipping junction with the specific need
for smaller vessels and the medium sized flutes (rate ) in order to be able to serve as a point of
transhipment.
It was also possible for retourschepen to combine a trip to Taiwan with a return trip to Europe.
With a departure from Batavia in August at the latest the ship could be in the region around
Taiwan in September. As was the case with the collecting of a pepper cargo from southeast
Sumatra, the ships could take on a good shipment of sugar; however, loading took a month
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due to the complexity of the logistics between Taiwan and the Pescadores where the big ships
had to anchor. If these retourschepenwere not affected by the typhoon season they could make it
back to Batavia before the end of the year to load the remaining cargo and leave for Europe.
The high rate of flutes to Cambodia in Table - can be explained by the unique situation on
the Mekong River where vessels had to be dragged manually far up stream by their anchors.
This situation has been described as very arduous and almost inhumane for the crew who had
to handle the heavy anchors in the heat of the sun: ‘and when at night the time had come to get
some rest it was impossible because of the mosquitoes that were in such large quantities that
one doesn’t know where to turn’ (NA .., VOC , fol. , ). Damaged rinckelwerck
or not, it must have been more efficient for the VOC to use flutes rather than the yachts because
they had a better cargo capacity for the same effort. A complication was still the danger of
hostilities on the Mekong River that required the protection of the vessel, crew and cargo. The
VOC probably did develop a more heavily armed flute. This more defensible flute type is re-
corded on one occasion in the Arabian Sea when, against all odds, the flute Noortster (ID:)
was escorting a yacht. This flute then had a crew of  and was armed with  canons (Colen-
brander , p. ). In the database more of these types of defensible flutes have been found:
Vliegend Hert (ID ),  canons, Zon (ID:)  canons, Koning David (ID:) and Trouw
(ID:)  canons.
Table .: Activity levels of the various types of VOC vessels in the separate destinations in the region
of the Far East. - (areas in the first row of the table: .Sarawak, .Gulf of Thailand, .
Cambodia and lower Mekong delta, .Vietnam, north from Mekong Delta, .Sulu Sea, . Coastal
China, . Taiwan and adjacent islands, . Japan and Korea)




Focus on the Dutch shipping network in Asia
This study focussed on the logistical and technical accomplishments that made Dutch develop-
ment of trade and shipping in Asia possible. Pivotal area of this research was the shipping in
Asia. It aims in that sense to be an extension and in some respects a counter point to the pre-
valent view of VOC shipping that is based on the monumental volume, Dutch-Asiatic Shipping
by Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer (-). Whose research focused mainly on one aspect of
the shipping network: the route between Europe and Asia, the so-called Retourvaart (home-
ward bound shipping). By analysing the development of VOC ships in service in Asia up to
, this research aimed to highlight the interesting and complex world behind the better-
known Retourvaart. Through this study information has been unearthed revealing the ways in
which the VOC developed and managed its complex shipping network; and conclusions
drawn regarding and the processes by which the VOC gained experience and adjusted its fleet
to meet the multiple requirements linked with trade, military-political activities and the main-
tenance of a network of trading posts and strongholds in Asia.
The central research question was: to what extent did the fleet of the VOC and the organi-
sation of shipping contribute to the political and economical success of the VOC organisation in
their expansion into Asia during the th Century. To determine this a supplementary question
is posed: how successful was the VOC in adjusting their fleet to the demands of both the overall
organisation and unfolding events in order to conduct their Asiatic operations? The suitability
of a ship for any given function depended on the correct combinations of a complex array of
features. In order to interpret the full development of the fleet, an understanding of the com-
plete range of functions possible for any VOC ship is essential. By identifying the specific com-
binations of requirements and linking these to the logistical elements of the shipping, the prob-
lems the VOC management encountered in adapting ships for their purposes can be
understood.
Knowledge and understanding of the context (historical, political, climatic, financial etc) is
important to interpret information and draw valid conclusions. To understand the whole of
the shipping detailed information was gathered about the ships and ship types that were in
service and their areas of operation. Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer (-) provided the in-
itial information, details on every ship that sailed for the VOC between Europe and Asia. How-
ever, the expansion of shipping within Asia itself was of crucial importance to the changes that
took place in this period. Therefore, the work of those authors was extended in order to recon-
struct all shipping activities of the VOC. A database was created to analyse the development of
a differentiated shipping organisation for various routes and destinations. Through a systema-
tic study of the VOC fleet and their voyages in Asia there is now precise and detailed informa-
tion available on the expansion of the VOC to , in the Asian trade and shipping network.
Investigation into the logistical aspects of this expansion created a better understanding of both
the obstacles the VOC faced and the opportunities they were offered. The establishment of
regular shipping within Asia and the development of a VOC fleet provides a good example of
the methodologies of the directors of the VOC, how they searched for the both the best way to
organise VOC activities and the most suitable ships.
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Trade was the purpose, but the ships were the means and the organisation was the oil that
kept the engine going. Experience (and experiments) led to changes in the shipping organisa-
tion, the design of ships and the composition of the fleet.
The Dutch shipping in Asia to 
The extent of Dutch shipping in Asia could be derived from analysing from historical records
both the ships in service in Asia and their voyages in the intra-Asian network. A single compar-
ison of shipping between Europe and Asia and Dutch intra-Asian shipping clearly demon-
strates the importance of this lesser recognised aspect of shipping history.
Between  and , , voyages of shipping between Europe and Asia were recorded,
while in the same period , voyages in the intra-Asian network were recorded. It must be
borne in mind, however, when making any comparison the differences in nature between the
long inter-continental voyages and the shorter routes of the network in Asia.
Table .: Comparison of frequency of Europe-Asia and intra-Asia shipping (number of voyages be-
tween destinations)
The development of intra-Asian shipping in both frequency and volume is an interesting indi-
cator of the overall VOC expansion in this region.
From  until  the frequency shows a rapid growth, consistent with the initial devel-
opmental phase. Up to , first the Voorcompagnieën and then (during its early years) the VOC
operated mainly trading-round-tours that would bring most ships back to Europe. After 
the establishment of a permanent organisation in Asia and the build-up of a fleet by the VOC in
Asia is reflected in the growth of the shipping to various destinations. After the establishment
of Batavia in  the expansion continued and was tempered only slightly by the VOC’s ex-
periments in the early ’s in privatising parts of the intra-Asian shipping. This foray is
hardly visible in the  year figures as this policy was short-lived and half-hearted and was
overshadowed by the overall expansion.
In the ’s the VOC network developed and the routes were consolidated and fine-tuned.
From  until  there is steady growth: the existing network is further developed and
intensified. In the period - the intensity of the total shipping decreases by %. If the
volume of shipping is considered, the growth is not as consistent. The total volume of the ship-
ping increases up to  but the rate of growth between - is much lower. From -
 there was a boom in growth with an increase close to % in volume. The volume stabi-
lised between - with an % decrease in volume.
With the compilation of all the data from historical records in to a database it is possible for
the first time to analyse the development of VOC shipping in Asia quantitatively. Data on ship-
ping to the various regions provides a background to the development of an Intra-Asian net-
work. Data was collated into ten-year periods from  to , Data prior to  was col-
lated in an additional category. Analysis was then carried out the data in these six distinct
time periods. The frequency of arrivals and ships’ tonnages in the main trading areas was eval-
uated. The results of the analysis show an ongoing development in trade, but in addition these
results highlight the VOC’s military strategies.
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Table .: Development of the Intra-Asian shipping – frequency and volume (tonnage in lasten)
At a regional level the development of the trade on the major routes is clearly visible. Aside
from the centre of the activities on West Java, the Spice Islands were important destination
over the entire period as the supply of core products for the VOC. In order to purchase the
textile that served as the currency for spices and pepper the VOC had to develop shipping on
the Coromandel Coast and the Bay of Bengal. From the ’s the VOC also aimed to set up
their own pepper trade on Sumatra; to become independent from the traditional sources like
Atjeh and Bantam. With the availability of Malabar pepper shipping to Sumatra declined after
. In the Far East in the ’s attempts to access the Chinese market failed, the VOC found
an alternative in a stronghold on Taiwan. In the ’s the Dutch obtained a beneficial position
in Japan, which lead to an intense circuit of shipping from Batavia via Thailand to the Far East.
With the decline of the Portuguese power in the Bay of Bengal the VOC almost reluctantly
reinforced their position in this region to prevent others from filling the vacuum. This gave rise
to more intense shipping to this area from the ’s. From that period on the VOC also intensi-
fied their shipping to the Arabian Sea.
Around  when the VOC intensified its attempts to ban Portuguese shipping through the
Strait of Malacca (the important connection between the Indian Ocean and the Far East), they
sent smaller, well-armed yachts to this region. After the VOC captured Malacca from the Portu-
guese they were able to connect the traditional Arabian trade route from the west with the
Chinese trade route from the east. The VOC was the first to link these two routes and create
their own direct shipping system.
The efficient Dutch system
In the search for the most efficient shipping organisation that met the circumstances within
Asia, flexibility became an important characteristic for the VOC. Firstly, flexibility allowed the
VOC to manage the difficulties of the physical conditions of the region. Traditionally, the mon-
soon seasons dictated shipping activities, this meant that shipping, would come to a halt and
sometimes for months on end. The VOC’s European competitors in Asia were essentially lim-
ited by the monsoon season in the same ways: the Portuguese, as they relied predominantly on
Asian shipping for their local trade; and the English, because they focussed on direct trade
between Europe and Asia. The VOC, however, looked for ways to overcome this limitation
and designed a shipping network that ensured an efficient use of the ships, to various destina-
tions, the year round.
The flexible opportunistic approach applied by the Dutch is revealed by a detailed study of
the shipping routes and the ships that operated on these routes. The result is an elaborate struc-
ture of shipping and trade connections that allowed the VOC to keep trade circulating continu-
ously. The ship Avondster (ID:) serves as a good example of this system. The ship arrived in
Batavia from Europe in  and left for the Spice Islands on the western monsoon winds in
December. In March  the Avondster returned to Batavia on the eastern monsoon. In July the
season was right for a trip to Japan from whence a return trip could be undertaken in Novem-
ber. After the Avondster proved to be unfit for a return voyage, the VOC organisation was flex-
ible enough to use the yacht first to patrol the Java coast and after that to engage in a military
campaign on the coasts of India, where it reverted to being a freighter again. The developing
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complexity of the trade and shipping network between these regions illustrates the flexibility of
the VOC in utilising their ships to the fullest extent and keeping them sailing, in contrast to the
Portuguese who often left ships idle waiting for a change of season.
Optimising the use of the different ships within the Asian shipping network was in itself a
difficult task. Connecting the supply of cargo from various regions to the Europe-Asia shipping
network made the task even more complex. The development of the shipping and trade net-
work is outlined in Chapter . The logistical organisation required to link the intercontinental
and the intra-Asian shipping was incredibly complex and the prescript timeframe for the de-
parture of the homeward bounders to Europe contributed to bottlenecks in Batavia. In order to
be in the Netherlands at a convenient time before the winter and avoiding the Asian monsoon
season, shipping would have to occur in a timely manner within tight timeframes. By working
out a scheme in which the VOC made optimum use of a variation of vessel types most of these
problems could be overcome. Also on a local level, as for instance, in Taiwan, where the trans-
hipment of the Chinese and Japanese products required small vessels only for a short period in
the year, the VOC optimised their operation by sending specific vessels to the region for this
purpose, but employed for other purposes during the off season.
A VOC fleet for Asia
To what extent was the VOC fleet differentiated?
Analysis of the composition of the VOC fleet in Asia allowed conclusions to be drawn regard-
ing the level of differentiation within the fleet. In the period - the VOC network was in
a state of constant development and modification. After the initial stage, when fleets were sent
to Asia and sailed back to the Netherlands after collecting Asian goods, the VOC successfully
set up their own shipping network in Asia. This endeavour required a greater and greater
differentiation of the fleet. The role of the various vessel-types in this process is clear from the
analysis of fleet composition.
The first clear step towards differentiation took place after  when the Retourschip (rate
), appeared as a specialised vessel. The Retourschip was initially introduced as a new name
for the existing big ships of rate  that were serving as de facto Retourschepen (homeward-boun-
ders), but it was not long before this rate became a subject of intense debate at VOC directors’
meetings and an important component in the VOC shipbuilding program. From this time on-
wards, a steady growth in the numbers of this type of vessel can be seen. Retourschepen were
robust and under normal circumstances could last for at least twenty years, that is providing no
disasters befell the ship and it was regularly maintained. Retourschepen were mainly employed
on the route between Europe and Java, the connection point where the Asian shipping network
assembled the Asian merchandise. Later in their career these ships would serve in Asia if they
were no longer fit to make the intercontinental journey to Europe. In Asia they could be em-
ployed as cargo carriers or, on an incidental basis, as well-armed ships for military operations.
In that respect they took over the role of the men-of-war (rate ) that were especially active in
Asia in the early period of the Dutch presence in Asian waters. In this early period the VOC
sailed to Portuguese strongholds with a large offensive fleet. With a truce in  this strategy
changed to more specific offensive actions where the direct interests of the VOC could be
proved. So instead of Mozambique and Goa the men-of-war were employed in the regions
around the Spice Islands, the Philippines and in  in the Strait of Malacca. The rate  men-
of-war that came into service shortly before  were explicitly meant to fight the English.
When the English became allies of the Dutch, these ships were employed instead in an Anglo-
Dutch ‘fleet of defence’ against the Iberian enemy in the region of the Spice Islands, the south
China Sea, and the Persian Gulf. The partnership between the VOC and the English was not
very enduring or successful. The coalition broke up in the early ’s. After  the role of the
big men-of-war in the VOC fleet was also reduced as the early Dutch State subsidy for the
efforts of the VOC against the Portuguese no longer took the form of Admiralty vessels. For
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their military capacity the VOC then relied on the yachts as armed merchant vessels with some
‘war features’; well-armed smaller vessels and occasionally the Retourschepen. Gradually the
VOC’s strategy also changed to a policy in which the Portuguese activities were disrupted by
well-armed cargo carriers assisted by smaller types of vessels like the fregat in rate . The num-
bers of fregatten in rate  grew rapidly between  and , during this period they played
an important role in the establishment of the VOC positions in various regions. Many of these
vessels were captured from the Portuguese.
An important element in the development of a differentiated VOC shipping network in Asia
was the search for the most suitable vessel to maximise commercial activities in combination
with a military capacity when required. If the balance of power allowed it, the VOC could
employ pure merchant vessels on certain routes. The best indicator of this process is the intro-
duction of the flute as the cargo carrier. Their introduction into Asian waters was discussed in
the early s. On an experimental scale various types, such as the flute-like gaing Galiase
(ID:) in , were sent to Asia and tested. Due to the tense circumstances still present in
the whole VOC trade area, but also mainly because of the organisational experiment with out-
sourcing most of the intra-Asian shipping in the early s, the VOC did not use many flutes
until . From this year flutes were sent to Asia on a regular basis. The various types of flutes
(rates  and ) became an enormous success as was the case in Europe. After  the medium
sized and big flutes became the most popular VOC cargo-carriers to destinations where heavy
protection was not required. The number of flutes diminished around , when, under the
threat of renewed confrontations with the English and the Portuguese, war-yachts were pur-
chased and dispatched to Asia. Soon after the Dutch-Anglo war ended, flutes were once again
sent to Asia and the trading component in the VOC fleet grew yet again.
As discussed previously the success of the yacht in the VOC fleet in Asia was based on a
combination of features. Often these yachts were true multi-purpose vessels, transporting sub-
stantial amounts of cargo but also displaying sufficient battle strength when required. Depend-
ing on the actual situation in Asia, and the availability of these vessels in Europe, the balance
between merchant and military features was subject to change. As was the case with the ‘war-
yachts’ of the s, the scale tipped to military features at the cost of cargo capacity. In other
instances, like the Avondster, captured in the s, the vessels were more suitable for trading
activities. After , yachts played an important role in the renewed ambition of the VOC to
attack the Portuguese in their strongholds. Since these actions were proactive strikes by the
VOC they were able to maximise use of the best available vessels.
Relating to the growth of the trade and shipping network, another issue emerges clearly
from the analysis, the need for smaller vessels that could be used to support the operations of
the VOC. These vessels (rates  and ) were employed at all the various types of locations
where the VOC was established. Both these rates show a steady growth that mirrors the gener-
al growth of VOC activities in Asia. An interesting development was the trend towards repla-
cement of the Dutch prefabricated vessels with Asian-built vessels after the s. This is
highly significant as it demonstrates the extent of VOC shipbuilding in Asia. Unlike the Portu-
guese the Dutch failed to set up a successful shipbuilding programme for bigger vessels. The
VOC directors in the Netherlands felt the need to control this important economic aspect for
their various Chambers. A significant benefit of the shipbuilding program in Asia was that
smaller vessels no longer needed to be strong enough to sail from Europe or small enough to
be shipped on board a retourschip. In fact after  no more prefabricated vessels were shipped
to Asia.
Input of new vessels into the fleet
The availability of suitable ships was of prime importance for the capacity of the VOC. From
the early th century onwards, the VOC had its own shipbuilding facilities in the Netherlands.
It is generally believed that the VOC primarily built its own ships. However, besides control-
ling the construction of its own ships, the VOC also purchased ships for modification in their
own shipyards. The directors would decide on the shipbuilding programme at an annual meet-
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ing, but could react quickly to changes in circumstances by acquiring directly from the large
Dutch ship market. Decisions were based on the advice and recommendations received from
VOC officials in Asia, the skippers and the shipbuilders.
Although the VOC controlled its own shipyards, the shipbuilding procedures were the same
as for the private shipbuilding sectors, where the design of a ship was based on a consensus
between the owner, the user and the builder. The outcome, the various requirements and possi-
bilities, was laid down in a charter that listed the main features of the ship. Ultimately, the
construction and design of a ship was a practical skill, as theoretical shipbuilding with technical
drawings was not practised at the time. The shipbuilder was responsible for the end result, that
it met the wishes and the requirements of the user; but the shipbuilding methods in practice in
the Netherlands allowed the relevant parties to implement changes during the building pro-
cess, a flexibility that ensured the success and fame of Dutch shipbuilders in the early th
Century.
The shipping conditions and cargoes in Asia were at least as diverse as those in Europe. In
addition, military confrontations created by the competition with European and Asian traders,
required ships that could be used for warfare, patrols and blockades as well as for trade. The
ships that were fit to serve in a ‘merchant fleet’were not necessarily fit to meet all these require-
ments. Through experience, the requirement for certain ship types became evident. From the
extensive correspondence between the management in Asia and the VOC directors in the Neth-
erlands, these changing requirements can be understood. These recommendations and requests
were often points of discussion and disagreement with the Directors of the VOC in the Nether-
lands. The great distance between operations in Asia and the decision-makers in the Nether-
lands, initially led to unproductive policies as did the decentralised structure of the VOC where
changes in the organisation often led to long debates exacerbated by conflicting interests and
opinions between the Directors of the different Chambers. Thus a request by the Director Coen
in  (Colenbrander , p.) to send flutes to Asia was only granted eight years later in
 (NA .., VOC , fol. ). The VOC eventually succeeded in building up an efficient
organisation with a differentiated fleet consisting of ships for the intercontinental route, for the
intra-Asiatic trade, for military tasks, and vessels for supporting tasks.
This process of differentiation required in the first place a good understanding of the require-
ments for a suitable vessel. In this study numerous examples of the discussions between the
management in Asia and the VOC directors in the Netherlands regarding the composition of
the VOC fleet are examined. The decision makers needed access to shipbuilders and facilities,
to translate these demands into new designs or modifications of existing vessels. The VOC also
had access to a market of used vessels or ‘casco-built’ hulls that could be modified for specific
purposes It was not an easy task to combine the specific requirements and then decide which
type of vessel would be suitable and what fleet composition would best meet the prevailing
needs, especially as shipbuilding was far from standardised at this time. As the th Century
author of a shipbuilding handbook, Nicolaes Witsen, stated: ‘no ship, like no human being, is
the same as another’ (Witsen , p. ). Shipbuilding underwent a very dynamic period from
the late th Century. In almost every sector of maritime activity, changes were taking place in
the scale and design of vessels. The flute has been mentioned as an important type of vessel for
the merchant fleet, but the Dutch Admiralties were also searching for the most suitable vessels
for their changing activities and organisation. In general one can see the tensions caused by the
push toward standardisation and the struggle to put these ideals into practice and control the
shipbuilding process (Elias ). Although the VOC tried to rationalise the composition of
their fleet by formulating a strict shipbuilding programme, in practice they were forced to im-
provise, primarily because the Dutch shipbuilding system did not, in the main, require vessels
to be built from a construction drawing but simply from a specification of basic dimensions: the
so called ‘charter’. Although one can observe a growing trend toward the development of the
theory of ship construction at that time, including in the Netherlands, in practice shipbuilding
was based on the input of the shipbuilder interpreting the charter (Waard ; Stevin ).
Often decision makers did nothing more than formulate their wishes for a certain design by
referring to an existing ship and then indicating how the new vessel should differ from that
one: ‘but a bit longer, stronger or with an extra deck’. As a logical consequence the shipbuilders
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of the various VOC Chambers often also took liberties in the interpretation of the building
charter that contained the main dimensions of the vessel and was intended to control the
agreed division of cargo capacity between the chambers. The building and equipping of ships
meant economic activity for the town so it is understandable that for many reasons it was
tempting for the shipbuilder and local managers to push the boundaries. It is ironic that such
an important element, shipbuilding, became subject to a game of cat and mouse between the
Chambers and the Heren XVII, a game with a lot at stake. The VOC directors tried just about
everything to keep the Chambers and their shipbuilders under control. They had to pledge to
follow instructions; inspections and missions from other chambers were organised and penal-
ties became heavier over time. In  a fine was set and in  the responsible shipbuilder
had to put his hand on the written charter in order to declare solemnly that he would follow the
instructions. The ultimate sanction then was that he would be removed from office. Directors
were held personally responsible for all financial damage caused to the Company by the build-
ing of vessels that were too large (Stapel , p. ).
Regardless of these apparent limitations, Dutch shipbuilding became famous for adapting
the design of vessels to changing requirements. During the studied period the VOC experimen-
ted fully with the size and design of the vessels. The design of the Retourschepen in particular
was almost constantly subject to small changes. It was only at the end of the th century that a
serious attempt was made by the VOC to standardise their fleet. The performance of a specific
vessel in relation to various features was often the subject of discussion with decisions to
change the design resulting. It is however interesting that a number of ships criticised for their
bad design were kept in service for many years.
The VOC directors wanted an extensive fleet of VOC owned vessels in Asia for two impor-
tant reasons relating to their general policy. The first factor was that the VOC strove for a
monopoly over trade in a number of Asian products and did not leave transport in the hands
of private local transporters. The second factor was the aim to finance the costs of acquiring
products for the European market by intra-Asian trade. A substantial part of this fleet origi-
nated from the Netherlands, however due to the means of acquiring vessels in Asia – including
an active policy of capturing – many, mostly smaller ship types, came from another shipbuild-
ing tradition. Small vessels were built by and for the VOC in many places in Asia. Judging from
type-names these smaller vessels were of both European as well as local design.
Unlike their Iberian competitors the VOC directors had a policy of homeland construction for
most of the larger ships in their Asian fleet. This policy was partly based on practical considera-
tions such as the problems the VOC experienced in finding good shipbuilding materials and
ships’ carpenters in Asia. An important factor however was that the Bewindhebbers (local Direc-
tors) of the Chambers wanted to control the shipbuilding themselves and keep the revenues of
building and equipping ships in their own companies and cities in the Netherlands. The osten-
sible reasons were their fear of exporting successful Dutch shipbuilding techniques abroad and
the higher costs of shipbuilding in Asia – but this may simply have been a rationalisation of
their wish to keep profits in the Netherlands.
From a contemporary European perspective Asian shipbuilding techniques were considered
to be of a poor standard. The military power of the ships was important and in this area most
Asian ship-types were inferior to the European. Although there are examples where local rulers
tried to build European ship-types, the VOC officials in Asia were not primarily concerned
about the transfer of knowledge but more about the capacity of their craftsmen, the materials
required and ultimately also their trade competitors. In the year  a yacht of around  last
was built for the King of Siam: ‘[in] the Dutch manner, very strong and designed to carry 
canons’. Van Goens was indignant about this development and advised that this should never
be allowed. ‘The use of our excellent shipwright is already unacceptable but they would cer-
tainly also get hold of our equipment and eventually try to send off these ships with our navi-
gating officers to Japan’. (NA .., VOC , fol. v).
Building ships in Asia for the VOC fleet was considered. In  it was suggested by Batavia
that if vessels of  to  lastwere constructed in Japara and Siam, the VOC would not need to
send this type of vessel from the Netherlands, which would result in substantial savings (Cool-
haas , p. ). The VOC directors in the Netherlands believed that, on the contrary, the cost
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of Asian production would be much higher if a realistic calculation was made of the expenses
for the transport of the materials and the fee of the Dutch craftsmen working on these projects.
Documents from later in the th Century spell out the advantages to the Netherlands local
economy of retaining shipbuilding rights ‘[…] that it gives work to many people, that the
money needed for the construction of such vessels is kept here in the country, rather than send-
ing it with many costs and dangers to India’ (Stapel , p. ).
Weaving it all into a efficient maritime network
The VOC succeeded in setting up an efficient shipping organisation that allowed them to opti-
mise the use of their fleet. In contrast with the European competitors and many local traders
the VOC designed a system of sailing routes that would make them as independent from the
monsoon as possible. Aiming for a flexible system the VOC build an elaborate network of ship-
ping and trade connections that allowed them to keep trade circulating continuously. Conse-
quently two shipping systems were developed: European-Asian shipping and Intra-Asian
shipping. Both systems met in the central VOC headquarters Batavia on West-Java. The foun-
dation for this system had been set prior to . An initial base centred around a fleet of ships
sent to Asia for a trading-round-tour with some additional (exploration and military) tasks, a
permanent organisation was then established on West-Java, with the headquarters at Batavia
from . The development of these two shipping systems and the timely convergence at a
central rendezvous is a clear example of the complexity of the VOC organisation with its strong
ability to adapt to changing circumstances also limited by its specific character. It shows the
interdependence of a suitable fleet and an efficient logistical organisation. The two shipping
networks were of major influence on each other. As explained in Chapter  the requirements of
the Retourvloot had a profound impact on the Intra-Asian network. This is evident in the ship-
ping times, where cargo was expected to arrive in Batavia in good time for the return voyage to
the Netherlands or in the organisational set-up where the Retourschepen being already partly
loaded with bulky cargo items at important destinations in the Asian shipping network before
they sailed back via Batavia could also load the smaller quantities of expensive cargo items. On
the other hand the moment of the arrival of money and men from Europe in Batavia was deci-
sive on the possibilities of commercial and military actions in Asia.
This study revealed a high degree of differentiation within the VOC fleet in Asia. In Chapter
 ‘fleet to regions’ it is shown that the differentiation of the VOC fleet was even greater at a
regional level. Through their finely woven organisation the VOC were able to maintain specia-
list vessels for certain purposes even on a local level. In addition they were also able, as indi-
cated in the yearly Navale Macht, to assess the quality of a certain vessel and find suitable em-
ployment during all the stages of its career.
Probably the biggest advantage that this system had to offer was the ability to circumvent the
traditional monsoon trade in Asia. The centralised organisation from Batavia allowed the VOC
overview of the deployment of the fleet on various routes and the ability to plan Intra-Asian
trade activities (and the availability of the associated trade capital). They could therefore avoid
longer periods of vessels, staff and trade capital being idle waiting for a changing monsoon
season this period of idleness characterised traditional monsoon trade and shipping. Through
the availability of vessels of various dimensions the VOC was able to react efficiently to fluctua-
tions in the requested or available cargo. The central control from Batavia could have contribu-
ted, with the right policy, to the commercial success of the VOC on the Intra-Asian market in
the th century.
Central control at strategic locations and routes came with a price and required a permanent
military presence. The general opinion was that the monopoly on the purchasing of some prod-
ucts (mainly spices) and prevention of other European traders shipping products to Europe
would eventually compensate the expenses. In the short term the value of the cargo of some
captured Iberian vessels rarely covered the expenses of the military operation and the delay or
abortion of trade-missions. Only on some occasions, especially in the early period when the
Portuguese were still using huge trade vessels, was the booty very large. Preventing the trade
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between China and the Iberian settlements by confiscating some Chinese junks could be profit-
able. Although the overall balance is difficult to measure, it is clear that through the availability
of a differentiated fleet with vessels that combined military power with a reasonable cargo
capacity, the VOC was able to combine an offensive mission with trade activities and so reduce
the expenses. For instance the vessels from the Goa blockade could ship pepper from the Mala-
bar Coast and cinnamon from Ceylon on their way back to Batavia.
An interesting aspect of this policy was the way in which the VOC could acquire the neces-
sary vessels for their centralised Asian organisation. The decentralised structures in the Nether-
lands, of Chambers with often local interests, was basically the cause of a persistent policy to
build and purchase the vessels of the Asian fleet in the Netherlands. Even some of the smallest
vessels that were used by the VOC in Asia were from the Netherlands. The building of vessels
in Asia by the VOC was marginal and for the bigger ships almost non-existent. However de-
centralised shipbuilding and an active policy of purchasing vessels from the ship market in the
Netherlands allowed a swift response to the arising needs for certain types of vessels.
The tension between the European and Asian organisational set-up was also tangible in the
sending of the cargo to Europe. The management in Batavia was in principal bound to the
orders they received from the Netherlands for the return cargo. However to a certain extent
VOC Batavia was able influence policy by the implementation of the return shipping. Often
they deviated from the orders using unforeseen circumstances as an acceptable excuse (Cool-
haas , p. ; Colenbrander , p. ).
Obsessively the organisation in Batavia tried to meet the prescribed division of cargo for the
various Chambers. They sometimes blamed the Netherlands organisation for not sending a
fleet of Retourschepen that would allow then to make the division of cargo over the various
Chambers (Coolhaas , p. ). An extra complication for VOC Batavia was that the home-
ward-bounders did not have standardised dimensions (NA .., VOC , --).
The internal structure of the VOC with its strict division of activities between the various
chambers was often a burden for the organisation. The authorities in Batavia must have grown
grey hairs in order to meet the requirement of proportional division of the cargo for the various
chambers in the Netherlands. It would be interesting to examine in depth how the ‘egalisatie’
driven organisation from the Netherlands sat with the establishment of the VOC in Asia, which
had another mission and was only confronted with the consequences of this policy through the
ships that were granted for the Asian fleet, the restrictions in developing their own ship build-
ing programme and of course the complex division of the return cargo. Illustrative of the com-
plexity and mistrust of the situation is an order from the Heren XVII in  to Batavia to
strictly follow the instructions by their college and pay no attention to possible private requests
by the individual chambers ‘niettegenstaende eenich particulier schrijven contrarieerende met
gemelte resolutie van de Seventien’ (Colenbrander , --).
Dutch spirit of commerce?
One of the assets of the intricate structure of the VOC shipping network in Asia was the possi-
bility for fast communication. The extensive correspondence between this network of trading
posts, the central rendezvous Batavia and the directors in the Netherlands allowed the VOC to
have access to accurate and detailed information. In the disciplined exchanged administration
and letters a wide range of subjects was covered. For commerce it was of major importance to
have knowledge of profitable products, current prices and the available shipping capacity. It
was possible for the VOC management to send detailed instructions and evaluate the results of
a policy: those disobedient but with fortunate alterations to the instructions were praised whilst
the less creative, strict followers of instructions with consequently poor results were repri-
manded. This type of communication occurred between Batavia and the VOC and associated
trade posts in the region.
Through this extensive source the impression arises that, regardless of the many cases of
private trade, the working culture within the VOC in Asia was clearly aimed at cooperation for
the benefit of the Loffelijke Compagnie (Laudable Company).
Conclusions 
One could argue that what has been called the Hollandse Handelsgeest (Dutch spirit of com-
merce) often used as a ‘mythical’ explanation for the Dutch success, is mainly based on the
access to information. Through this information commercial success was possible. Profits in
the intra-Asian network could be made because of the insight and overview of VOC employees
in the network. They knew how to utilise the available capital most efficiently, where shipping
capacity was available to send the products for a timely and safe arrival at another location;
and where it could be used as multiplier of commercial success. The structured way in which
this information was exchanged at all levels of the organisation and to the far-off corners of the
network must have given the VOC an advantage over their competitors.
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Notes
. The author is indebted to Menno Leenstra for his assistance and determination to ‘collect’ ships and
trips
. For instance, the vessel Nieuwicheyt (ID:, see section .) listed by the VOC as multiple vessel
types, i.e. roeychaloup, opgeboeide sloup, chaloup, jacht, adviesjacht.
. This description applies for this specific study of the shipping in Asia. The whole database also con-
tains destinations, areas and regions outside Asia.
. In order to follow the ongoing sailing history of a certain vessel, the periods of stay at destinations
have also been included as a separate record within the database.
. Not all the arrival and departure dates were accurately documented in the various VOC records. For
instance, there might be information on the departure of a ship but not on its arrival. In such cases, the
ship is then still listed in the database for a given journey but a ‘true and false’ indicator prevents the
data polluting research on more detailed issues such as average sailing time between destinations.
. Initially this distribution formula was based on the building and the equipping of the ships. This
would have served the purpose if every ship returned to its specific Chamber. Problems with this
system arose when ships returned to other ports or stayed in Asia.
. The goods also included the capturing of enemy ships sanctioned as a legitimate activity, as in the
expeditions of Van Noort and Spilbergen.
. During the ‘tweede schipvaart’ men were left behind at Banda and six at Tidore. In  there were
 men at Ambon. In , some men were left by Pieter Both of the ´Nieuwe Brabantsche Compag-
nie´. Van Heemskerck left six men behind at Bantam for the ´Oude Compagnie van Verre´. Men were
also left behind at other places such as Patani, Atjeh, Surat and Grissee.
. The decision to replace Reael with Coen had already been taken in the Netherlands in . This news
was brought to Java in  but Coen could not inform Reael who was on the Spice Islands until the
beginning of . When Coen arrived at the Spice Islands early , then the formal conveyancing
took place (Colenbrander , p. ).
. For instance all the  vessels researched for the Galle Harbour Project -: Avondster (ID:), the Her-
cules (ID:) and the Dolfijn (ID:) served in this blockade.
. : (ID:&) , : (ID:) : (ID:), (ID:).
. Hongis were annual inspections in the region. VOC officials landed at various locations to discuss a
variety of issues with the local ruler. On this occasion the spices growing wild were destroyed (Jacobs
: ).
. The VOC could take over a flourishing trade that was earlier organized by Japanese traders. (Tarling
, p. ): ‘Between  and more then  Japanese ships went overseas under the Red Seal
permit system. They called into approximately nineteen ports, including Vietnam, Cambodia, the
islands in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, and Luzon in the Philippines. A measure of the impor-
tance of this Japanese trade was their export of silver. Between  an  an estimated ,-
, kilograms of silver was sold, amounting to - per cent of the total world output outside
Japan’.
. Van Goens Sr. was active in various functions in the region from . He was Governor in -,
 and then again -.
. ‘slandts indicates that this was a man-of-war sent out by the Netherlands Admiralty. In  the so-
called Nassausche fleet was sent to Asia around South America by the government of the Nether-
lands.
. Wrecked near Mauritius in : Banda (ID:, left Netherlands ), Gelderland (ID:, left Nether-
lands ) and Geunieerde Provintien (ID:, left Netherlands ).
. De schepen Peerl (ID:) en princesse Royale (ID:) voorn- werden bevonden seer swacke pericu-
leuse Schepen te sijn, veroorsaeckt door haer grote lenghte ende ondiepte ofte vlackte, waer doorse

wanneer de Zee een weynigh ongestuijmigh is soodanigh arbeyden ende slingeren dat alles moet
bersten Scheuren en breecken watter aen is
. De Cameel (ID:), for instance, sent to Asia in , was already called an old ship in  (Colen-
brander , p. ).
. The ship der Goes (, ID:) was  feet with a beam of feet. The charter in  for big yachts
was  by  feet. The vessels Groene Leeuw (ID:) and Sterre (ID:) purchased by the VOC,
were regularly called yachts and measured  by  and  by  feet respectively.
. In making this classification, the first premise was that yachts would be reasonably easy to group
according to their ‘lastmaat’. Based on the frequency of a certain ‘lastmaat’ it was hoped to determine
the common size of big, medium and small yachts. The reducing frequency from one group to the
other was expected to set the limits for a certain category. A complicating factor was that peaks in the
frequency of lastmaat were also influenced by the ‘political’ assignment of a size due to the ‘egalisa-
ties’ system.
. Although this was an argument used by the VOC for maintaining the blockade, Van Veen believes
that the reason for the drop in exports to Portugal is to be found in the deterioration of the Portuguese
shipping organisation (Van Veen ; ).
. NA .., factory Japan , --.
Vroegh omtrent ses uijren sont den gouverneur quiemonsamma den offona met alle tolcken bij mijn
en liet vragen hoe het quam dat in plaets van fluijt scheepen (die voor desen ordinarie plechten in
Japan te comen) nu altemael zulcke groote Jachten ende spiegel scheepen herwaerts gesonden wier-
den, want verleden jaar hadde zijn Ed:t onder de acht scheepen die hier geweest waren, niet mee dan
eene fluijt Namentlijck de koninck davidt bevonde, ende soo hij bericht was stont er dit jaar niet een
fluijt meer, maar altemael sulcke groote oorloghs Jachten (als hier nu lagen) te verschijnen, waerop
deselve antwoorde gaf, om dat de fluijt.scheepen die eenige Jaaren herwaerts in dit vaerwater en tot
desen handel waeren gebruijckt geweest, als de witte Valck, 't witte paert, Campen, Hillegaersbergh,
de pellecaen, Coningh davidt, en meer andere meest alle afgevaren en van ouderdom vergaen waren,
zulcx die geene diemen noch eenigh sints bequaem oordeelde, en in stille vaerwateren konden geb-
ruijckt werden, anders nergens toe en dienden, als om steen en hout tot batavias timmeragien te
halen, ende omdat ons dit jaar apparent oock geen nieuwe fluijten uijt nederlant souden zijn toege-
zonden geweest soo hadde d'Ed=le H=r generael nootsaeckelijck dese jachten (die noch nieuw hecht
en sterck waeren om in dit ongestuijmige vaerwater een storm te konnen uijtstan) moeten ordineren
herwaerts te zenden met welck bescheijt die quel geesten weder te rugh naar gemelte gouverneur
gingen.
. The yachtsDelft [ID , lost in the Moluccas ] Enckhuysen (ID , lost in Ternate ] and Me-
denblick [ID , returned to the Netherlands in ].
. Arend (ID:), after military actions at Mosambique and Goa visited the Cormandel coast and sailed
via the Moluccas to the Philipines where the yacht was lost by fire in a fight against the Spanish in
.
Griffioen (ID:), after military actions at Mosambique and Goa, took part in the action near Malacca
and later made a trip to Patani and Japan. Ended its career in the Moluccas in .
Pauw (ID:), operated together with the other yachts, also took part in the action near Malacca,
escaped from the fight in the Philippines and was in use in the Moluccas till .
Valk (ID:) same career as ID , was taken by the Spaniards in the fight in the Philippines.
. The Supply and Blessing (Rate ) were captured together, the Blessing was renamed the Avondster
and wrecked  years later in 
. Bruijn et al (-; . and .) propose that Der Goes (ID:) and Der Goes (ID:) are
the same vessel, and that this was the second trip of this yacht to Asia. Der Goes [ID:] returned to
Zeeland four years prior in . From the resolution of the Heren XVII (NA..., VOC , --
) and the list of ‘egalisatie van de timmeringe’ (NA .., VOC , --), it is concluded
that the Der Goes (ID:) was newly built. It had the following dimensions: length  feet, width 
feet, and draught , feet, height of the ‘coebrugge’ a little less then  feet.
. Amsterdam feet of . metres.
. The lastmaat of the der Goes was  last according to the charter of building (NA .., VOC ,
fol. ) though it only was registered in the egalisaties as  last.
. Dimensions from primary sources are mentioned following the th century units. For length, beam
and draught feet are used. Estimated dimensions are in modern units. Since only the lastmaat of the
Duyfken is known, the reconstructed length is given in metres.
. Also named Arrakan.
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
. Van Ravesteyn had in zijn remonstrantie reeds gewezen op de uitstekende gelegenheid tot de scheeps-
bouw, waarvoor in Gandivi het geschikte hout te krijgen was. Van den Broecke maakte hiermee een
begin. Kleine vaartuigen, fregatten of fusten, werden in Gandivi en Broach op stapel gezet; van den
Broecke vertelt met zekeren trots, hoe het eerste door de Hollanders gebouwde fregat, de Goede For-
tuin, groot ongeveer  lasten, in februari  uit Gandivi voor de stad Suratte ter reede kwam.
. Amboyna ende alle de omliggende plaetsen sijn seer wel begaefft met diversche soorte van schoon
hout, soo dat men daer van alles soude connen maecken, ja groote ende cleyne schepen,¬ galeijen
ende fregatten. Sommige soorte van dit hout can eenige jaren langer int water dueren als 'tgene dat
wt Nederlant comt, dat wij alsoo bij experientie hebben bevonden. Onse timmerlieden most 'thout
vande Amboynsche timmerlieden eerst leren kennen.
. The idea that the term yacht in the th century applied to fast sailing vessels as compared to the
more "clumsy" ships does not always hold true.
. Vessels of more than  last were seldom called frigates. The only one found was the Jager of  last,
which was "built up from a frigate", (Colenbrander ) so may originally have been smaller (Cool-
haas , p. ). These dimensions show that these Asian frigates were different from the warships
used later in Europe with the same type-name, which were much larger.
. The origin of the Arnhem is unclear. It came into service at Ambon and it seems only to have been
used for the discovery voyage to Australia. It was not a very successful vessel. It was considered less
suitable: boven water heel onsterck en swack (very weak above the waterline) (Heeres , p. ).
. The Dutch term ‘sloep’ can be translated as shallop in the sense of a utility vessel carried by a bigger
ship. These vessels were primarily propelled by oars. The Dutch term ‘sloep’ can also be used for a
small sailing vessel in which case the English translation is sloop.
. Hoorn refers to the place in the Netherlands where this type of vessel was developed at the end of the
th century.
. The ratio between beam and length was never more then :. Over the period studied, the dimensions
and features of the flute were often the subject of detailed discussions by the VOC.
NA .. (VOC) –  Res H XVII maart :
Onder voorvallende saecken, Maendach den  Marty .
Is geordonneert, om Indien met behoorlycke cleyne schepen te versien dat men tegens ult.o septem-
ber toecomende sal gereet maecken. ses cleyne fluyten waer van dry sullen werden getimmert van
amsterdam een tot middelburch een tot Hoorn & een tot Enckhuysen slecht & recht sonder galderyen
ofte eenigh onnodich Sieraet, van tjarter als volcht twee van hondert vyff voeten lanck over Steven
tweentwintich voeten wyt binnen de huijt hol elff voeten twee van  voeten lanck  voeten wyt 
¾ voeten holl: twee van  voeten lanck  voeten wijt  ½ voeten holl: sonder verdeck, marsen ofte
andere andere wintvanck de groote versien met  Gotelingen & eenige Steenstucken & dander naer
proportie …
NA .., VOC , --:
Hebben d'heren van de werff gerapporteert dat sij een fluydtschip voorde compe- gecocht hebben
voor sestienduijsent …hondert gl- met  stucken geschudt, oudt  ½ jaer, lanck  voet, wijdt  ,
 voet hol
Stapel , p. :
Een fluyt of bootje Langh  voeten, wijt , hol  ½, daarboven  ½, dogh voor  ½
NA .., VOC , --:
Certer te bouwen fluyt  x  x  ½ boven  ½ (Stapel , p. ) Na het eyndigen van den
voorsch oorlog en dat geoordeelt wiert dat de Compagnie beter soude wesen gedient van fluyten als
van spiegelschepen, alsoo die onkostelycker en met minder volck kunnen werden gevoert, sijn daar-
toe de volgende charters beraamt (Siet de resolutiën van de ne van  April  en  April )
Van een grote fluyt langh  à  voeten, wijt , hol ¼, 't verdeck ¼, back en stuyrplegt op  of
minder, soo het bequamelijck kan geschieden. Van een kleynder fluyt langh over steven  voeten,
wijt binnens huyts , hol  ½, daarboven , met byvoegingh van een specificatie van de dickte en
swaarte van 't hout, dat daartoe soude moeten werden genomen. Van een kleyne fluyt langh over
steven  voeten, wijt , hol , 't verdeck  ½.
. There are no English equivalents for these vessel types. The English smack being different to the
Dutch smack and the kaag being a ship-type unfamiliar to the English
. It should be noted that most VOC flutes were not newly built when they came into service of the
VOC.
. No records have been found to indicate otherwise
. Already in the early voyages to Asia, fresh fruit was mentioned as a remedy against scurvy:
(Rouffaer & IJzerman , p. ) den en ditto zijn wij tsaeijl ghegan wtt diee baeij, ghenampt
Notes 
Aguade dee Sanbras; ouermidts dat wij daer gheen lamoene nochte aplen van oraanghen wonden om
die scheurbuijck tee werdrijven
(Keuning , p. )
De schipper Symen Hoen bracht oranges ...die ons daerna veel goets deeden doen de scheurbuyck het
volck began te plaghen.
(Commelin a, p.)
Den  December uyt Texel ..ghegaen .. Den  May gekomen inde Bay van Antongil, daer ons versch
water in nemende / sijn den  dito naer Bantam t’zeyl gegaen / wel van Lemoenen / ende Orange-
Appelen / teghens t’scheurbuyt versien sijnde
. wiert een Thuyn op de Compaggie vaerdich gemaeckt / die met Salade / Thuyn-kers/ Pieterselie saet
besayet ; ende met Miredyck wortelen beplant wiert
Den  ditto [-] .. hoochte  graden  minuten [zuider¬breedte] ... hebben dat etmael  mylen
geseylt / namen de bramstengen/ boven blint / ende kruyszeylen af / passeerden Tropicum Capricorni
; hadden alsdoen den eerste Salade uyt haer Thuyn / ende voor  dagen Miredick bladen / Thuyn-
kers / ende kleyne Radys welcke de siecken / die 't scheurbuyt hadden / dagelijckx mede gedeelt is…
. De dryerlye maniere van schepen, die deheeren dienen te sendenende continuelijcken te onderhou-
den zijn dese :
Verscheydene wel gemonteerde oorlochschepen (gelijck alreede een gesonden hebben),omme soo
hier soo daer ten oorloghe alleene te gebruycken,te weten,eenighe sware ende eenighe lichte...
Soo veele ende alsulcke groote sware lastvoerende schepen, omme de retouren van Bantam naer 't
patria te keeren als daertoe jaerlijcx gelieven overgesonden te hebben
Ten derden is seer hooch nodich, dat Ue herwaerts sent verscheydene lastvoerende gaingen, ende dat
dryerlye ofte tot drye besundere eynden,te weten eenige slechte schepen vol soldaten ende bootsge-
sellen, scheepsprovisie ende viveres tot versterckinge ende provisie voor de forten ende schepen in
Indien zijnde, omme gesleten te worden als ter gedistineerde plaetse gearriveert sullen zijn. Ten twee-
den verscheyde gaingen off schepen, die veel lasten mogen voeren ende met weynich volck geregiert
connen worden, omme de Molucques ende Banda met rijs, sagou, arack ende andere nootlijckheden
daermede te versien ende wederomme uyt de Molucques, Amboina, Banda ende Solor na Jaccattra
off Bantam te brengen de speceryen ende sandelhout, dewelcke jaerlijcx vergadert worden ende alsoo
op dese vaerwateren te houden. Ten derden, zoo dienen eenige wel gemonteerde jachten in Indien te
hebben gelijck als het schip der Goes, welcke bequaem sijn omme een goede last te voeren ende sich
selfs te diffenderen ende den vyant te comen offenderen omme van Bantam na de custe van Choro-
mandel te gebruycken, ende oock van Bantam op Patana, Siam ende Jappon ende wederomme van
Japon op Bantam, doch alhier dient daertoe een groot schip gebruyct te worden
. Rate  prefabricated vessels
. Decker, Hendrick – Middelen om uit te vinden de ware ladinge der Scheepen na hare groote (NA
.., Collectie Hudde , p. ) ...’ dat het gemelde schip Spierdyk,in Tessel binenkomende... niet
dieper heeft gegan als  voeten, zynde wel  voet  / duim boven de holte, waar op het by
metinge van zyne charter gestelt is, doch onwedersprekelyk ruim  voeten ondieper als de  voeten,
zoo de Compagnie dit zelve schip tot twee malen achter den anderen en noch veele andere schepen
meer, ja zelfs dieper gaande, naar advenant hare holte, van hier naar India vertrekkende, geresolveert
heeft af te laden en noch doorgaans wel doet afladen. 't Welk bewezen werd, door de hier aen vol-
gende scheepen, alle uitgegaan en van de holte als by een ieder nevens haar diep gaan, volgens qui-
tantie by de Lootze daar van gegeven... als te weeten’
. (Opstal , p. )
De vloot zal geen koopmanschappen mee krijgen, alleen realen van achten en als ballast wat ijzer en
lood
(NA .., VOC , --) onder  Coopmanschappen naer Indie, o.a.
  # loot in cleyne schuytkens ofte stuckens
voor Coromandel
  # isere Staven soo viercante als platte
  # Stael iser Staaven
(NA .., VOC , --)
Amsterdam zal  of Θ pont lood copen ommet de Delfshaven naar Cormandel gebracht te worden.
(NA .., VOC , --)
Tachtichduysent pont loot voor haer schip [kamer Delft] t Hoff van Hollandt te kopen
(NA .., VOC , --)
de heren van de equipage mogen . pondt loodt copen, waarvan . voor Eliphant en .
voortjacht [Lisse]
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
. Also called spiauter and regularly mentioned in VOC-sources, most probably an alloy of pewter and
lead
. (NA .., Archief Geleijnessen de Jongh  ,p. )
[eisen voor de retouren van  met een toelichting en toevoeging uit ]
Den tintiago ofte Spiaulter die wij voor desen alhier hebben gehadt, alsoo niet bekendt was, is van
hier weder tot ballast naer Indien gesonden om op de custe coromandel ofte in Japon vertiert te mo-
gen worden naerderhandt alsoo een partye terugge hebben gecregen tot ballast in t' Schip Amsterdam
soo is de selve nu onlanch hier verkocht.... Dit soude mede eene Courante Chinese waere zijn, om
t'herwaerts seynden tot ballast onder grenier van de schepen gevoert te worden also dan geene
plaetse altoos occuperen soude wij verstaen dat op de Custe coromandel & in Japon mede groote
quantiteyt soude connen werden vercoght met redelyck profyt..
(Blussé, Opstall & Ts`Ao Yung-Ho , fol. r)
Schreven niettemin een briefken aen de opperhoofden onser schepen in Pehouw, waerin haer advi-
seerden dat  ghroot kisten met poeyersuycker naer ons vaderlandt per berckhout bequamen,
welcke die van Sutphen hadden over te nemen ende ongestort, bequamelijck te bergen, waerneven
sonden voor Suratte  canassers met alluyn, die wij recommendeerden in Schiedam te schepen,
ende apart, behoorlijck wech te stouwen om na desen moeyte en spillinge voor te comen, miits dat
staet gemaeckt wierden in aenstaende ongeveer  a  picols spiaulter te verwachten hadden,
welck onder (tot ballast) soude werden gelecht.
. Om den timmerluyden in Indien min werck te geven wenschen wij,dat UE. de verdubbelinge der
schepen van de buytenste greene huyden gelieven noch eens soo dicht te laten spijckeren, als tot
Amsterdam geschiet, waaruyt ongeloofflijck voordeel getrocken sal werden alsoo die huyden door
het roest den worm soo weeren dattet een verwonderinge om te sien is. De heeren van Hoorn laeten
dichter spijckeren als die van Amsterdam, daeraen het voordeel wert gespeurt, want de huyt door 't
gemelte roest bijna onverganckelijcken wert, daerom dienen oock de spijckers niet langh, maer aen de
hooffden dick te wesen ende selffs de hooffden mede grooter ende dicker als ordinaris. Tot Enckhuy-
sen werden de boegen van de scheepen verdubbelt met eecke schuytenplancken, hetwelcke hout is
dat wel buyge wil ende moy state ,maer het valt soo soet voor den worm, dattet ons hier veel werckx
veroorsaackt; door 't eeckenhout can oock de roest sich niet soo verspreyen ende alsoo 't costelijcker
valt als met greene deelen,soo bidden wij dat daertoe het greenen- voor het eeckehout, mits op 't
dichtsts gespijckert sijnde, geprefereert werde
. De timmeragie en reparatie aen scheepen in India cost de compa. groott geltt ende worden de schee-
pen pricepal. de groote na behooren niet versien, t'is over sulcx gants noodich, alle swaere reparatie
aen schepen soo veel doenel. geexcuseertt wordtt…. ende t'ordonneeren datt de costel. oorlogh- ende
goede andre schepen op zijn oorboor ende ter behoorlijcker tijtt als retourschepen gebruijckt worden,
gel. Ao.  mett Uttrecht geschiede. Cleene jachten moeten in India geholpen worden, dan connen
eenighe jaren mett kiel haelen voor datt vertimmeringh vereischen, onderhouden worden, schuijts en
boots dienen oock ter vaerte gesonden gelijck meede eenighe chaloepen voorde Cust Choromandel
ende elders omme t'timmeren soo veel moogelijck in India t'excuseeren
. During the whole period calamities with an immobilised crew occurred.. See:
(Coolhaas , p. )
Als voorengemelt, arriveerden hier [Ambon] den en Januarij ao stanti [] de scheepen den Briel,
Purmerent ende 't fregatt Suratte met seer debil volck, invoougen om 't schip te regeeren geen vijff
gesonde persoonen overschooten.
(NA .., VOC , fol. -v) Lourens Pitt van Paliacatte aan van Kittensteijn --
op  stanti (al niet meer verwacht door verlopen moesson) gearriveerd Reijger op  augustus in
comp van de jachten Concordia, Avontsterre ende uijtgeest [Utrecht] en de fluytschepen Salm en
Coninck van Polen van Gamron herwaerts vertrocken en omtrent de bay van Gale den  deser door
een stormweder gesamentlijck van anckers gespilt... in  etmael dese rede bereickt
De Reijger was seer desolaet gearriveert, swack van volck.. is nu versien van  Nederlantse soldaten
van het guarnisoen en  inlantse bootgesellen.
(NA .., VOC , fol. )
De fluit pellicaen is hier den en Mey wel onverwacht van sijn verloren reijse naer gale te rede geco-
men, beladen met siecken, sulcx pas machtigh waren t schip te regeren,  der selver sijn hier aen-
stonts in hospit=l gesonden waervan reede  personen sijn gestorven.
. The galjoot Appelboom sailed to Asia with a crew of  of which  died (Coolhaas , p. )
. The retourschip Nieuw Delft (ID:arrived at the Sumatra coast with only  man who could do
work on board.
Notes 
. The local currency, a small golden coin that was produced in large quantities by the mint in Negapat-
nam after  (Jacobs , p. )
. The exact length of a fathom (vadem) is not clear. In the th century vadems in use by the Dutch
varied. Most common were the vadem of six Rijnland feet (. m.) or of six Amsterdam feet (.m).
. Many types of currency were in use during the period of this study. Where possible the guilder will be
used as the standard. The different currencies were also a problem for the VOC. Right after they were
established in  it was decided that the accounts for all the chambers or departments would be
made up in guilders (NA .., VOC , --)
. The difficulty with the design of this type of diving device is to keep the hose open for the air supply.
On deeper dives the difference in air pressure will also create problems. In Finland an th century
leather dive suit has survived – the problem with the hose was solved by reinforcing it with wooden
pipes. (Maarleveld , p. )
. Dutch sea mile is . kilometres
. Nieuw Enckhuysen (ID:),  last, built 
. Witte Duyf (ID:),  last,in service since 
Witte Paard (ID:),  last, built 
Overschie (ID:),  last, built 
Trouw (ID:),  last, built 
Os (ID:),  last, built 
Koe (ID:),  last, built 
. Swarte Beer (ID:),  last, built 
. Santdijck or Zaandijk (ID:),  last, built 
. Hillegaersberg (ID:),  last, built 
Pellicaen (ID:),  last, built 
Potvis (ID:),  last, built 
. Hulst (ID:),  last, built 
Maasland (ID:),  last, built 
. Liefde (ID:),  last, built 
Vrede (ID:),  last, built 
. Koning van Polen (ID:),  last, built 
Robyn (ID:),  last, built 
. Kampen (ID:),  last, built  , Witte Valk (ID:),  last, built 
. Nassouw (ID:),  last, built 
. Wesel (ID:),  last, built 
. Reiger (ID:),  last, built 
.  jacht Valk, vrijliedenjacht Bonijt,  jonk Sincan,  jacht Woerden,  veroverd jacht Ba-
tavia,  jonk Girim, fluit Swaen,  fluit Son,  jachtje kleen Rotterdam,  jonk Que-
lang,  jonk Taiwan, jonk Tamsuy,  fluit Jonker,  fluit Potvis,  fluit Lam, retoruschip
Vreede,  galjoot Vleermuis,  jacht Maarsen.
. Only the first stage of the analysis of the shipping encompasses a longer period of  years, i.e. up to
. The reason is that  is a demarcation date in the organisation when the VOC set up a perma-
nent structure in Asia. On the other hand, no specific demarcation year can be found to discriminate
early ("Voorcompagnieën") voyages in Asia from those made by the VOC, so all "early" voyages
which had the "trading round-tour" character are included in one stage.
. ‘Spice Islands’ is a collective noun for the following regions: the islands Ternate, Tidore (area ),
Ambon (area ) and Banda (area ).
. This was specifically the case in the early period of the shipping when the VOC tried to adopt the
local system of maintenance and repairs by bringing the vessels in shore on the river. This was the
location where the locals kept their vessels in the off-season. For the VOC it turned out to be more
efficient to sail back regularly to Batavia or, later in the th century, to Galle for maintenance and
repair.
. The first stage of the analysis of the shipping encompasses a longer period of  years, i.e. to
. The reason being that  is a demarcation date in the organisation; the date the VOC set up a
permanent structure in Asia.
. Beeckman discussed the shape of the underwater body with shipbuilders and studied, for example,
the working of the rudder and other sailing features of a ship. Stevins contribution was in the field of
stability. He studied the theoretical background of practical issues like the construction of a ship’s
superstructure.
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 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
List of vessels in service during the
period -
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 amsterdam    
 duifje    
 hollandia    
 mauritius    
 amsterdam    
 boodschap, blijde    
 eendracht    
 friesland    
 gelderland    
 gelderland    
 geloof    
 hendrik frederik    
 hoop    
 hoop    
 langebark    
 leeuw    
 leeuwin    
 liefde    
 maan   
 mauritius    
 overijssel    
 trouw    
 utrecht    
 zeelandia    
 zon    
 hof van holland    
 maan    
 morgenster    
 nassau    
 nederland    
 postillion    
 verenigde landen    
 zon, grote    
 amsterdam    
 amsterdam    
 arend, witte    
 arend, zwarte    
 delft    
 dordrecht    

ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 dordrecht    
 gouda    
 gouda    
 haarlem    
 leiden    
 sloep v/d maan   
 sloep v/d zon    
 alkmaar    
 duifje    
 eendracht    
 enkhuizen    
 hoorn    
 lam    
 leeuw, groene    
 leeuw, rode    
 leeuw, witte    
 leeuw, zwarte    
 leeuw, zwarte    
 lint, de   
 middelburg    
 ram    
 schaap    
 wachter    
 zeelandia    
 claes   
 erasmus    
 goes    
 hollandia    
 amsterdam    
 hollandse tuin    
 jago, sint    
 maagd van enkhuizen    
 mauritius    
 nassau    
 papegaaitje    
 rotterdam    
 sterre    
 vlissingen    
 zierikzee    
 amsterdam    
 gelderland    
 catharina, st    
 delft    
 duifje    
 enkhuizen    
 hof van holland    
 hoorn    
 hoorn    
 medemblik    
 provinciën, geunieerde    
 westfriesland    
 mozambique    
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 anthonio, san    
 middelburg    
 oranje    
 patani    
 provinciën, geunieerde    
 zon, grote    
 zon, kleine    
 banda    
 bantam    
 ceylon    
 china    
 jonk van quackernaet   
 patani    
 veere, ter    
 walcheren    
 arend    
 delft    
 griffioen    
 hert   
 hollandia    
 jager    
 leeuw, rode met pijlen    
 madagaskar    
 middelburg    
 pauw    
 rotterdam    
 sloep v/d gelderland    
 sloep v/d westvriesland    
 valk    
 draak    
 fregat, spaensch    
 hoop    
 middelburg, klein    
 sloep v/d zeelandia    
 hazewind    
 maan, halve    
 sloep v/d delft    
 sloep v/d walcheren   
 brak    
 goes    
 leeuw, witte    
 leeuw, zwarte    
 nederland   
 sloep uit amboina    
 ternate    
 vlissingen    
 wapen van amsterdam    
 aeolus, grote    
 duifje    
 leeuw, groene    
 leeuw, rode    
 maan, grote    
List of vessels in service during the period - 
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 ster    
 veer, klein der    
 zon    
 arrakan    
 enkhuizen, klein    
 hoop    
 tanassery    
 aeolus, kleine    
 arend    
 mauritius    
 nassau    
 neptunus    
 valk, witte    
 wapen van amsterdam    
 amsterdam    
 zeelandia    
 aeolus, grote    
 beer, witte    
 beer, zwarte    
 engel    
 enkhuizen    
 fortuin    
 hert    
 jacatra    
 jager    
 maan, grote    
 meeuwtje    
 morgenster    
 oranjeboom    
 sloep v/d middelburg    
 sloep v/d zeelandia   
 walcheren    
 zon, grote    
 bantam    
 bergerboot    
 ceylon    
 dolfijn    
 eendracht    
 galiasse    
 hollandia, klein    
 hoop    
 hoorn    
 jonk van siam, onse    
 jonk van simsuan    
 macassar    
 parel    
 bantam    
 ceylon    
 eendracht    
 jamby    
 japanse bark    
 leeuw, gouden    
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 nn   
 roeychaloupe    
 smak, de    
 trouw    
 vlissingen, klein    
 wapen van zeeland    
 westfriesland    
 brak    
 dedel    
 defence    
 eenhoorn    
 fortuin, goede    
 hazewind    
 jacatra    
 jamby    
 onrust    
 postpaard    
 singapore   
 spaans veroverd    
 taffasoa    
 tholen, ter    
 tijger    
 vlot, grote    
 vlot, kleine   
 vosje    
 zeewolf    
 zierikzee    
 zwaan    
 amsterdam, klein    
 banda   
 bode, vliegende    
 delft    
 dordrecht    
 haarlem    
 haas    
 hoop, goede    
 hoorn    
 hoorn, nieuw    
 jacob dircxs   
 jager    
 jortan    
 michel sint    
 palliacatte    
 salomon    
 thomas    
 beer, engelse    
 bima    
 dolfijn    
 draak, engelse    
 expeditie    
 hollandia    
 hond, engelse    
List of vessels in service during the period - 
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 hoorn    
 jonk van hans keyser   
 leiden    
 medemblik    
 nassau    
 samson    
 schoonhoven    
 sloep, advies van de gouen leeuw    
 sterre, engelse    
 vrede    
 wapen van enkhuizen    
 wapen van hoorn    
 alkmaar    
 amboina, klein    
 arrakan    
 bruinvis    
 gouda    
 groningen    
 haan    
 haring    
 hazewind    
 heilbot    
 malakka    
 middelburg    
 muiden    
 muis    
 naarden    
 noordholland    
 oranje    
 pera    
 purmerend    
 schiedam    
 ternate    
 valk    
 wapen van delft    
 wapen van jacatra    
 weesp    
 zuidholland    
 arnemuiden    
 borneo    
 china   
 cruz, st    
 delfshaven    
 diamant   
 edam    
 enkhuizen    
 firando    
 fortuin, goede    
 gorkum    
 heusden    
 jacatra   
 kaag    
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 laurens,sint    
 leeuwin    
 mocha    
 monnikendam    
 nossa senhora de   
 palliacatte    
 pegu    
 solor    
 suratte    
 tholen, klein    
 victoria    
 wapen van rotterdam    
 westkappelle    
 woerden    
 anthonio, san    
 arnhem    
 batavia   
 bengalen    
 bier en brootspot   
 bonijt   
 brak    
 brotcha    
 erasmus, klein    
 hoop, kleine    
 jamby   
 makreel    
 mallabar    
 massulipatnam    
 nicolaas sint    
 robijn   
 roeychaloupe open   
 singapore    
 timor    
 amsterdam    
 arend    
 cotchin    
 david, koning    
 delft    
 eendracht    
 goa    
 griffioen    
 haas    
 hazewind    
 hollandia    
 hoop    
 jager    
 mauritius    
 nachtmery   
 nassau    
 onrust    
 oranje    
 rendezvous    
List of vessels in service during the period - 
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 sloep v/d dordrecht   
 tortelduif    
 anthonio, san   
 arnemuiden, klein    
 bon remedio    
 cambodja    
 celebar    
 cruz, st    
 fortuin    
 gouda, klein    
 jamby, klein    
 leeuwin, jonge    
 madre de dios    
 nicolaas, st   
 nieuwigheid    
 parel   
 pulo-ay   
 tanassery    
 trouw   
 zeelandia, klein    
 dordrecht, klein   
 engelenbak   
 ghift   
 heemstede   
 kameel    
 lontor    
 meeuw    
 monnikendam   
 packan   
 parel, kleine   
 parel, nieuwe    
 provinciën   
 pulo-ay   
 revenge   
 sinckan    
 taiwan    
 valk    
 victoria    
 amstelveen    
 beverwijk    
 bijenkorf   
 bommel    
 briel, den    
 diemen    
 domburg    
 grotebroek    
 jacinto, sao    
 oranje    
 ouderkerk    
 sloten    
 zeepaard, gulden    
 anthonio, san    
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 arend, zwarte    
 arnemuiden, klein    
 batavia    
 bon successo    
 bon successo   
 brouwershaven    
 bruinvis   
 chincheo    
 draak, vliegende    
 duif    
 frederik hendrik    
 galiasse    
 heusden, klein    
 hoop    
 huis van nassau   
 kampen    
 kemphaan    
 nassau    
 nera    
 prins willem    
 queda    
 roermondt   
 terschelling    
 texel    
 utrecht    
 veere, ter    
 velzen    
 vianen    
 vlieland    
 vlissingen    
 wieringen    
 zeeburg    
 assendelft    
 batavia    
 batavia   
 buren    
 cotchin   
 david, kleine    
 gouverneur Coen   
 gravenhage, 's    
 grisseck   
 holland, klein    
 jager    
 negapatnam    
 pehou    
 sincan    
 soulang   
 vlissingen    
 walcheren    
 zaandam    
 zeelandia   
 zoutelande    
List of vessels in service during the period - 
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 amboina    
 beets    
 boot v/d batavia   
 brak    
 broekerhaven    
 deventer    
 goes    
 leeuwarden    
 nassau   
 nijmegen    
 oostzanen    
 parel, kleine    
 rammekens    
 reigertjen   
 westzanen    
 zalm    
 amoij   
 batavia    
 bloempot    
 boodschap, droevige    
 buis, gulden    
 ceylon    
 cotchin    
 egmond    
 goudsbloem   
 hof van holland    
 japan   
 katwijk    
 koudekerke    
 macao    
 malakka    
 manilha    
 middelburg    
 middelburg   
 noordwijk    
 rijswijk    
 wankan    
 warmond    
 wassenaar    
 wezel    
 amboina    
 anhay    
 banda    
 falcon    
 grol    
 huisduinen    
 lelie    
 pulo-ay    
 rosengheyn   
 saccam   
 tamsuy    
 aemilia    
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 amsterdam    
 banda    
 blijswijk    
 boodschap, blijde    
 bosch, den    
 breedam    
 daman    
 fortuin, goede   
 hoop   
 hoorn    
 ijsselstein    
 maan    
 oudewater    
 sloep, grote    
 sterre    
 tancoya   
 veenhuizen    
 venlo    
 zeelandia    
 zon    
 zutphen    
 amoij   
 anthonio, san   
 balam   
 banda    
 barnsteen   
 bovenkarspel    
 coupan    
 goa    
 kameleon    
 nassau, klein    
 pinto    
 quelang   
 quinam    
 revenge    
 schagen    
 sloterdijk    
 souburch    
 warmond, klein    
 wezel, klein    
 zwaan    
 amboina    
 amsterdam   
 bardes    
 bode, vliegende    
 cabo de rama    
 girim    
 jago, sint   
 langerak    
 limburch    
 maastricht    
 nachtegaal, zeeuwse    
List of vessels in service during the period - 
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 nieuwigheid    
 petten    
 rarop    
 rithem    
 robijn   
 zandvoort    
 amboina, klein   
 china    
 dolfijn    
 fortuin    
 harderwijk    
 hollandia, klein    
 hooghkarspel    
 malakka    
 manilha    
 nangasacque   
 neptunus    
 petten, klein    
 rotterdam, klein    
 singapore   
 voorburg    
 waterland    
 waterloose werve    
 akersloot    
 amsterdam, klein    
 arrakan    
 batavia    
 breedam, klein    
 campher    
 duif    
 enkhuizen    
 enkhuizen, klein    
 haarlem    
 hoorn, klein   
 keizerin    
 maria   
 oostkapelle    
 otter    
 prins, jonge    
 prinses maria    
 quinam    
 roemerswaal    
 valk    
 vos    
 wapen van alkmaar   
 westhoven    
 wilde vercken   
 zwolle    
 amsterdam   
 bon successo   
 broekoord    
 bruinvis   
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 diemen    
 graft    
 henriëtte louise    
 hoop, goede    
 hoop, goede    
 india    
 jonk, groote   
 leeuw, sluimerend   
 maan    
 maan, kleine    
 pibamba   
 rijnsburg    
 rijp, de    
 rijswijk    
 sterre    
 taiwan   
 valkenburg    
 wijdenes    
 zon    
 zon    
 arnemuiden    
 bode, vliegende   
 breda    
 delft    
 draak    
 engel    
 grijpskerk    
 holland   
 hollandia    
 leiden   
 noordster    
 pehou   
 rog    
 rog, kleine   
 serpent    
 tonijn    
 wachter    
 welsingen    
 zwaan, indische   
 anna, engelse    
 banda    
 capelle    
 castricum    
 david, kleine    
 david, koning    
 franeker    
 heemskerk    
 hert    
 limmen    
 lisse    
 maria   
 maria de medici    
List of vessels in service during the period - 
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 meerman    
 middelburg    
 negapatnam    
 olifant, witte    
 pauw    
 zeelandia   
 zierikzee    
 zon    
 zutphen, klein    
 berkhout    
 brak    
 buis, gulden    
 dolfijn    
 eendracht    
 gale    
 galjoen, spaans    
 heemstede    
 jager    
 jamby    
 kelangh    
 kievit    
 leek    
 leeuw, oude    
 liefde    
 nassau, klein    
 neptunus    
 oranjeboom    
 rob   
 rog, kleine   
 salamander    
 snoek    
 tamsuy   
 uitgeest    
 utrecht   
 utrecht   
 walvis    
 waterhond    
 zaaier    
 zeehaan    
 amboina    
 amsterdam    
 bergen op zoom    
 lillo    
 malakka, nieuw    
 mauritius, klein    
 pipeli, klein    
 provinciën, verenigde    
 rotterdam    
 tijger    
 vogelstruis    
 wakende boei    
 amboina    
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 arend    
 breskens    
 campar    
 delfshaven    
 delft    
 fortuin    
 haan    
 hazewind    
 leeuwerik    
 lootsboot, grote    
 lootsboot, kleine    
 luipaard    
 taiwan   
 visser    
 vrede    
 westfriesland    
 zwaan    
 alkmaar    
 amsterdam   
 anthonio, san    
 eiland mauritius    
 gewelt, 't   
 haring    
 hof van zeeland    
 hollandia    
 hoop, goede    
 hoopwel    
 malakka    
 rijnsburg, klein    
 wingurla    
 zeehond    
 zeemeeuw    
 aagtekerke    
 andries, st   
 batavia    
 batavia    
 beer, zwarte    
 bosch, den   
 brak    
 diemen    
 gans, gouden    
 gapinge    
 hazewind    
 hillegersberg    
 maasland    
 makreel    
 oranje    
 overschie    
 post    
 schelvis    
 schiedam    
 utrecht    
List of vessels in service during the period - 
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 westfriesland    
 zalm    
 zeelandia    
 zeewolf    
 bruinvis    
 formosa   
 haring, gulden    
 hoop, goede   
 jonker    
 juffer    
 koning van polen    
 malakka   
 nachtuil    
 overal   
 rob    
 sas van gent    
 sluis    
 taiwan    
 tamsuy    
 tonijn    
 valk, witte    
 david, koning    
 dromedaris    
 hulst    
 kampen    
 koe    
 liefde, gekroonde    
 os    
 paard, witte    
 patientie    
 prins, jonge    
 zaandijk    
 banda    
 duif, witte    
 griffioen    
 hoorn    
 noordholland   
 noordmunster   
 popkensburg    
 prinses royaal    
 siam    
 tegenepatnam    
 batavia, klein    
 concordia    
 diamant    
 hoop   
 jamby   
 oranjeboom    
 pelikaan, vergulde    
 reiger    
 solor    
 sperwer    
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 trouw    
 visiagapatam    
 alkmaar    
 brak   
 lastdrager    
 medemblik    
 paliacatte    
 potvis    
 queda    
 robijn    
 velzen   
 waterhond   
 amsterdam    
 candia   
 mature   
 morgenster    
 rhijnocer    
 safier    
 smient    
 taiwan    
 troostenburgh    
 wapen van gale    
 alkmaar   
 batavia    
 formosa, ilha    
 hoop, goede    
 hoorn    
 jager    
 katwijk   
 lam    
 malakka    
 parel    
 perach   
 prins willem    
 charlois    
 goa    
 haas    
 hoop, goede    
 jaffenapatnam    
 joan baptist    
 kat    
 katwijk    
 leeuw, rode    
 muiden    
 nasaret    
 onrust    
 schelvis    
 schevelingen    
 tortelduif    
 vleermuis, gulden    
 vos, rode    
 vos, zwarte    
List of vessels in service during the period - 
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 wapen van batavia    
 weesp    
 windhond, witte    
 abcoude    
 amboina    
 amsterdam    
 arnemuiden    
 avenhorn    
 avondster    
 cabo jaques    
 ceylon    
 cotchin    
 dordrecht    
 draak, vergulde    
 duif, engelse    
 erasmus    
 formosa    
 haan   
 jacatra   
 kabeljauw    
 kalf, witte    
 lam, witte    
 larentucque    
 leeuw, gekroonde    
 leeuwin    
 maagd van dordt    
 naarden    
 phoenix    
 tulp    
 utrecht    
 veere    
 zierikzee    
 zijdeworm    
 anjelier    
 bimmelepatnam   
 bloemendaal    
 boterbloem    
 brouwershaven    
 bul, zwarte    
 diamant   
 dolfijn    
 domburg    
 ekster    
 gideon   
 goudsbloem    
 hoop, goede    
 kaapvogel    
 konijn    
 koudekerke    
 lelie    
 maagd van enkhuizen    
 mars    
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 molucko    
 negombo   
 prins te paard, jonge   
 roos    
 terschelling    
 tholen    
 vlieland    
 vlissingen    
 waijpouty    
 wapen van amsterdam    
 wapen van holland    
 zeelandia    
 zoutelande    
 achilles    
 amersfoort   ? 
 appelboom    
 arnhem    
 brak   
 breukelen    
 flora   
 fortuin   
 geldria    
 goes    
 hector    
 hercules    
 hoorn    
 jager    
 jamby   
 maarssen    
 nachtglas    
 slot van honingen    
 spreeuw   
 timor   
 vink   
 workum    
 zeehond    
 zeepaard    
 zwaluw    
 damme    
 draak   
 emmeloord    
 ens    
 garnaal   
 geep   
 hilversum    
 kreeft    
 mature    
 molen    
 ooievaar    
 schidpad   
 schol    
List of vessels in service during the period - 
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 taiwan    
 ulysses    
 urk    
 venenburg    
 vink    
 vogelzang    
 wachter    
 wakende boei    
 zeeridder    
 amsterdam, klein    
 arke noë   
 caliture    
 cruz, st   
 elburg    
 formosa    
 geelmuiden    
 hasselt    
 hert, vliegende    
 hiettoe   
 jacatra    
 japara   
 japara    
 kaneelschiller    
 krab    
 leeuwin   
 lootsboot, grote   
 lootsboot, kleine    
 mannaar    
 maria    
 massulipatnam    
 mees    
 mozambique    
 narsepouer    
 otter   
 ouglij    
 patientie    
 postillion    
 romain    
 sillida   
 snoek    
 spijt den duijvel   
 spreeuw    
 waterpas    
 zeeblom    
 bantam    
 breskens   
 colombo   
 goeree    
 harp    
 hert, rode    
 hoogland    
 immenhorn    
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
ID Name Last Year in Year out Rate
 jaffenapatnam    
 kortenhoef    
 leerdam    
 loenen    
 meliskerke    
 morgenster    
 negapatnam    
 nieuwpoort    
 pegu    
 pipely    
 wapen van batavia    
 zuilen    
 banjarmassing   
 diemermeer    
 ganges    
 graveland, 's    
 hammenhiel    
 jager    
 maagd van dordt    
 mandarsaha    
 nagelboom    
 oester   
 palembang    
 palliacatte    
 terboede    
 wapen van colombo    
 buienskerke    
 coromandel    
 maagd van dordt    
 nieusolor   
 notenboom    
 parkiet    
 remedie, hollandse   
 roothaas    
 ster van ceylon    
 zoon, verloren    
 japare    
 middelburch    
 lintworm   
 bruinvis    
 batavia    




Adams, William , 
Admiralty -, , , -, , , ,
, , 
adviesjacht , , , 
afbreekboot , , -, , , 
Africa , , , , , , 
coast , 
east 
east coast , 
Akersloot (ID ) 
Ambon , , -, , -, , , ,
, -, , -, , -
Ambonese 
America, south , -, , , 
Amsterdam , -, , , , , , ,
, , , -, -
Amsterdam (ID ) 
Amsterdam (ID ) -, -, , ,

Amsterdam (ID ) 
Amsterdam, klein (ID ) , 




Appelboom (ID ) 
Arabia , -, , , , 
Arabian Peninsula , 
Arabian Sea , , , , -, , -,
, , , -, , , , -, -
, -, , -, 
Arafura Sea , -
Arakan , , , , , , 
Arctic 
Arend (ID ) , 
Arend, zwarte (ID ) 
Arnhem (ID ) , 
Arrakan (ID ) 
Aru 
Atjeh , , , , , , , ,

Atlantic , , , , , , , 
Australia , , , -, , , , ,
, , 
west 
west coast , 
Australian , , , 
Avondster (ID ) , , , , , ,
-, , , , -, 
Avondsterproject , , 
Ayutthaya , -, 
B
Bali , , , -
ballast , , , , , , , -, ,
-, -, , , -
Baltic Sea 
Banda , , , , , , -, , ,
, -, , -, , , -

Sea 
Banda (ID ) 
Banda (ID ) , 





Bantam -, , , -, , , -,




Batavia , , , -, , -, , ,
-, , -, -, , -, -, ,
-, -, -, -, -,
, -, -, -, , ,
-, -, -, -, -

Batavia (ID ) , , , , , 
Batavia-project 
Beeckman, Isaac , 
Beer, witte (ID ) , 
Beer, zwarte (ID ) 
Beer, zwarte (ID ) , 

Bengal , , , , -, , , ,
, -, 
Bay of , , , , , , , , , -
, , , -, -, , ,
-, , -, , 
bezaansjacht 
Biesman, Lambert 
Blessing(ID ) , 
boeier -
Bommel (ID ) 
Bontekoe, WillemIJsbrandsz. 
boot , , , , , , , , 
Borneo , , , , , , 
south 
Bosch, den (ID ) 
Both, Pieter , , -, -, , ,
, 
Brak (ID ) 
Brak (ID ) 






Broecke, Pieter van den , , , 





Cabo Jasques (ID ) 
Caerden, Paulus van , 
Cambay, Gulf of 
Cambodia , , , , , -, ,

Cameel (ID ) , 
Cape Colony 
Cape of Good Hope , , , , , -,




Carpentaria, Gulf of -
Carpentier, Pieter de 
Catharina, St. (ID ) 
Ceram , , , , , , , 
east 
west 
Ceylon , , -, , , , -, , ,
, , , , -, , -,
-, , , -, -
charter , , -, -, , , -,
-
China , , , , , , -, , -,
, , , , , , -, , -
, , , , , , , 
coast 
China (ID ) 
China Sea, East , -
China Sea, South , , , , -,

Chinese , , , , , -, , -,
, , , , , , , , -, ,
, , -, , -, , ,
-, 
coast , -, , , -
Chinsura 
cinnamon , , , , , , , 
cloves -, , -, , , -, ,
, -
Cochin , 
Cochin (ID ) 
Coen, Jan Pieterszoon , -, , -,
-, -, , , -, , ,
-
Colombo -, , , 
Comores 
Concordia (ID ) , , 
Coper, Jacob -
copper , , , , , , , 
Cordes Cordes, Simon de 
Cordes, Simon de , 
Coromandel Coast , , -, , -,
-, , , -, , , , , ,
-, , -, , -, ,
, -, , , , -, ,
, 
Coxinga , 
crew , , , , , , , , , -,
, -, , -, , , , ,
, -
D
David, Koning (ID ) , 
Decker, Hendrick , 
Delft , , 
Delft (ID 
Delft (ID ) 
Delft (ID ) 
Delft, nieuw (ID ) 
Deshima , , 
Diemen, Antonio van , , 
Dolfijn 
Dolfijn (ID ) 
Dolfijn (ID ) , , -
Domburg(ID ) 
Dordrecht (ID ) 
Dordrecht (ID ) , , , 
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
Dover 
Draeck, vergulde (ID ) 
draught -, , , , , , , ,
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Medemblik (ID ) , 
Mediterranean , 
Mekong 
men-of-war -, , , , -,
, , 
Menam river , 
merchant ship 
Mexico , , , -
east coast 
Meyden, Adriaen van der 
Middelburch 
Middelburg , 
Middelburg (ID ) 
Middelburg(ID ) 
Mocha , , , , 
Molucca Sea , 
Moluccas , , -, , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , 
Monnikendam (ID ) 
monsoon , , -, -, , , , -
, , -, -, , -, ,
-, , 
Mozambique , , , , , 
Myanmar , , 
N
Nagasaki , , , 
Nassau (fort) 
Nassau (ID ) -, , 
Navale Macht , , , , 
navet 
Neck, Jacob Cornelisz. van 
Negombo , 
Neptunus (ID ) 
Netherlands , -, -, -, -, ,
, , -, -, -, -, , -,
-, , -, -, , ,
-, , -, -, 
Nicobar islands 
Nieuhof, Joan 
Nieuwigheid (ID ) , 
Noordster (ID ) 
Noort, Olivier van , , , 
nutmeg , , , , , 
O
Onrust , , , , 
oorlogsjacht , 
opium , , , 
Os (ID ) , 
Ouglij (ID ) 
Overschie (ID ) , 
P
Paard, witte (ID ) , , 
Pakistan 
Paleacatte , , , 
Palembang 
Parel, nieuwe (ID ) 
Patani , , , , , , , , -
, , 
Pauw(ID ) , 
Pegu (ID ) , 
Pehu 
Pelikaan, vergulde (ID  
Pelikaan, vergulde (ID ) , -
Pelsaert, Francisco 
pepper , -, -, , , -, , -
, -, , , , , -, , , ,
, -, -, , -, ,
-, , , , , -, ,
, 
Pera (ID ) 
Persia , , -, -, , , , ,
-, , , -, , -,
-, , 
Persian Gulf -, 
Pescadores , , , -, , -,

pewter , , , , 
Philippines , , , -, , -, ,
, , -, , , -, -,
-, , -, 





pinas , -, 
Pitt, Louens 
porcelain , , , , -
Portugal , , , , , , 
Portuguese -, -, -, , , -,
-, , , -, -, -, -, ,
, , , , , -, , -,
-, -, -, , -,
, , , 
Potvis (ID ) , 
Provinciën, Geunieerde (ID ) 
Punto de Gale (ID ) 
Purmerend (ID ) 
Q
Quast, Mathijs Hendriksz. 




Rarop (I , 
Ravesteyn,Gilles van 
Reael, Laurens , 
Reael, Laurens 
Reiger (ID 
Reiger (ID ) , , -
rendezvous , , , , , , , ,
, , -
Rendezvous (ID ) 
retourschip , -, , -, , , ,
, , -, -, -, ,
-, -, -, , , 
retourvloot , -, 
Reynst, Gerard , 
rice , , -, , , , , , -
, , , , 
Riebeeck, Jan van , 
Rijksen, Jan 
Rijswijk (ID ) , 
Robyn (ID ) , 
roeifregat 





Rotterdam , , , , 
S
Salamander (ID ) 
saltpetre , , , , , , 
Sarawak , 
Sas-van-Gent (ID ) 
Schiedam (ID ) , 
Schouten, Willem Cornelsiz. 
Schram, Wybrant 
scurvy , -
sheathing , , -, , 
shipworm , -, 
shipyard , , , -, 
Siam , , -, , , , , , , -
, , , -, , , , 
Gulf of 
silk , , -, , , , , , , ,
-, , , , , -, ,
, 
silver , , , , -, , , , ,
-, 
Singapore , , , 
slaves , , , , , , , 
sloep , -, , 
sloepjacht 
sloop , , , , , , 
Sluys (ID ) 
smak -, 
Snoek (ID ) 
Solor -, , , 
Souratte 
Spain , , -, , 
Spaniards , , , -, -, 
Spanish , -, , -, , , , ,
-, , , , , , 
Specx, Jacques , 
spiauter 
Spice Islands , , , -, , -, ,
, -, -, , , , , , ,
-, -, , , -, -
, , -, -, , 
spices , , -, , , , , , , -




Spilbergen, Joris van , , 
Spilbergen, Joris van 
Sri Lanka , , , -
St Thome 
steenhaalder 
Ster (ID ) , 
Stevin, Simon 
Succadena 
sugar , -, , , -, -,
, , , 
Sulawesi , , , , -
Sulu Sea , , , 
 Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters
Sumatra , , -, , , , -, ,
-, , , -, , , -
, , 
southeast , , , , -, 
west 
west coast , , , , , , 
Sunda Islands 
Sunda Strait , , -, , , -,
, , 
Supply (ID ) -, 
Surat , -, -, , , -, , ,
, , -, -, , , ,
-, -, , , , , 
Suratte (ID 
Suvali (estuarium) , 
T
Taiwan , , -, , -, , , ,
-, , -, -, -, -
, , , -, -, -,
, , 
Tasman, Abel Jansz. , , -
Ternate , , , , -, , , 
Texel 
textiles , -, , , -, , , ,
, , , , -, , , 
Thailand , , , , -, , -
, , 
Gulf of 
Tholen (ID ) 
Tidore , , , -, , 
timmerschip 
Timor , , , , 
tintinago 
Tonkin , -, , 
tonnage -, , , -, -
Tortelduif (ID ) 
Trouw (ID ) , , , 
Tutucorin, Gulf of 
typhoon , , 
U
Udjong Salang 
Uitgeest (ID ) 
Ujung Pandang 
Utrecht (ID ) 
V
Valk (ID ) , 
Valk, witte (ID 
Valk, witte (ID ) , 
Veere (ID ) 
Verhoeff, Pieter Willemsz. 
Vianen (ID ) , 
Vietnam , , , , , , -,
, 
Visscher, Francoys Jacobs. 
Vlaming, van Outshoorn, Arnold de 
vlieboot 
Voorcompagnieën , , -, , , ,
-, -, , , , -
Vrede (ID ) -, , 
vrijburgers -, , 
W
Wakende Boei (ID ) 
Walcheren (ID ) 
Wapen van Amsterdam (ID ) 
Wapen van Delft (ID  
Wapen van Delft (ID ) 
Wapen van Delft (ID ) 
Wapen van Enkhuizen (ID ) , 
Wapen van Hoorn (ID ) , , 
Wapen van Hoorn ID ) 
Wapen van Rotterdam (ID ) 
Warwijck, Wybrant 
Warwyck, Wybrant , 
Weesp (ID ) 
Westerkwartieren , , -, , 
Wezel (ID ) , 
Wezel, klein (ID ) 
wharf , , , , , 
Wingurla 
Witsen, Nicoaes , , 
wood , , , , -, , , 
ebony , , , 
pine , -
sandal , , , , 
sapan 
Y
yacht , , , , -, , -, , -
, , , -, , , -, -
, , , , -, -, -




Zaandijk (ID ) , , 
Zalm (ID 
Zeehaan (ID ) -
Zeeland , , -, , , , 
Zeelandia, castle 
Zeelandia (castle) , , 
Zeemeeuw(ID ) 
Zon (ID ) 
Zon, grote (ID ) , 
Index 
